



AFRICA AND COMMUNISM

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COMMUNIST INROADS

The Communist threat to the Free World would, if one were to judge by the mass indoctrination by news media dominated by United States propagandists, appear to have been concentrated in the 1960's on South-East Asia, notably Vietnam, and the Western Hemisphere, notably Cuba. And yet, International Communism has launched its most intensive and diabolical campaign in the present decade on the continent of Africa, where a stream of less-developed nations have burst onto the world scene as sovereign independent states.

The Western world has reacted to this campaign in Africa either by turning a blind eye or by making preposterous excuses on behalf of emergent African states and seeking to cover up Communist inroads. Regrettably so, for it is in Africa that the millions have most needed the inspiration and guidance of the Free World in confronting the wiles and deceit of Communism.

This reaction of the West can be traced, by and large, to the guilt complex of the European, or former colonial, powers and the isolationist attitude of the United States. The European powers - Britain, France and Belgium - have failed dismally in preparing the people of Black Africa for life in the modern, 20th Century. Confronted with the failure of colonial rule, these powers have panicked and rushed the peoples of Black Africa into premature independence with the result that Africa has been exposed to the full fury of Communist onslaughts. The European powers' unscrambling of their links with Africa could not have dove-tailed more neatly with the plans of International Communism.

The European powers have sought to ease their guilt complex by turning their backs on the harsh realities of the situation or trumpeting profuse apologies for the Black African. The United States' reaction has been to retreat hastily in the face of the fact of Communist infiltration of Africa, and leave the continent to its fate while building bridges against Communism nearer home.

The American attitude is epitomised in the statement by G. Mennen Williams, the American Liberal politician, when he retired at the end of his inglorious period as U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs with the boastful assertion that "particularly noteworthy" of his stay at the State Department had been the "fact" that "not a single Communist satellite has emerged in Africa and that Communist efforts at dominating African countries have been curtailed".

The statement is naive and not strictly correct.

It is true that there is not a single state in Africa to-day that is Communist in the sense that East Germany or North Vietnam are Communist states. Russia and China have no satellites in Africa as they have in Europe and Asia. But bland acceptance of this fact would be misleading and would certainly not give the West any cause for complacency, because in Africa, a development has occurred that is equally disturbing to the development of Communist satellite states in Europe and Asia.

In Africa, there has been the development of Communist stooge states. A Communist stooge state in

Africa can be defined as one in which policies are followed that actively promote the cause of International Communism. This active promotion is to be found in two avenues: firstly, the pursuance of internal policies that have led to totalitarian rule and intense socialism to the extent that a climate has been created that could, and in most cases inevitably must, lead to establishment of a Communist state unless there is a dramatic check on current directions; secondly, the pursuance of policies that are preparing the soil for Communism and are exporting the seeds of Communism to the soils of African countries elsewhere on the continent.

Some of the stooge states in Africa conform to the first classification, some to the second, and most of them to both. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, countries in Africa that had become Communist stooge states by the beginning of 1967 were Algeria, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan and Tanzania. For International Communism, these nine stooge states represent a valuable asset in the ideological and propaganda warfare that is commonly termed the "Cold War" but is, in reality, a war in which, in Africa, much heat is engendered.

The success of International Communism in gaining nine stooge states in Africa by the beginning of 1967 is near spectacular if two factors are borne in mind.

The first is that Communism has made its gains in a comparatively short period of time. Although the first Communist Party in an African state was formed in 1921, in South Africa, it was not until after World War II that Russia began turning her attention to Africa, Communist activity up to then having been sporadic in Africa. In the first half of the 1950's, Communist concentration in Africa was largely confined to North Africa and it was only in the late 1950's, mostly in the early 1960's, that Russia started turning on the pressure in Africa south of the Sahara. Communist China's first steps in Africa came in 1956.

The development of nine Communist stooge states within the space of 10 years certainly does not bear out Mennen Williams' bland statements.

The second factor that must be borne in mind is that in contrast to the Communist "revolutions" in Europe, nationalism has been a powerful political force in the "revolutions" in Africa. Black African leaders who have gained power have not easily relished the thought of sacrificing their nationalism for Communism. Kremlin Communists and African Marxists have therefore compromised to the extent that the Marxists have not been expected to become Communists openly. This compromise fits in with the general trend in the development of International Communism as presented to the outside world, namely a tendency to split into groupings of states rather than to perpetuate the monolithic Communist concept of a world-wide movement in which all the components owe prime loyalty to Russia.

To what extent there has been a split in Communist ranks and to what extent satellite states will be prepared to follow policies other than those prescribed by the Kremlin is open to debate, but certainly the image presented to the outside world is one of a Communist world in which members do not have to conform too rigidly to a common policy. In the light of this, it has not been necessary for African Marxists to declare themselves openly Communist. International Communism can reap the fruits of their political affiliations without such a declaration. (It should be stressed that, at the

same time, the aim of a world revolution remains common policy to all Communists.)

The emergence of nine Communist stooge states out of 40 independent states in Africa may not be an impressive number. But it is by no means a poor start for the Communists. Furthermore, as will be detailed in subsequent chapters, Communism has been active throughout the continent to such an extent that in the remaining 31 states, only a handful can be regarded as completely secure from the threat of Communism. South Africa and Rhodesia are at this stage the only countries on the continent which have certainty of repelling Communism except in the event of a Communist-backed United Nations operation or other international intervention. Portugal's African provinces can possibly fall into this category if Lisbon displays sufficient resoluteness; and so, too, can one or two of the smaller states that are wholly dependent on Western nations for their economical survival. But in most of the 31 states that are not stooge states at the present time, conditions are such that none can feel safe if exposed to a sudden Communist challenge. The inroads made by Communism in Africa, therefore, have been deep.

One other, extremely important, matter deserves mention. Those in the Western world who oppose Communism do not do so merely because it is a political ideology opposed to Democracy. Indeed an acceptable alternative ideology to Democracy would probably be a good thing. Communism is not opposed simply because it is "different" to Western ideologies, but because of the depravity and bestiality of the systems produced by implementation of Marxism-Leninism. It is opposed because millions of people are subjected to tyranny and slavery. Even if one were to accept at face value Mennen Williams' statement that there are no Communist states in Africa, the tyranny of government and the depravity of life in many African states ruled by Black leaders who claim to be "non-aligned" politically are not far removed from conditions pertaining in Communist states.

The thousands of Black men* butchered by Kenyatta's infamous Mau Mau terrorists and the thousands murdered by Khrushchev, the "Hangman of the Ukraine" all met the same fate at the hands of men who were bent on a common goal - imposition of the will of their master. Indeed the satanic nature of the bestial oaths taken by the Mau Mau - gouge out eyes and drink the liquid from them, burn children alive, hack off the feet of captives, etc. etc. - were, if anything, on a far crueller scale than the crimes committed by Khrushchev's henchmen in the Ukraine. The tactics adopted by the Black Communists in the Congo and the tactics adopted by the Russian Communists to suppress the Hungarian revolt differed only in shades of intensity. If anything, the atrocities committed by the Congolese and Black United Nations troops - repeated raping of women, mutilation of children, acts of lust against nuns - were more shameful than even the brutal mowing down of defenceless people by Russian tanks in Budapest. Nkrumah's secret police did not murder as many innocents as Lenin's Cheka or Stalin's thugs, but it is doubtful whether they showed any greater morality in the execution of Comrade Nkrumah's whims than did those working under Comrade Lenin and Comrade Stalin. At least Beria, for instance, died quickly - the highly-respected Dr. J. B. Danquah, for one, died a lingering, painful and tortorous death in a Ghanaian prison.

** Between October 1952, when the Mau Mau rebellion broke out, and July 1960, when the state of emergency ended, Mau Mau terrorists had killed 1,858 civilians, of whom 1,800 were Black Kenyans and only 32 Whites and 26 Asians. The Mau Mau campaign had also cost the lives of an estimated 10,000 terrorists and 1,167 Army and Police personnel.*

The tendency in Africa to use the most bestial forms of force to gain or retain power are very reminiscent of Communist tactics. Even if their perpetrators do not admit to being Communists, the societies of fear they are bequeathing to their people can be admired only by those in Moscow and Peking. What use is there in leaders declaring that they are not Communists if their people are living in the same societies of fear as are found behind the Iron Curtain?

Communism by any other name would smell as rank.

If one were, therefore, to contemplate a list of states in Africa where leaders depend on the same rule of the rifle as the Communists do and have, or threaten to, plunge their people into the same rigidity of life as is found in Communist states, then the number of Communist stooge states in Africa would be far higher than nine. And the West would have even less cause for complacency, for it is such states in Africa that, if a choice has to be made in five, ten or twenty years' time, will find their ideologies far more aligned with those of the Communist world than with the Free World.

The tragedy is that, given an opportunity, Africa would stand a good chance of repelling Communism. This is not to say that Communism does not have an inherent appeal for the Black peoples of Africa. On the contrary, the theory of Communism can have tremendous appeal to these people.

In the first place there is the question of economic appeal. The term "under-developed" nation is a popular one in this day and age, but even the derogatory "under-developed" does not fully describe the state of development in the vast majority of African states immediately after independence. These states were poverty-stricken and the people were poverty-stricken.

These poverty-stricken people were suddenly thrust into the glittering sophistication of the 20th Century, with its tremendous emphasis on material things; and where they were confronted with Capitalism and Communism - and it should be borne in mind constantly that from an early stage Communist ideas were flooded into the continent of Africa - it is obvious that Communism, with its theoretical dissertations on the equitable distribution of the wealth of the land, could be a magnet and often made more sense to the Black African than did the complexities of private enterprise and suchlike in Capitalism.

It made even greater sense because traditionally the Black man was accustomed to working on a communal basis with the less-privileged in the family - a Bantu family consisting, in addition to conventional members, of "brothers" and "cousins" that are not necessarily blood relations - being assisted by the more fortunate. This basic belief was exploited cruelly by the Communists and by the so-called "nationalist" leaders through promises of a Utopian state once independence was achieved from the hated colonial rulers, who were responsible for the Black man's poverty. Although long since lost in the short memories of the Western Liberals, there were the shocks in recent years when news despatches were received from countries such as Kenya that a certain house occupied by a White family had been ear-marked by a Black man after independence, or that a White man's wife had been "booked" by a Black man, or that a young White girl had been "won" in a lottery by the Black office-boy where she worked. This belief that independence would automatically bring with it the material pleasures of the White man, was assiduously cultivated by the Communists.

Its force is reflected time and again in the repeated admonishments by Black leaders to their subjects to work hard, to "pull together" and not to expect a life of comfort and ease just because they now live in an "independent" state. For many the disillusionment was great and led to violence. For others, the fruits of independence did, in fact, appear to be sweet, but they were few - usually heads of state who built themselves multi-million rand palaces and cabinet ministers or party functionaries who found themselves suddenly with enough money to buy big houses, big limousines and the flesh of other men's women.

Some government leaders saw the red light and cut down on extravagances; others gave full rein to the debauchery and their countries ended up in the corruption, chaos and tyranny that the Communists had been angling for.

Secondly, the theory of Communism had definite political appeal for the peoples of Black Africa. Russia, and Communism in general, had, after all, made tremendous strides. By the time Black Africa was emerging to independent status, Communism had spread, in less than half a century, from a single country to cover a quarter of the surface of the globe and had consumed a third of the population of the world. Russia herself had made startling advances not only in conventional fields but in that even more tantalizing sphere of space technology - and, what was important, Russia had attained her position of eminence and power in the world in direct competition with the hated colonialists. Where the policies followed by the European powers prior to independence resulted in an utter rejection of these powers, the Communist nations were represented as "clean" powers who could show the way to a better life. The complete subjugation of the individual to the interests of the State and the hardship and tremendous loss of life that had made Russian and Communist progress possible was not appreciated by Black Africans; likewise, the fact that the endeavour required to achieve agricultural and industrial progress was absent from the make-up of the vast majority of Black Africans was immaterial. Feasting on Communist propaganda that always emphasized the theory and avoided the harsh realities of Communism in practice but dished up the results of the policy of tyranny although not the tyranny itself, the Black African had much food for thought. The Communists were not slow in exploiting this feeling of wonderment.

In the third instance, there was the sociological aspect of Communism. Africa, under colonial rule, was seen in shades of black and white. The European from across the seas saw himself as superior to the Black man, who was regarded as an inferior being, epitomised as the inhabitant of "Darkest Africa". The Black man was made to feel acutely conscious of the colour of his skin and was subconsciously puzzled at the social injustices and inequalities inflicted on him. Apart from the fact that he saw Capitalism as the embodiment of the sentiments of the White man across the sea who looked down on him, Communism purported to have all the answers that would free him from these social injustices and inequalities. When he was faced with a choice, his natural inclination, both because of his experience of the Capitalists and because of the theoretical teachings of Communism, was to go for Communism. The fact that, as in economics and politics, the theory of Communism differed radically from the practice of Communism, did not enter into the matter in his emotional approach to his sociological state of mind.

A complicating factor was that in Europe, Socialism and Communism had become blurred, and if it is remembered that even in developed Western countries there was mass ignorance on where to

draw the dividing line between Socialism and Communism, it is obvious that in the mind of the Black African there was even greater confusion. The natural inclination was to fuse the two concepts and to regard Socialism and Communism as one, particularly where this suggestion of fusion was encouraged by Communist propaganda. The Black African, looking abroad, saw that in Western Europe his staunchest friends were the Socialists such as Fenner Brockway, who were always ready to rush to his side to demand that he be given independence, always ready to jump to his assistance and act as apologist with ready-made and stereotyped excuses if he faltered.

Flowing from this, there is the fourth appeal that the theory of Communism held for the Black man in Africa - the psychological appeal. Boiled down to its essence, the organizational administration of Communist movements rests on regimented leadership at progressive levels from the very inferior to the very superior. In this strict regimentation, the leaders make all the decisions and the individual must blindly follow the instructions and guidance of the leaders. This does not find mass appeal among Black Africans, except to the extent that they are accustomed to the strict rule of their chiefs, but it certainly does find decided appeal among the "nationalist" leaders. These leaders saw in the Communist system an opportunity to dominate and execute their authority over the mass of their followers, and they knew from their tribal histories that this was of utmost importance if they were to succeed. Many of these leaders modelled their own governmental machinery on the patterns of the Communist party organization. Indeed, in the majority of independent states in Africa, the executing of power by the man at the top derives to a far greater extent from Communist organizational machinery than from Western democratic institutions; and by 1970 this is likely to be general in Africa with the exception of most of the states in Africa south of the Zambesi. In assessing the impact of Communist thinking on the Black elite of Africa one must not lose sight of the fact that for the few, Communism gives a sense of importance and ensures authority.

It might well be argued that all this reasoning would be too sophisticated for the illiterate, ignorant and backward peoples of Africa. Naturally, it is true that the vast majority of those living in Africa have no conception of the complexities of political systems or even of the real meaning of a word such as "independence". This, as far as the Communists were concerned, was just as well because not only would the practical implementation of Communist theory not stand up to penetrating minds but a deep analysis would, indeed, find Communism alien to traditional norms in Africa. It cannot be sufficiently stressed, however, that International Communism flooded the continent with propaganda that was expertly designed to excite the Black African into believing that Communism was the way to Utopia; the Communists were adept at political propaganda, picking out just the basics to win over men's minds. In other words, whereas the theory of Communism could have appeal in Black Africa, the practice, if fully understood, would be rejected. Except, of course, among the few who could often benefit personally from Communist teachings; and, in fact, where Communism has succeeded in Africa it has been through the few, the dedicated leaders who have used Communism to obtain and maintain power. The danger of Communism is an ever-present one in Africa. The Communists have won important victories in the stooge states, but they have lost the first round in the battle for complete domination of Africa. They are now re-grouping for the second round, and they will not make the same mistakes they did in the first round.

The dramatic gains made by Communism in Europe were largely attributable to the unsettled conditions prior, during and after the war years 1939-1945 and the presence of substantial units of the Russian Army in most of the countries that were to become Communist satellites. Initial

Communist successes in Asia likewise came in the aftermath of a major armed conflict. In Africa, these favourable conditions were lacking. There was no Red Army in Africa, and no large groups of local Communists.

The Communists, accordingly, found it necessary to import Africans for indoctrination courses and then send them back to their homelands and they had to smuggle arms into African countries. This (obviously not as ideal a set-up as had existed in Europe) import-export of men and arms formed the basis of Communist tactics before Black Africa became independent and even after it became independent. At the same time, it was found necessary to launch a crash indoctrination programme amongst the masses to make up leeway. The continent was swamped with Red literature. Hundreds of thousands of copies of Mao Tse-tung's handbook on revolution were, for instance, distributed in Africa in various languages.

The radio became a prime source of distributing propaganda. Africa is poorly served with local radio networks of quality. Programme standards are generally low and news bulletins are not renowned for their freshness (two notable exceptions are South Africa and Congo-Brazzaville). Because of this, Africa has always been an ideal hunting ground for airwave propagandists.

The importance the Communists attach to radio propaganda is shown by the fact that in 1966 Communist Chinese technicians completed building and equipping a R2,800,000 shortwave broadcasting station with a powerful 100 kilowatt transmitter outside Dar es Salaam that is intended mainly for broadcasting propaganda in vernacular languages such as Zulu, Ovambo, and Herero to South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique.

The Communists concentrated chiefly on two factors in their drive for the minds of the people of Africa. They selected those Black Africans whom they felt would make good puppets and backed them to the hilt, and they concentrated on playing off personalities, factions, tribes and countries usually with the assistance of weapons and ammunition.

The men the Communists selected were those such as Lumumba of the Congo and Nkrumah of Ghana. But they exercised utmost caution in not offending Black nationalism. The Communists realized only too well the power of nationalism. They realized that unlike Europe where Communists had exploited class grievances and had made much play of the need for the "workers of the world" to "unite" against the oppression of the capitalist landowners, factory owners or noble rulers, all the people of Black Africa, from the future Prime Minister to the peasant farmer, were in virtually the same economic plight. Furthermore, they were all Black, and their quarrel was not against a Black ruling elite (with exceptions such as in Ruanda-Urundi) or against a wealthy Black clique but against White "oppressors". By and large, Black Africans were never as united before or since as they were in the "liberation years" fighting the "colonialists". Black nationalism was, therefore, a force more potent than the forces of workers vs capitalism that had been used by the Communists in Europe. The Communists, appreciating this, were careful to nurture the seeds of Black nationalism rather than oppose it as they had opposed nationalism in Europe.

Having found their "elite" Black leaders, the Communists worked incessantly on them. They were invariably "sweetened" with considerable and regular amounts of money both for their own use and

for distribution among the party hacks and for oiling the party machinery; they were fed with violent anti-White and anti-Western propaganda; and they were royally treated on trips behind the Iron Curtain which were designed to form a marked contrast to their treatment at the hands of the British, French and Belgian administrators. In return this "elite" corps was expected to act as the channel for vicious Communist propaganda to be disseminated amongst the masses. They were expected to be sympathetic towards Communist regimes. They were expected to work themselves into positions of authority and influence.

The strategy worked well, especially as the Communists proved extremely patient, realizing that it would take many years to win the battle for Africa. The basic theory of Communism could find appeal amongst Black Africans, but it would take time for that theory to be disseminated effectively. There were a lot of people in Africa, most of them illiterate and uneducated, and it took time for them to absorb the propaganda.

In the meantime, the aim was to encourage, propel or bribe Communist sympathisers into, preferably, the saddle of government but if not the saddle at least onto the hindquarters of the horse.

Of course, not all the leaders of the emergent states of Africa were ready-made puppets. Others were. Nkrumah was one. In his case, the Communists made the mistake of waiting too long before taking over power completely. Lumumba was another and in his case the bid to achieve total Communism came too soon. Ben Bella of Algeria was an excellent puppet but the Communists lost him when he went too far in building up his own personality cult. Toure was yet another, and in his case the Communists decided that he could best serve the cause of International Communism by remaining a stooge state ruler for the time being. This pattern of varying Communist tactics has been repeated in several states in Africa.

Where it was considered that the leader of an emergent state did not have sufficient potential as a puppet, the Communists employed the tactic of sponsoring an influential member of the government with a view to a long-term take-over. A typical example of this occurred in Kenya where the Communists had little faith in the ageing Kenyatta, despite his leftist associations in his youth and his Stalinistic Mau Mau attributes, and so selected Oginga Odinga as their front-runner. Here again, the Communists overplayed their hand and the immense financial and other resources they spent on Odinga came to naught - for the time being at any rate.

In yet other African states, the Communists were unsure of specific "leaders" and concentrated on fomenting general unrest. This was the case in Nigeria and the Congo-Brazzaville where much energy was expended in a combined attack through politicians, trade unions and sometimes intellectuals to precipitate tribal and racial tensions, with a view to throwing the whole country into the melting pot and then backing a dark horse to come to the fore out of the fire. In Nigeria, this tactic up to now has failed; in the Congo-Brazzaville it met with success. Tribal and racial unrest remains a key Communist tactic in the battle for Africa.

Other states were used as the routes to their neighbours, and whilst every attempt was made to make the leaders good Communists their real value was seen as agents provocateurs in other regions of Africa. Nasser and Nyerere were particular favourites for this role and were widely used by the

Communists to spread subversion in other countries of Africa. Nkrumah and Ben Bella, before they disappeared from the scene, were also agents provocateurs of exceptional value to the Communists as well as leaders of Communist stooge states.

It is obvious, therefore, that the Communists saw Africa as a continental chess-board, both in the complexity of the game and in the stature of the individual pieces, rather than as a sudden-death game on the draught-board. A few countries were selected as the prime targets; the others would follow in the course of time. In the former cases, concentration was upon establishing Communist stooge states as soon as possible. In the latter, the aim was to foment as much chaos along racial and tribal lines as possible in a process of slowly wearing away resistance until such time as the Communists behind the scenes could come forward and administer the death blow. Wherever possible, frictions between states based on the illogical boundaries drawn by the European powers were exploited and fanned into life. And all the while, Communist arms and propaganda poured into Africa.

In those countries where White Africans formed the government, the technique was one of open Communist subversion.

While Communism was rejected by the vast majority of the White Africans, the Communists went underground and waged a relentless and subversive campaign through local agents. Very often the most dedicated Communists in Africa were found in the ranks of White Africans.

The value to the Communists of a stooge state is borne out in an article in the American magazine, *Life*, in March 1965, in which Ida Lewis reported a detailed plan whereby Black African "revolutionaries" and the Communist Chinese would join forces to conquer Africa. The article makes it clear that under this plan, details of which Miss Lewis collected on a visit to Africa, the island of Zanzibar will be the base for continent-wide operations by Chinese-trained and financed terrorists. An unidentified Cabinet Minister in Tanzania told Miss Lewis: "First we ignite a Black revolution in the Sudan. The issue there is Arab domination. Our plans then take us to Somalia... these plans will naturally affect Kenya and Ethiopia... Revolution in Ethiopia is not our concern now. Her day will come when Selassie dies... Kenya is different... our key word for Kenya is patience but we have a good man in Kenya - Oginga Odinga... once the Indian Ocean is under our control, there is no god who will be able to save the Whites in South Africa..."

This article underlines not only the pregnant danger of the Communist sword that hangs over Africa but also indicates why the Communists have been content to establish stooge states rather than fully-fledged satellite states and sharply illustrates the patience which the Communists have displayed in their campaign for the soul of Africa.

Where the Communists have failed in Africa it has been mainly through the timing of their individual campaigns rather than through flaws of policy. But the Communists have made some bad mistakes in Africa. They presumed that sustained indoctrination and intimidation of the masses would have the desired effect. In this they misjudged the strength of purpose and determination to remain free that is a characteristic of White Africans; and they misjudged the ability of educated Black Africans (including the Sandhurst- and St. Cyr-trained military careerists) to be able to grasp

and appreciate the true meaning of Communism when stripped of its fanciful theory and to act decisively and with determination to reject an ideology that in its practice is alien to Black African traditions.

The Communists have also made "silly" mistakes. Favourite story is of the snow-ploughs that Russia delivered to Guinea in the early days of her "aid programme" and that lay in the sweltering heat of Conakry docks for three years. Guinea, in fact, is a haven of such stories - tens of thousands of lavatories have been standing idle at Conakry docks for years, the Russians sent a million screwdrivers to a country that uses 5,000 a year, a pen-holder for every inhabitant was provided but no nibs, on one occasion thousands of tons of cement were off-loaded in cement bags in the rainy season and a monumental mass of concrete was formed... There have been similar faux pas elsewhere: the Egyptian Government had to buy R88,000 worth of lorry spares from an American firm because the Russians could not provide spares for the lorries they had given the Egyptians to help build the Aswan Dam; on another occasion, Egypt bought 45 British lorries for work on the Dam because the brakes on the Russian vehicles were so bad that the doors had been removed and the drivers told to jump clear if the lorries went out of control; Yugoslavia once bought tractors from the United States and shipped them to Algerian farmers some years later but they were so obsolete that no spares were available and when they broke down they had to be abandoned in the fields; in the Sudan Communist money built canning factories with nothing to can; the Russian oil refinery at Assab in Ethiopia cost double what Western companies could have built it for; Ethiopia invested in United States government bonds, at something over 3%, 2,000,000 United States dollars advanced at 2.5% interest by Russia...

These and other stories were always good for a laugh in conscience-torn Western capitals but it is doubtful whether they have had any measurably adverse effect on relations between Africa and Communist countries except in the case of a few individuals who have been affected personally by Russian inefficiency.

What has caused considerably greater embarrassment to the Communists has been the reports of racialism involving Black Africans in Communist countries. These reports have been given great prominence in news media and have constituted a serious affront to the pride of Black Africans. These incidents deserve more than passing attention not only because of their effect on African/Communist relations but also because they so graphically give the lie to Communist assertions that racism is absent in Communist states.

In December 1963, 700 Ghanaian students broke through police cordons and rushed to the gates of the Kremlin in a bitter demonstration alleging racial discrimination by Russian authorities after one of their number, Edmund Asaro-Addo, had been found dead in mysterious circumstances, never satisfactorily explained. The Ghanaians carried placards reading "Stop killing Africans" and "Russian Friendship", the latter under a skull and crossbones. The demonstration, according to a report in the Daily Telegraph of December 19, 1963, was the climax to "an increasing amount of violence against African students in Russia, very often over their relations with Russian girls. These have involved a number of brawls in which the police, the students say, always take the side of the Russians". The newspaper also reported that "The Africans have been forced to realize that not all Russians treat them as brothers and equals". As for Asaro-Addo there were two versions of what happened to him. The Russians claimed that he had been drunk and had frozen to death. The

Ghanaians claimed that he had been beaten to death because he had wanted to marry a Russian girl, who was pregnant. Some Ghanaians claimed that his was the third "mysterious death" of a Ghanaian in a year.

In January 1965, ten Sudanese students arrived in Athens from Sofia University, Bulgaria, after being subjected to racial taunts and Communist indoctrination. The following month, 70 Black Africans were deported from Bulgaria for taking part in demonstrations protesting against a Government order to disband their "All-African Students' Union".

In April 1965, 29 Kenyan students returned from the University of Baku, in Russia, with dire tales of cold, hunger, low standards of education, perpetual propaganda - and racial discrimination. (This followed racial demonstrations at the University after the death of George Daku, a Ghanaian, under mysterious circumstances.) Nicholas Nyangere, one of the Kenyan students, described the racial discrimination as "unbearable". Another student said: "It was hell. May God let us all forget that place." Nyangere told newsmen that the students were scathingly referred to as "the Blacks". Many local people had never seen a person from Africa before and because they were black, they were hated by the Russians. "We got our first taste of race hatred as soon as we arrived in Baku. We were told that we could not go out with Russian girls. There was no law against it, but they said it was just local custom. In any case we soon discovered it was unsafe to go out alone with a Russian girl because there was a good chance of being beaten up by the local people. Several Kenyan students got beaten up. Usually it would begin with abuse, then lead to violence. I don't remember a week that went by without an African student being robbed or attacked. One of my friends was beaten up in a restaurant while drinking a glass of lemonade. I was actually with another friend when he was robbed of his watch and pen in a train. We shouted but the thief just walked away. A policeman stood by doing nothing. Taxis refused to pick us up and I was often refused service in restaurants. There were queues for everything. When an African reached the head of the line, he would be told they had just sold out, but the person behind him would get served."

In May 1965, another Kenyan student returned to Nairobi with allegations of racialism practised by Communist countries. He was Samson Mzerah, who had left Communist Czechoslovakia on a pretext because of the racial discrimination. Mzerah complained that everywhere he went, Czechoslovakians shouted "Black man" at him. He said Black Africans in Czechoslovakia were "treated as less than human beings" and revealed that young thugs often beat up students from Africa and sometimes policemen joined in the beating of students for no apparent reason. His report was confirmed by a Sudanese student who had also studied in Czechoslovakia and who said there was racialism and maltreatment in that country. He told of a Rhodesian student who had been thrown off a moving train by Czechoslovakians.

Communists also practised racism on an extensive scale when in Africa. The racism of Russians, for example, was brought home forcibly to many in Africa particularly in a country like Guinea, where there have been several bitter conflicts because of a Russian diplomatic rule forbidding Russians to fraternize with Black men or women. A good example of this was brought to life on January 31, 1963. On that date, Miss Svetlana Ussopova, a Russian schoolteacher working in Guinea, arrived at Conakry Airport in the company of two Russian diplomats to board a flight to Moscow. Checking her passport, a Guinean official found the photograph in the passport was not of Miss Ussopova. He

questioned her in French, and she said she was being forced to return to Russia because she had broken the Russian rule forbidding social fraternization with Black Africans. The Guinean officer refused to allow her to board the aircraft. The Russian diplomats tried another ruse - Miss Ussopova was dressed in an air hostess' uniform but she was again turned back.

Racism is not confined to Russia and other European Communist countries alone, however, but manifests itself in Communist China, which has an official policy of denigrating the Russians as "White" whereas the Chinese are "coloured, like the Africans". In 1961, for instance, four Sudanese students returned to their homeland after completing only one year of their seven-year course because of the racial segregation practised in Communist China. About the same time it was unofficially reported that 20 Somali students had returned to Africa from Communist China for the same reason.

In March 1962, it was reported that several people had been injured seriously in a brawl outside a Peking hotel started by a Zanzibari and a Chinese. In July 1966, Clarence Adams, a 37-year-old American negro returned to the United States from Communist China, where he had defected after the Korean War, sadly disillusioned, inter alia, by racial inequality in Communist China. On two occasions, he told newsmen, he had been involved in fights with Chinese after racial slurs had been hurled at him.

In his book "An African Student in China" (published by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.) Emmanuel John Hevi, a Ghanaian student in Communist China, describes the racism in that country and concludes: "Chinese racial discrimination is not of the kind that springs spontaneously from the people. It is a deliberate attempt by the Communist Party to assert and to make the African accept once and for all the idea of the superiority of Yellow over Black." Another comment by Hevi underlines the racialism in China: "Sino-African relations were in no way improved by the fact that such girl friends as we were able to make were packed off to prison or to commune farms for hard labour almost as fast as we made them, their only crime being that they dared to make friends with Africans contrary to the Party's orders."

These reports, and others of racial discrimination practised by Communists, certainly did harm to the Communist drive in Africa because of the prominence given to them and because of the inbuilt resentment amongst Black Africans against those who regard them as inferior.

They emphasize, too, the fact that the West should not assume that it is essential in combating Communism to give up all principles out of fear that Communism will triumph if Democracy does not pander incessantly to the whims of Black African leaders. Communists make mistakes in their drive for the minds of the peoples of Africa just like the West does and yet they prosper in Africa. The West will prosper, too, even if it sacrifices immediate gain for the sake of principles. The West would be well advised to write-off its set-backs as liabilities that are inevitable accompaniments of strict principles. What is lost on the swings by alienating Black African extremism will be made good on the roundabouts by virtue of the fact that the Black man of Africa understands and reacts better to those who deal straightforwardly and honestly with him.

Some observers would doubtless aver that in addition to the above factors, the split in the

Communist ranks along Sino-Soviet lines has also damaged the Communist presence in Africa. Certainly it is true that a superficial survey shows that Russia and Communist China have competed with each other for influence in Africa. The appearance of other Communist bloc countries, such as East Germany in East Africa, Cuba in parts of West-Central Africa, Yugoslavia in North and North-East Africa, and Czechoslovakia in the "liberation movements", can be regarded as largely supplementary aid in specific directions. Moscow and Peking, however, appear to have been in direct conflict.

The conflict, as far as Africa is concerned, has been mainly on racial lines. Communist China has made much play of the fact that Russians are "White" and as such are not in a position to feel brotherly love for the Black man of Africa; China on the other hand is a country of yellow men and is in the same camp as Black Africans in what will eventually be a global White-Coloured clash. The Chinese, for instance, when entertaining Black leaders from Africa take great pains to differentiate between the men in the Kremlin and the Russian people. They refer in contemptuous terms to the "Ukranian group" when speaking of Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Kosygin, regarding them as European Russians who have imposed themselves on the majority of the Russian people who are, the men in Peking take pains to point out, Asiatics. This is, of course, true, there having been several examples of the Kremlin despatching senior "European" officials to "Asian" Russian republics to bring racism under control (Leonid Brezhnev, the Party secretary in Russia, was once assigned such a duty). The Russians have tried to counter this slur on occasions by sending reliable "Asians" to African states as diplomatic envoys.

Another point in favour of the Chinese is their willingness to roll up their sleeves and get down to some hard work. With the notable exception of the thousands of Russians who have toiled on the Aswan Dam in Egypt, the Communist Chinese have shown a greater preparedness to get down to manual, even menial, work in Africa; they have been prepared to go into the fields and onto the roads of Africa and help the local Africans. The Russians, on the other hand, have generally been more sophisticated and have preferred to use their money to buy influence and their "technicians" to act as propagandists. Russians working in Africa have liked their comforts such as motor-cars and their "flashiness" has been resented by many Black Africans.

Peking has also generally gone to greater lengths than Moscow to lay on lavish receptions for visiting Black Africans. One typical example of how the Chinese "win friends and influence people" will suffice. John Kali, head of a Kenyan delegation that went to Russia and Communist China to seek assistance, returned to Nairobi in September 1963, and told newsmen that he and his delegation members had been impressed by Communist China but had been bitterly disappointed by the treatment meted out to them in Russia. "When they (the Russians) found we were on our way to China", Kali said, "they simply transferred their hatred of China to us. We had to sleep in hotel corridors while Russians occupied all the hotel rooms." He also complained of an eight-hour passport check, during which they were not given any food, at Moscow Airport and contrasted this with his 4 1/2 hour conversation with Chou En-lai and later discussions with Mao Tse-tung.

It would appear on the surface, therefore, that there is open conflict between Russia and Communist China for the spoils of Africa, and it cannot be denied that there are historical and geographical disputes between Moscow and Peking that would make sense of the Sino-Soviet schism. But it cannot be too greatly emphasized that when taken in sum total, both Russia and Communist China

aim at the eventual goal of complete Communist control of the world, let alone the whole of Africa. Western, freedom-loving nations cannot for one moment be tempted into a false sense of security because of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Communism, in whatever form it manifests itself, is an ever-present danger to Democracy and it would be fatal to relax one's vigilance for a single moment in the hope that the split in the ranks of International Communism will be the saving factor for the West. For Communism, whether it be advocated by Kosygin or Chou En-lai, the means always justify the end: and the end is total world conquest.

There is no proof that the Communists are really split over their campaign for Africa. There is no proof that the Russians are not aiding and abetting the Chinese in their offensive in Africa and, in the interests of Communism as such, are prepared to leave the lion's share of the dirty work in Africa to Peking while they get on with the "clean" work of spreading roubles around. The history of Communism is one long and sordid story of broken pledges and underhand dealing. Communism and Communist leaders are notorious for deceit and total absence of morals. There is no proof to gainsay an argument that the Communists are presenting a deliberate image to the outside world of a split to further their own ends. After all, by splitting, the Communists have widened the choice open to emergent nations in Africa: before there was a straight choice between Capitalism and Communism; now there is a choice between Capitalism, Russian Communism and Chinese Communism: when the pawns jump, perhaps the chances of them jumping into a Communist square are greater if there are two Communist squares to every Capitalist square. There is no proof to dispute a theory that the Russians would even be prepared to put up with the insults of being "Europeans" in the interests of International Communism. There is no proof that the Communist "schism" in general is not a deliberately calculated bluff to put the West off its guard.

The above paragraph might not appear too absurd if it is constantly remembered that Communism will use and has used in the present century any devices and any deceit to further territorial ambitions; that the eventual goal of all Communists is world domination; and that Communist infiltration of Africa has indicated (although this is not generally appreciated) a distinct splitting of the battle field.

In North Africa, for instance, Russian influence has been predominant and likewise West Africa has been largely left to Russia for exploitation purposes. Communist China, on the other hand, has been left a virtually free hand in East Africa and Central-East Africa, and, in recent years, in Southern Africa. This demarcation of "influence spheres" surely does not indicate that Russia and Communist China are in active opposition in Africa? There has, let it be said, been over-lapping of "influence spheres" but this can be regarded as part of the Communist campaign, i.e. acceptance of the fact that brotherly niceties do not preclude injecting additional forces or doubling armies if this could help win the overall battle. This theory that International Communism has demarcated specific spheres of influence for Russia and Communist China in Africa is borne out by the fact that the Russians have concentrated on North Africa, where they have a greater chance of success by virtue of the fact that North Africa is not really part of Africa at all but finds a closer link with Europe (of which Russia is a part) and the Middle East (which Russia is desperately interested in influencing). Communist China, on the other hand, would have greater influence among the "coloured races" of Africa south of the Sahara. As far as West Africa is concerned, Russia was probably given this area as a sphere of influence because French-speaking Africa is closer to Europe than English-speaking Central, East and Southern Africa and because of the valuable Communist agents to be found in Ghana and

Guinea who were confirmed Marxists before independence and could thus serve as a basis for future Communist intrigue in West Africa in general.

As has been stated, and is detailed in subsequent chapters, Communism has been successful in establishing nine stooge states in Africa. The tally could have been higher had it not been for mistakes in timing and other set-backs. But its achievement in Africa has by no means been a small one.

It has not been a small achievement, because the Communists have not had a particularly long period of time in which to implement their diabolical plans for Africa. Indeed, they can regard their initial offensive in Africa as one of experience-building and ground-preparing for the real battle for the minds of the people of Africa. So much chaos and uncertainty has come to Africa in the turbulent 1960's that the Communists can look ahead with relish at the years that lie ahead.

Indoctrination campaigns have progressed well and in many of the African states the development of totalitarian government has put the Communists in a favourable position. In the days immediately after independence, most of the African states had democratic governmental machinery that made it difficult for the Communists to gain power; in most of the African states a stage has been reached today where democratic principles have been so eroded that it will be much easier for a dedicated Communist to take over the reins of power in five years time than it would have been five years ago.

Ghana rejected Communism through its military officers, but the machinery of government in Ghana today is such that a Communist working his way up through the ranks of the Ghanaian Army will be much better placed to get control than would have been the case in 1957. The same can be said of countries currently under civilian rule such as Uganda. One or another of these two patterns are to be seen in other African states. And it should not be forgotten that the years of Communist indoctrination of the masses might one day begin bearing fruit.

In addition, the stooge states that serve as Communist agents against other states are a powerful part of the Communist armoury in the battle that lies ahead in Africa.

All in all, the rulers in Moscow and Peking can look back with satisfaction at the first phase of the battle for Africa and can feel well pleased with the preparatory work that has been done in preparing Africa for Communist domination.

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WESTERN FAILURES IN AFRICA

While International Communism can look back with satisfaction on recent years in Africa, the West has little cause for jubilation; and while International Communism can approach the future with confidence, the West has no reason for optimism.

The West has failed in the Africa of the 1960's and, short of a radical change of outlook in Whitehall and the White House, the West has little chance of recovering the losses it has conceded to the Communists, and only slightly more of a chance of halting Communist inroads.

Why, then, has the West failed in Africa in the past?

In the first place, the West should never have handed over power to the states of Africa before they were ready for independence. By the same token, the West should have done far more to prepare Africa for independence. The European powers bear a heavy responsibility that they cannot escape despite the strenuous efforts of apologists such as Mennen Williams and Harold Macmillan for the chaos and strife that has come to Africa in the present decade.

The West has never really understood the people of Africa - either the White or the Black African. There has been no conception of tribal traditions and deep-rooted racism found in Black Africa. Boundary lines have been drawn arbitrarily across the face of Africa to meet contingencies of European interests without the slightest thought being given to the tribal norms, aspirations or future welfare of the Black Africans - or the White Africans. In some instances, boundaries were so drawn that members of the same ethnic group inhabited more than one state (e.g. the Somali tribesmen who are found in Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and French Somaliland) while in other cases, antagonistic elements were bundled together in a single, artificial state (e.g. the Ibo, Hausa and Yoruba of Nigeria).

Where the European powers, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, have lost their dependencies in Africa anyway, they would have done a far greater service to Africa to-day if they had decided yesterday to get around a table and work out the boundaries of Africa in a more realistic manner. We would then have been saved much of the chaos and loss of life that has been experienced in countries such as the Congo-Kinshasa, the Sudan and Nigeria. We would, too, have been saved the tedious border problems such as Algeria-Morocco, Sudan-Ethiopia and Kenya- Somalia. And the subversive activities of the Communists would have been that much harder to carry out.

The second respect in which the European powers have failed the people of Africa is that in those states destined for independence, little was done about equipping the indigenous people of Africa to run their countries after independence. One night Black men went to sleep as post office clerks, army sergeants and unemployed vagrants and the next morning awoke to be Prime Ministers, army commanders and Civil Service administrators. The enormity of the responsibility that rests on the European powers for failing to ensure minimum standards of advancement of the indigenous people prior to independence cannot be shrugged off.

It should be emphasized that in mentioning the fact that the Black African is not at a level of development that warrants sovereign independent status, there is no intention whatsoever of being derogatory. The typical Black African is a man of not inconsiderable charm who has attributes that are attractive to those who know him well. But the typical Black African still finds sustenance in traditional norms and attitudes. (Even a "sophisticated", "Westernized" leader like Nkrumah resorted to the comfort of witchdoctors when he was in low spirits, and went so far as to marry an Egyptian woman because a witchdoctor had told him this would be the way to become ruler of all of Africa.) Traditional tribalism is characterized by an autocratic family structure, rigid social traditions and ritual religious cults; the traditional tribesman's outlook is dominated by fatalism, as is shown in his acceptance that man and the world were made as they were and there is nothing a human being can do about it - man must accept his place in life, and, in any case, to-morrow will take care of itself.

Black Africans, who still adhere to these and other tribal beliefs, norms and outlooks, were suddenly thrust into the realities of a highly-sophisticated world and told to run a country along 20th Century lines with all the complexities of administration that that implies. The result was that they simply could not grasp the intricacies of a typical Western state, with its emphasis on things material, its concentration on rationalism and individualism. The few leaders who had been trained in overseas countries were too small in numbers to carry the burden of the whole country. Chaos was bound to result. The average man or woman had believed, naively, that this "thing called independence" would bring them a personal life of luxury and happiness without their having to lift a finger to effect the radical transition from tribalism. The realities of independence created confusion in their minds and this confusion found outlets in killings and rapings.

If one bears in mind the depravities which Europeans or Americans of advanced "civilization" commit from time to time, it can readily be understood how greater the chances would be for the committing of depravity by people unaccustomed to the realities of the modern world.

The fact that the European powers shot backward peoples into a modern world without any preparation is the tragedy of Africa, and of world history, in the 1960's. It is here that the historians of the future will return a verdict of "guilty" against the leaders of the West of the present day.

It can be argued that the re-drawing of boundary lines throughout Africa would have been an immense task and that because of the pace of modern developments independence could not have been withheld from Black Africa indefinitely.

It is true that a fresh demarcation of frontiers in Africa would have been an immense task and extremely complicated (even the most vociferous of Black African "nationalists" who raved and ranted in pre-independence days about the evils of colonial boundaries would not be prepared to-day to concede an inch of territory to ensure a more realistic demarcation of national frontiers); it is also true that tremendous pressures were placed on the European powers by the Communists, Liberals, Communist frontiers and other leftists all over the world to grant speedy independence to their African dependencies.

These two cardinal points in which the misery of Africa in the 1960's is to be found, were for solving by statesmen of vision, determination and inflexible strength of principle. These two

cardinal points could not be solved, and the misery of Africa could not be avoided, by weakling political expedienters. When the rulers of the major powers in the West were tested on this score, they were found to be wanting.

Perhaps it is not surprising that London, Brussels and Paris, saturated as they were with Marxist-Leninist propaganda through such agencies as news media and Liberal literature, capitulated heavily in the face of the onslaught mounted by the Communists and their witting and unwitting comrades in the West. The alternative, for the West, would have been years of firm and rigid dedication to principles; something which has appeared impossible for Western leaders.

Nevertheless, the alternative was there, and it must be studied to determine whether it would have been what British, French and Belgian policy has not been - an effective counter to Communist take-over bids for the continent of Africa.

The model of this alternative policy that could have been pursued is, of course, to be found in the Republic of South Africa. At the outset, let it be said unequivocally that this book is not intended as a defence of the South African policy of separate development, nor are the succeeding paragraphs in any wise intended as even remotely a complete guide to this policy. However, in the context of Communism in Africa, the active role played by the Government of South Africa since 1948 in seeking a solution to the vexed race problem of Africa will decide the fate of Communism in the southern part of Africa and the ideological thesis of South Africa's policy (as opposed to the political combatting of Communism, dealt with in Chapter 9) should accordingly be analyzed.

In the first place, South Africa is meeting the challenge of the two cardinal points enumerated above by dividing the country's land mass into separate areas where groups linked by cultural and historical associations will be brought together to develop separately towards full independence. In other words, the boundaries of South Africa are being re-drawn to group distinctive ethnic units into nation-states.

A study of Southern African history with the continual warring between Black tribes and the mass annihilation of Black people by chiefs of other Black tribes, as well as the history of Africa in the current decade, would amply illustrate the necessity for such a demarcation of frontiers. Suffice it to say that the Black man of South Africa, like the Black man elsewhere in Africa, is not a member of a homogeneous race but, in fact, forms part of a heterogenous group of people of different races, tribes, languages, dialects and so on that are afflicted with tribal animosities that are incomprehensible in their intensity and ferocity to Whites who have never lived at close quarters to them. In the light of this, the South African policy of separate development is the only one that would logically permit Black man and Black man to live alongside each other in peace. (There is, of course, the complication in South Africa of a large White population; but even though White/Black relations are far more harmonious in South Africa to-day than would Black/Black relations be if a magic wand were suddenly to whisk away all the White people in South Africa, this policy seeks to ensure a permanent place for both White and Black in South Africa and so, in one stroke, attempts to solve not only problems found in all-Black countries but also problems found in multi-racial societies where the alternative forms, such as in Kenya, have failed dismally. Although eventual success of the policy of separate development will provide the only solution of many attempted at

attaining peaceful multi-racialism, the real value that success with the policy of separate development will have for the millions of Africa is as a model for bringing peace and tranquility to the entire continent).

It should be stressed, at this stage, that the demarcation of these boundaries and the consolidation of ethnic groups into their separate areas is not by any means an overnight operation. It is a highly-complicated operation requiring intensive research, much patience and tact, and considerable sums of money. In the consolidation of these various areas that form natural boundaries, the Government of South Africa has spent, and is continuing to spend, millions of rands each year of White, not Black, taxpayers' money. Despite the continual snipings from across the Atlantic Ocean at South Africa, the South African Government has stuck with commendable resoluteness to its principles in continuing to pour money into what is essentially a long-term investment in securing peace and stability for all races (and rejecting Communism finally) in at least one part of Africa.

Having accepted, therefore, the logic and wisdom of the alternative to chaos in Black Africa - namely the establishment of separate states necessitating new boundaries for distinctive tribal groupings, one faces the next question: the time-table for independence. Here, too, there has been an extreme divergence of opinion and approach to cardinal issue number two by the European powers and by South Africa. The former have followed a policy of granting independence as soon as possible. The latter has decreed that independence can only be accorded when economic and human resources match political ability.

Once again, it is necessary to stress that it is difficult for some-one who has not lived close to the complexities of tribal life in Africa to appreciate why it will be many years before the Black people of Africa, including those who already have independence, are really ready to exercise the powers of government. It should be stressed again that there is no intention of deriding the Black African but merely is there acceptance of his less-advanced stage of development. Once again, too, it is necessary to stress that this book is not intended as a study of, or defence of, the policy of separate development. But South Africa's race policy must be analyzed, however briefly, in any study of Communism for, apart from seeking to solve race problems common to African states, it also provides a clear and definite answer to Communist penetration of Africa.

Kwame Nkrumah, the one-time dictator of Ghana, exhorted his followers "seek ye first the political kingdom" before worrying about such unimportant things as economic and social development; for, argued Nkrumah, if there was political independence in Black Africa, economic growth and social uplift would inevitably follow. This Nkrumahistic theory, so reminiscent of Communist theory for its naive simplicity of presentation whilst glossing over a myriad of practical complexities, was at the one extremity of the scale and the one generally followed by the European powers. At the other extremity is the South African policy of separate development.

Whilst the United States, Britain, and other Western powers, under the increasing pressures of the Afro-Asian states in the United Nations, refuse to allow the latter extremity to be put to the test under conditions of fair-play, they did, at least, permit more than is allowed for in the laws of cricket for the Nkrumahist doctrine to be put to the test in Ghana.

Ghana, under Nkrumah, became bankrupt. Corrupt, immoral, tyrannical and economically bankrupt.

The alternative theory is unpopular because reason, logic and orderly development of societies is unacceptable to Communists and their fellow travellers at the United Nations.

One of the tenets of separate development is that the less-developed peoples must be assisted towards achievement of full status and respectability but that they must help themselves. In other words, the developed nation, or developed sector, is quite prepared to give assistance to the less-developed, but expects that the less-developed pull their weight and help themselves.

This tenet has not been devised just for the sake of being "different". Nor has it been devised to be derogatory or compassionate to less-developed sectors. Rather is it based on intimate knowledge and experience of the less-developed peoples of Africa.

Experience in South Africa has shown that the Bantu (Black African) in general displays little individual initiative and enterprise, but is content to live according to the concept of "sufficient unto the day..." In general, there is little thought for the morrow. There are many examples of this; a few must suffice.

One of the best known is that cattle are the status symbol of the Bantu, kept not for their meat or commercial value but for buying brides or slaughtering as sacrificial animals. In keeping up with the Joneses, a Bantu takes pride in the number of cattle he possesses, not in the quality. It has taken considerable patience and understanding to persuade the Bantu of the necessity for concentrating on quality rather than quantity. The normal solution to such a problem in a Western country, namely that the farmer would soon appreciate the value of good quality stock if his poor cattle realized lower prices than good quality animals, is not applicable as the Bantu, until very recent years, have steadfastly refused to part with their cattle. An analogy is in the harvesting of maize, where, again until very recently, unscrupulous dealers would pay a fixed price per bag of maize to Bantu farmers irrespective of quality. The natural reaction was, therefore, one of acceptance that it did not help to cultivate better maize, so why worry?

This whole attitude is found time and again in, for instance, the Transkei, where, when the Government launched its massive aid project, land was grossly over-grazed, eroded and inefficiently worked. Typical is the oft-told story of the pig that was drowned in a dam and left to rot for some weeks. By the time a Government stock inspector arrived on the scene, the stench was unbearable. On questioning the local Bantu as to why they had left the pig to rot in what was, after all, their water supply, the reply was that the dam had been built by the Government and the Government should therefore remove the pig.

A fertilizer company spent considerable money on advising a particular farmer of the best method of growing maize with fertilizer. The results were impressive, and the farmer's crop outstripped any in the district. The fertilizer had been provided gratis, and the following season, the fertilizer company salesman arrived at the farm with the comforting expectation of a large order. He was, to say the least, taken aback when the Bantu farmer said curtly: "No fertilizer!" The salesman protested that the farmer had produced three times the crop of any of his neighbours with the use of fertilizer. Ah,

explained the Bantu, he had obtained enough maize for three years, so wouldn't have to plant for another three years.

This situation is not confined to South Africa, but parallels can be found throughout Africa. In an article in the British newspaper, the Daily Telegraph, on May 19, 1966, Brigadier W. F. K. Thompson drew attention to the remarkable results that have been achieved by White farmers, in co-operation with the Rhodesian Government, in assisting non-White farmers. Of several such schemes, Brigadier Thompson concentrates on the Stanning Scheme, started by Mr. Tom Stanning in the previous decade when he offered to finance two Bantu farmers for a season if they followed his advice on correct farming methods. They accepted, and after the first season were able to re-pay Mr. Stanning in full. Now there are 60 Bantu farmers, making handsome profits, under White supervision. Brigadier Thompson writes: "I have written of it because I saw the remarkable results with my own eyes, visiting a number of African farmers with £300 to £400 worth of tobacco in their drying barns and a splendid crop of standing maize, while the farms in between exhibited the normal depressing sight of a miserable crop of weed-choked mealies. There are many obstacles to be overcome to induce the subsistence farmers in the African reserves to become more productive. They tend to produce enough for bare subsistence and no more; if you can grow enough for three years in one, why continue to work? Tribal society is not conducive to competition: a member of the tribe who does better than his neighbours is expected to support them."

But let us not cry over spilt milk, and accept colonial boundaries and independence as a fact. Accepting that there are now 40 independent states in Africa, what could have been done in the post-independence era to contain Communism? What measures would have been effective in stopping the advances that have already been made by the Communists in Africa?

Firstly, standing out like a sore thumb in the whole question of West/African relations is the matter of foreign aid. Probably because of their guilt complex at having left Africa in such a sorry state when they pulled out, the Western powers rushed forward every time a Black finger curled and beckoned, and pumped inexhaustible supplies of pounds, dollars and francs into Africa. Historians of the future will doubtless look in amazement at the spectacle of immature politicians villifying the leading nations of the West and, at the same time, cupping both hands for economic or military assistance to keep themselves at the top of the pile; at the way in which these same politicians played off the West and Communist East to squeeze the orange dry. Only occasionally, such as when Nkrumah of Ghana published a book in which he had some particularly nasty things to say about the United States and America found she just couldn't manage to ship the next consignment of goods to Ghana, did the West refuse to tolerate the give-nothing, take-all attitude of Black Africa.

The West should have displayed a considerably greater measure of self-respect and principle in its aid policies to Black Africa. This is, admittedly, a complex subject and one in which the rules vary, or should vary, from continent to continent, country to country. At the root of the problem, however, is the fact that the West did not know its Africa.

In mitigation it is only fair to mention that in the early years of post-independence in Black Africa, the West was deeply under the influence of the Marshall Plan under which more than R1,350,000,000 was pumped into Europe and it was assumed that what had been achieved in Europe

could be attained in Africa. It was only in 1963 with the publication of the Clay Commission's report on foreign aid that the United States began appreciating the fact that development of human resources was also important in saving Africa. The Clay Report brought home to the West the correct way of using a foreign aid programme, even if subsequent practice and theory did not always coincide.

If unlimited aid is not the answer, what is? Aid with strings attached? And if so, why should the West continually see repeated the lesson of Aswan, where Egypt's dictator, Nasser, obtained with consummate ease the money he sought from Russia when the United States tried to tie strings to her offer to help build the Dam? Is the answer in limited aid? Would the result not then be as was seen in a country like Guinea, where sudden cessation of Western (French) aid was promptly replaced with Communist aid in abundance? It is, let one be honest, a vexed and complicated problem, not easy of solution, and certainly he would be rash who would supply a ready reckoner for determining aid to Africa, as Africa and Africans are always yielding unprecedented surprises.

A study of the mind of the Black African, however, would make one inclined to accept two basic rules: one, that aid should be limited in the sense of quantity and two, that it should be completely without political strings. Limited because, as has been explained, the Black African does not really appreciate anything for which he has not worked. If, therefore, a small nation requires, say, ten farm dams it should be given not unlimited funds with which to build the dams but should be given guidance and mechanical and physical help where required - but when the ten dams are completed, the farmers should feel that they must look after them because they themselves physically built the dams. Without political strings because the Black man of Africa is basically a proud man whose character reacts more favourably to those who are honest with him than those who deal slyly with him as though he were a savage. This would appear to be a contradiction when one reads of the brutalities and corruption of Black Africa, inter alia in this book, but it should be pointed out that the former is more often than not caused by intense pride in belonging to a particular tribe usually accompanied by scorn for another tribe and the latter more often than not because of the sudden absorption by peoples unskilled in modern government practices into the machinery of government of the 20th Century world.

The point about the traditional tribesman reacting more favourably to those who are honest with him is borne out by the story, which I believe true but for which I cannot vouch, about the visit Mr. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister of Britain, paid to Rhodesia before that country's independence. Twice Mr. Wilson's attempts to impress Bantu chiefs with his stand on Rhodesian independence were interrupted by a wise chief who enquired of Mr. Wilson: "White man, tell me - why is that you move like a snake through the grass?"

In short, aid to Black Africa should have been on a much slower and more gradual basis, with the Black man advancing step by step with the assistance of the White man. (Obviously this would have been easier before independence.) The important thing to remember is that in Africa, more than in any other continent, the development of human resources is more important than the outward manifestations of aid. The development of brain power that can efficiently at some future date take over the reins of government without fear of resultant bloodshed or chaos is more important than the building of huge dams and luxurious palaces. The importance of this facet of foreign aid was underlined by Senator Allen J. Ellender of the United States when he expressed amazement, in 1963,

at the fact that U.S. administrators "simply cannot detach themselves from incorporating in the African program the 'show-place' type of aid, that has failed so dismally in the past. It seems to me that by now it should be fully understood that 'dollar diplomacy' is not the solution to the world's ills." Senator Ellender mentioned, as examples, the fact that the Haile Selassie I University in Addis Ababa had been erected with the help of R800,400 of U.S. money but that "there exists no network of worthy feeder schools"; that in Somalia, the United States was "building a port to export grain that is now grown in barely sufficient quantity to feed the native population", the principal explanation being that the Communists were busy expanding and modernizing the harbour at Assab in neighbouring Ethiopia; that Liberia had been given R85,000,000 in U.S. aid between 1946 and 1962 but had spent money on such projects as a palatial hotel and administrative buildings in Monrovia whereas the lack of adequate school facilities and the ever-rising percentage of uneducated children in the city had "reached critical proportions".

The ideal foreign aid policy, though logical, has two drawbacks.

Firstly, the concept of limited, strictly self-help aid does not provide for such projects as the Volta Scheme in Ghana. It would be necessary, therefore, to have two sections of foreign aid. The first would be for what can be termed "local" aid as outlined above, e.g. irrigation schemes, crop planting, forestry schemes, etc., where the concept of self-help would be applied strictly; the second would be "national" schemes such as a major river project where largesse would be permissible. In the former, the native has the opportunity of improving himself at the local level through his own endeavour; in the latter, thousands or millions will benefit from a scheme which they would not through their own energies have been able to carry out. In the latter event, aid should be provided in the national interest of the country concerned - without attachment of strings. It should be remembered that this is the type of project which lends itself to tremendous publicity, as Khrushchev found to his benefit with the Aswan Dam.

The second drawback is that if limited aid only is provided Africa will be left wide open to active penetration by the Communist powers. This is, of course, a very real danger; so much so that the only effective answer would be that aid should have been provided before, not after, independence. Whilst admitting this very real danger, it should be mentioned that the Communist countries, where they have been rebuffed in Africa, have been rebuffed not because of the sparseness of their money allocations but because of traditional antipathy towards the practical implementation of Communist doctrines. An excellent example is Ghana.

The most effective answer to Communism is the sharp contrast between honest, steadfast principles and the deceit and enslavement of Communism in practice.

But it is not only on the question of foreign aid that the West has been found lacking in the battle against Communism in Africa. The pre-independence centuries aside, the West's actions on African affairs in the post-independence era have been a sorry tale to relate. Their main characteristic has been lack of principle. Whereas the Communists have followed a rigid, inflexible policy of anti-Colonialism, anti-Imperialism, anti-White African, the West has vacillated from one attitude to another, continuously on the defensive, first hurrying to the beck and call of the Black man in the United Nations then harrying him for interfering in affairs such as "purely British matters", first

condemning racialism in Africa then having it exposed in all its naked ferocity in a country such as the United States, intervening militarily in some states and then refusing military assistance to others, first supporting one faction in the Congo then scurrying to the aid of another, and so on. The vacillation, dishonesty and lack of integrity in Western foreign policy towards Africa is well-known in all its facets from the infamous double standards applied in the United Nations to the scurrings around the continent of American politicians like Mennen Williams who shout "Africa for the Africans" at some dusty one-night stop and then spend the rest of their lives trying, for some obscure reason, to explain that they hadn't really meant "Africa for the Africans".

These facets are well-known and further examples will appear in subsequent chapters. But in this general discussion, two particular examples stand out, in my mind, in the whole history of the West and Africa in modern days as epitomising what the West could mean to Africa and how bankrupt, in stark reality, its African policies really are.

They are the relief of Stanleyville and the declaration of independence in Salisbury.

The events leading up to the story of Stanleyville are told in greater detail in Chapter 5 within the ambit of Communist penetration in the Congo. Briefly, Communist Congolese rebels were terrorizing Black and White citizens in the northern and north-eastern parts of the Congo. Headquartered at Stanleyville (now Kisangani) they were under the command of Christophe Gbenye, a dedicated Communist whose infamous treatment of human beings was to earn him the name of the "Butcher of Stanleyville".

As the reports of rape, wanton killings, and bestial torture of nuns, missionaries and other Whites by the Communist Congolese increased, the West became alarmed and - for once - sat up and took notice. The position went from bad to worse, and on October 29, 1964, Gbenye, accusing the Belgian Government of aiding the Congolese Government in its fight against his rebels, announced that he could no longer guarantee the safety of Belgian subjects or property. The same day, his chief executioner, "General" Nicolas Olenga, ordered the arrest of all Whites in the Stanleyville area. Gbenye followed this up a week later with an announcement that all Belgian and American citizens in Stanleyville were being held as hostages.

It was now clear beyond doubt that, in addition to the hundreds of people slaughtered by Gbenye's Communist thugs, the lives of many more hundreds were in imminent danger. The exact number of Whites in and around Stanleyville was not known but it was estimated that nationals of 17 countries totalling nearly a thousand were at the mercy of the Communist rebels.

The United States, Belgium, the Red Cross and others initiated a flurry of requests, pleadings and discussions but all to no avail. In one desperate meeting, President Kenyatta of Kenya, in his role as chairman of the O.A.U. Congo Conciliation Committee, played host in Nairobi to an emissary of Gbenye's regime and one from the United States Government. As the Western world pleaded and cajoled with the Communist, a chorus of booing went up from the sidelines. African countries like Ghana, Egypt and Algeria made it clear that they supported Gbenye to the hilt against the "puppet" Tshombe, then Prime Minister of the Congo.

It was obvious that the serious situation at Stanleyville was seen only in Black/White terms by the leaders of Black Africa and that Western (White) intervention against an African (Black) regime, albeit a Communist one, would bring forth shouts of "racism". The situation was now deteriorating to the stage where the only way to prevent massacre of the Stanleyville hostages would be armed intervention by the West. In contemplating this, the West knew full well that intervention would bring the ire of much of Africa upon it.

Placing humanitarian considerations above all else, the West decided to act. Belgium, the United States and Britain formed an alliance to rescue the hostages, and, despite the fact that they knew they would be attacked furiously by Black Africa, stood firm.

On November 20, United States Globemaster aircraft ferried 600 Belgian paratroopers to the British island of Ascension in a three-power warning to Gbenye that force would be used if the situation deteriorated further.

On November 21, Prime Minister Tshombe gave the green light for the operation and on November 23, the Belgian paratroop battalion was flown to the Kamina military base in the Congo. A desperate last-minute appeal to Gbenye having failed, the Belgian paratroopers took off in U.S. transport aircraft early on the morning of November 24. Destination: Stanleyville. Dropping over Stanleyville, they secured the airport within 35 minutes, and then advanced on the centre of the city, where a few hundred White hostages had been herded together. When the paratroopers arrived, Gbenye's henchmen opened fire on the hostages, killing 30 and wounding 40. The rest were rescued by the Belgians.

The expected outcry in the African and Communist camp was not slow in coming. Several of the African states, following Communist tactics, sought to place Stanleyville in the perspective of a wider, continental and racist operation. Typical among these were the sentiments of Ghana ("a flagrant act of aggression against Africa"), Tanzania ("defiance of Africa") and Ethiopia ("veritable manifestation of neo-colonialism on the African scene"). Other African states, such as Algeria and Kenya, joined in the chorus; Russia branded Stanleyville a "flagrant act of armed intervention" aimed at suppressing the "national liberation movement" and Communist China condemned the action.

In Cairo, demonstrators set the United States Information Library alight and caused R300,000 worth of damage; two similar libraries in Indonesia were burned down; windows at the British, American and Belgian embassies in Prague were smashed; the Congolese Embassy in Moscow was damaged; the windows of the United States legation in Sofia were smashed; and in Kenya, a British diplomatic car was stoned and a boycott of United States and Belgian ships ordered.

The mood of Black Africa after Stanleyville was summed up later by Charles-David Ganao, Foreign Minister of the Congo-Brazzaville, when he spoke in the United Nations Security Council on December 9: "To save the lives of an insignificant White minority tens of thousands of Blacks have been massacred. In their own country in Africa they have no security, seeing that the White man is untouchable and if anything happens to a single White man this may endanger the lives of millions of Africans."

This was the torrent of abuse that the West was expecting after Stanleyville and that it was prepared to suffer for the sake of humanity and to rid the Congo of the Communists once and for all. In the whole sorry story of the Western role in Africa, Stanleyville stands out as one of the few shining examples of the West spurning appeasement and standing firm by its principles - and acting decisively in the face of Communist terror.

The outcry that followed the Western decision to liberate Stanleyville was deafening. It was not an easy time for the United States and her allies, but they stuck resolutely to their principles with commendable rigidity.

It is worth noting that in standing firm on a matter of principle the wounds that were caused to American/African relations have healed, no less so than would other wounds have healed had the knife been in the hands of Washington instead of Accra or Dar es Salaam or Lusaka.

In the case of Rhodesia, Britain, under Harold Wilson, had committed herself to opposing any move by Rhodesia towards independence. It was not Mr. Wilson's fault that he had been saddled with the Rhodesian baby. The Government that had preceded his Socialist regime should have put Black Africa in its place on the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and given Southern Rhodesia her independence along with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland instead of applying double standards.

Not having fathered the baby but having been forced to sign the adoption papers on the electoral eclipse of the Conservative Party, Wilson had decided that Rhodesia would only be given independence if there was a Black Government in Salisbury, thus condoning the double standards of his predecessors in office.

When Mr. Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, made that momentous declaration of independence at 1.15 p.m. on November 11, 1965, Mr. Wilson reacted immediately and sharply. He told the House of Commons that his Government regarded the Rhodesian Government under Mr. Smith as a rebel regime and would adopt measures that would speedily bring down the Salisbury Government. He did adopt measures, but as the weeks and the months passed Rhodesians showed no signs of crumbling under the onerous sanctions imposed against them by Britain and other Western powers who were seeking the overthrow of the Smith Government in order to instal in Salisbury a government of Communist sympathisers. (See Chapter 8.) In the anti-Rhodesian campaign, Mr. Wilson's record was a sorry one of broken pledges.

On the afternoon of November 11, 1965, hours after Mr. Smith's radio speech, Mr. Wilson told the House of Commons that his Government rejected the declaration of independence and would have "no dealings with the rebel regime" of "small and frightened men". He indicated that he would abide by his pledges of the past not to use force to persuade Rhodesia to abandon independence but said he aimed at a "painless" ending of Rhodesia's sovereign status. He declared: "Our purpose is not punitive. We do not approach this tragic situation in a mood of recrimination. The solution of this problem is not one to be dealt with by military intervention - unless, of course, our troops are asked for to preserve law and order and to avert a tragic action, subversion, murder and so on. But we do not contemplate, as I have made very clear, any national action - and may I say any international

action - for the purpose of coercing even the illegal Government of Rhodesia into a constitutional posture."

Mr. Wilson also repeated his Government's stand that the Rhodesian issue was a purely British responsibility and as far as the United Nations was concerned fell within the category of a "domestic issue". He announced that he had requested a meeting of the United Nations Security Council because "if we do not somebody else will - and it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to keep control of this situation".

On December 1, 1965, Mr. Wilson told the House of Commons that he was sending troops to Zambia for "defence" purposes at the request of President Kaunda. On being repeatedly pressed by Mr. Edward Heath, the leader of the Conservative (opposition) Party, Mr. Wilson said he regarded Rhodesia as British territory and would send troops into Rhodesia from Zambia if Rhodesia cut off power supplies to Zambia from the Kariba Dam. "For British troops to enter British territory is not an act of war", he said.

Mr. Wilson, who had earlier said he would use force against Rhodesia only if requested by Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the ex-Governor, to maintain law and order had now added another qualification: conflict between Rhodesia and Zambia. Another interesting point at this stage was his categorical assertion that Rhodesia was still British territory; if he believed this to be so, why did he not send Her Majesty's troops into British territory?

On December 17, Mr. Wilson announced that he would institute an oil embargo against Rhodesia. Significantly, he had made no mention whatsoever to an oil embargo only the previous day when he had addressed what was left of the United Nations General Assembly after three-quarters of the Black African states had walked out when he had walked to the rostrum. Earlier, in the House of Commons, he had indicated that he was unhappy about the prospect of an oil embargo. "The oil embargo bristles with difficulties... there is the position of Zambia to be considered..." Nevertheless, on December 17, he capitulated to the African extremists and announced an embargo.

On December 21, Mr. Wilson, under fire from the opposition benches over his oil embargo and his subsequent intentions, declared:

"We want the oil sanctions to be effective, do we not, all of us?... I hope therefore that there will not be...seepage or leakage... If there is, we shall have to decide how it must be handled and it will be decided internationally. Certainly we have no intention of imposing a naval blockade around Beira, and we never have had. I do not know whether that is the fear that the right honourable gentleman (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) had. We have not considered this. If the embargo fails, it will fail because it is not sufficiently international and multilateral. The House can be quite certain that it would then be raised at the United Nations, and not by us. If there is a decision under Chapter Seven (of the United Nations Charter) in which it is suggested that a couple of frigates be placed outside Beira to stop oil tankers going through, this is what will happen, and it will happen by international decision. We do not ourselves propose to seek such a resolution. We certainly do not propose to take individual unilateral action to blockade Beira." (author's italics.)

On April 7, 1966, Britain asked the Security Council for an emergency meeting. When the Council met, she submitted a resolution asking for permission to use force to ensure the success of the oil embargo. The resolution urged Britain "to prevent, by use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia..."

This followed the famous incident when British units intercepted the Greek tanker, Joanna V, and ordered her not to enter Beira with the cargo of oil she was carrying for Rhodesia. British naval units had also interfered with Portuguese, Dutch, Swedish and South African vessels in an effort to enforce the oil embargo.

Mr. Wilson's pledges not to use force against Rhodesia had come to naught. His boasts about having nothing to do with the "small and frightened men" in Salisbury also came to naught when, late in April, Mr. Duncan Watson, a senior official in the British Commonwealth Relations Office, and Mr. Oliver Wright, the British Prime Minister's private secretary, were sent to Rhodesia on hush-hush missions that culminated in the "talks about talks" between Britain and Rhodesia that began on May 9.

During the succeeding months, Mr. Wilson was to sanction many talks with "the small frightened men" in Salisbury and eventually he himself met Mr. Smith on board H.M.S. Tiger in the first week of December 1966. In the meanwhile, he had succumbed to Afro-Asian pressure during the Commonwealth conference in London in September when he promised the Commonwealth countries that he would refer the Rhodesian issue to the United Nations if negotiations with Rhodesia failed and that he would seek mandatory sanctions from the United Nations. On December 16, having surrendered to Afro-Asian demands for an oil embargo on Rhodesia, Mr. Wilson's retreat from his political principles was complete: the United Nations Security Council approved mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.

The Wilson campaign against Rhodesia is, therefore, a sorry story of broken pledges. Mr. Wilson would have been far better off if he had either used military force against Rhodesia immediately after independence or had recognized the Smith Government at once. In the former event, he would have enhanced his prestige among the Afro-Asian states, albeit at the expense of seeing a Communist-orientated Government installed in Salisbury and at the expense of losing what little respect for British standards and norms was still retained by those White Africans who stand for peace and order and the rejection of Communism in Africa. In the latter event, he would by the same token have gone down in history as a statesman, one of the few in modern history, who put the interests of an African country and its peoples of all races above pandering to Black African racism. What he has in fact achieved through his vacillating policy and broken promises is to earn the lasting enmity of all the peoples of Africa. The White African was accustomed to this situation and took the Rhodesian saga in his stride. The Black African was embittered and the extremists of Rhodesian "African nationalism" became another pawn in the East-West battle on the African chess-board.

In the context of Communism in Africa, Stanleyville was a glowing example of how the West should have played its cards in dealing with the West/Black African/Communist jigsaw puzzle of Africa - a policy of resolute adherence to principle; Salisbury was an ugly example of how not to

play the cards - a policy of vacillation that no one understood and which made Black African leaders look on the West with contempt. Stanleyville was a set-back to the Communist campaign in Africa; Salisbury was a valuable weapon in the Communist propaganda offensive on the continent.

In addition to the Stanleyville incident, many African states have had open rows with the United States and other Western countries. Indeed, they are so many that it would stretch the point too far to chronicle them all. A brief cross-section will indicate, however, the extent of anti-Western feeling that has erupted from time to time in Black Africa.

After seizing power in Zanzibar in January 1964, one of the first acts of the Marxists was to order the United States to remove her satellite tracking station, which was done despite the inconvenience entailed. In Tanzania, President Nyerere had more than one brush with the United States, including a particularly nasty one in which the American Government was accused, through the medium of obviously forged documents, of planning to overthrow the Dar es Salaam Government.

In Uganda, in February 1963, Milton Obote accused the United States of sending Cuban-piloted aircraft to bomb two towns in the West Nile district of Uganda. (Subsequently, the Congolese Government produced a private in the Ugandan Army who told a Press conference that he had been ordered with his unit of 30 men to attack the village of Ngoto in the Congo, 40 miles from the Ugandan frontier.)

In North Africa, Libya, pressed by President Nasser of Egypt, called for the disbanding of British and American bases on Libyan soil despite treaties having been signed since independence. North Africa, of course, was a prime area in the battle against France, with virtually all the North African states giving France hearty slaps in the face with large-scale nationalization of former French property. Algeria was given an ideal sjambok to use against France when the latter used the Sahara for nuclear tests, and King Hassan of Morocco had a particularly nasty time with Paris when the French alleged that General Mohammed Oufkir, the Moroccan Minister of the Interior, had had a hand in the kidnapping on French soil of the left-wing opposition Moroccan leader, Mehdi Ben Barka. Hassan refused to dismiss his Minister, and relations between former motherland and former dependency were extremely strained. Tunisia, too, had strained relations with France when President Bourguiba decided to nationalize French property.

Britain has been a favourite whipping boy of the former British colonies and has suffered one political humiliation after another with Tanzania and Ghana going to the extreme of breaking off diplomatic relations (the first Commonwealth countries ever to do so) in the aftermath of the Rhodesian declaration of independence and President Kaunda of Zambia suggesting that Britain be expelled from the British Commonwealth.

But relations between the West and Africa have invariably returned to normal in the end. An outstanding example is that of Kenyatta of Kenya who took the cause of the Communist rebels in the Congo so to heart (he was chairman of the Organization for African Unity's Congo Committee) that he was deeply embittered by the Stanleyville incident, so much so that he gave his blessing to violent anti-Western demonstrations after Stanleyville. Going further back in history, one could recall the once-bitter anti-British campaign waged by Kenyatta at the time of the Mau Mau horror.

And yet to-day, Kenyatta is staunchly pro-Western.

In fact, one could go so far as to say that friction between Africa and the West is part and parcel of daily life. Even South Africa has had her disagreements with Western countries (e.g. the incident over the American warship, Independence, the holding of multi-racial parties by both the British and American embassy staffs in violation of local custom, the visit to South Africa of Senator Robert Kennedy of the United States, the Republic's break with the Commonwealth and its effect on Anglo-South African relations, the Anglo-American pressure on South Africa at the time of the Rhodesian declaration of independence) but South Africa has certainly not repudiated the West because of these temporary interludes of friction.

Furthermore, it should be appreciated that African disputes with the West are often only skin-deep because in Africa there has been a tremendous amount of image-building, self-aggrandisement and competition among certain leaders to become the leaders of all-Africa. In this climate, utmost publicity for the personality cult is essential and, whereas a head of government like the late Dr. Verwoerd would scorn any attempt to gain personal or political advantage from a temporary dispute with a Western ally, the Black African leaders do not display the same maturity and are not committed to the same principles of integrity. What better way to exploit one's personal position and further one's personal ambitions than by taking a whack at a stature figure such as the Prime Minister of Britain or the President of the United States and thus ensure the best possible means of gaining not only popularity among one's own immature followers but also gaining acclaim from the hardliners in the rest of Africa as a true champion of the cause of anti-Colonialist, anti-Imperialist Pan-Africanism?

The West should accept this situation and seek comfort in honest policy rather than in vacillating panderings.

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THE RED GATEWAY TO AFRICA

(North and North-East Africa)

EGYPT

An early, and in many ways the most dramatic, example of Western uncertainty on how to approach Africa and Africans, was provided in 1955-56, with the setting Egypt.

When President Nasser decided to build the Aswan High Dam, he got offers from Russia, the United States, Britain, and the World Bank. The first offer was made by Russia in October 1955; the others at the end of that year and early in 1956. The United States, having made her offer public, began exerting pressure on Nasser to toe the Western line on Middle East political issues and to lessen his swing towards the Communist camp. (Particular bones of contention in Western minds were the fact that Egypt had obtained a sizeable arms consignment from behind the Iron Curtain and the fact that she had mortgaged her cotton crop for years in advance to Communist countries.) Nasser refused to bow to the United States and in July 1956, John Foster Dulles, the American Secretary of State, cancelled his country's offer to help build the Aswan High Dam. Britain and the World Bank dutifully followed suit.

Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal and opening his arms to the Communists. The Suez crisis had erupted.

The Suez Canal episode has been subjected to much analysis and interpretation by numerous authors and commentators. Suffice it to say that whatever the merits or otherwise of the actions of Dulles, Sir Anthony Eden and others, the lesson of Suez as it applied to the infiltration of Communism into Africa was that African nations were willing and able to turn to Communist sources if the West tied political strings to its economic offers. Egypt, of course, was not typical of Africa and could not be used as a yardstick of the approach to be adopted to the more backward Black African states. For this very reason, the West should have shown greater delicacy in its dealings with Nasser. Another important point to remember is that in the late 1950's and early 1960's Nasser was regarded as something of a hero by Black Africa. He was a "revolutionary leader" who had decisively and with considerable success thumbed his nose at the Western capitalists and colonialists. The story of Suez was not lost on emergent Africa. The lesson of Suez was, however, lost on the West. In one blow, a large part of Africa was, through Nasser, exposed to Communist exploitation. After Suez, the West should have treated Africa with a greater measure of political integrity. But, alas, the lesson of Suez was not taken to heart.

The Aswan High Dam, to which Russia has contributed more than R200,000,000, enabled Moscow to obtain its first big economic foothold on the continent of Africa. Nasser was very much at the receiving end. Not only did Communist money enable him to realize the centuries-old dream of harnessing the waters of the River Nile but he also received millions of Russian roubles in economic and military aid, becoming dependent on Russia for the arming of his Army. For Russia, it was a tremendous commitment in financial resources. Military aid from Russia to Egypt between 1955 and

1966 has been estimated at R700,000,000. Another R200,000,000 was given for Aswan. Aid in general, such as R77,000,000 in commercial credits and R46,000,000 for land reclamation projects, also ran into nine figures.

It was a heavy commitment, but it paid dividends. No country gives another so much aid without expecting something in return. The Russian/Egyptian relationship was no exception. It became possible for Russia to influence the Egyptian domestic scene and to use Egypt freely as a base for the export of revolution and as a prestige-building platform to the rest of Africa. Not only did the Aswan High Dam become a symbol of what could be achieved by co-operating with Russia, but Khrushchev used the completion of the first stage of the Dam as a major publicity forum. (It was at the completion of the first stage in May 1964 that he made his first official visit to Africa.)

Russia also used Egypt as a vehicle for fighting her diplomatic battles outside Africa. Although Russia has not always shown enthusiasm for pushing the interests of her Communist satellites, she sent Mr. Alexander Shelepin to Cairo in 1965 to put pressure on Nasser to invite the East German Communist boss, Walter Ulbricht, to Cairo on a State visit (his first to a country outside the Iron Curtain). The Russian motives were to trigger off international incidents as a result of the German question. When Nasser succumbed to the pressure from the Kremlin, the international repercussions were immediate. West Germany threatened to break diplomatic relations with Cairo; Nasser promptly increased his long-standing pressure on Bonn to stop military aid to Israel; and the Israeli Government was forced into the issue. When the clouds cleared after months of bickering, the scorecard showed that Ulbricht had paid his State visit to Egypt and had reaped all the propaganda he could muster: Israel was no longer obtaining military aid from West Germany; Egyptian/ West German relations were shattered; Nasser was richer by a R56,000,000 aid programme from East Germany.

The Communist forces and Nasser had won a victory, although Nasser's victory was somewhat tarnished by the fact that he could not subsequently obtain support from the majority of his fellow Arab leaders for his stand against West Germany and by a row he had with President Bourguiba of Tunisia over the Israeli question.

Much friction had been caused among Western allies, and this suited the Russian book. The Communists, in the process, had strengthened their financial hold on Egypt.

Inevitably, and in conformity with Communist strategy, financial obligations led to other commitments. Nasser professed to being anti-Communist and had banned the Communist Party as far back as 1953. The Russians purported to be upset by this, and there was a further upset in 1961 when the Egyptian authorities ordered the large-scale imprisonment of Communists. But the Russians knew, and Nasser knew, that one could not obtain millions of roubles without some moral obligation to soft-pedal on such domestic issues. In 1964, literally hundreds of Communists were released from prison and soon found themselves in key positions in the Government, in universities and in newspapers. By 1965, Nasser had freed all the Communists from jail - and had given many of them responsible positions in Press, Radio and T.V. and had permitted them to infiltrate the Arab Socialist Union, the only "political party" in Egypt. (The top Egyptian Communist, Khaled Mohieddin, was at one time on the secretariat of the Arab Socialist Union.)

A further step towards the left came on September 11, 1966, when Nasser reshuffled his Cabinet to bring in Mohammed Sidky Soliman, Minister of the High Dam, as Prime Minister. Soliman, a former President of the Russian/Egyptian Friendship Society, is a prominent Egyptian left-winger and his left-wing tendencies are particularly apparent in economic matters. Some of the Marxists he employed on the Aswan Dam were subsequently arrested on charges of endangering the security of the State.

In 1966, Western naval experts were greatly concerned by the revelation that a powerful Russian fleet was stationed permanently in the Mediterranean, the first the Russians have ever had in the area. The Russian fleet consists of modern cruisers, guided missile destroyers, submarines, electronic intelligence trawlers and support ships. These vessels make regular use of Egyptian ports. Strategically, Egypt's commitment to Russia has enabled the Russians to obtain an inestimably valuable naval "base".

Despite his public protestations, Nasser could not stop the Communist infiltration into his Government, Press and academic life. News media became increasingly anti-Western and pro-Communist. To what extent he encouraged this infiltration in private is hard to gauge, but in the early 1960's the Communists appeared well established in Egypt and Nasser himself was becoming increasingly leftist in domestic policies. The Russian presence by now had expanded from the Dam project to embrace irrigation schemes, electrification projects, steel mills, textile factories, shipyards and other industrial projects. Other Communist states also chipped in. When Nasser was having trouble with Israel at the time of Suez, for instance, Czechoslovakia gave him 300 tanks and 100 artillery pieces. By 1966 Communist China had given Nasser R58,000,000 and East European Communist satellites had poured over R373,000,000 into Cairo's coffers. Egypt was clearly a big fish for the Communists, regarded as the gateway to Africa and the Middle East. The Communists were prepared to work closely together when the prize was such a big one. The schism in the Communist ranks did not seem so real when Communism had a chance to score victories such as that provided by the Dictator of the Nile.

Other aspects of Nasser's assistance to the Communist cause should be mentioned. In his role as Pretender to the leadership of all-Africa, Nasser allowed Cairo to become a major base, particularly before but also after the granting of independence to militant African leaders, of a wide spectrum of "revolutionary" movements and "governments-in-exile" whose sympathies were carefully guided along suitable lines by Moscow's agents in Cairo. Among these movements was the Communist-inspired Congolese rebel unit led by Gaston Soumialot, who had temporary headquarters in Cairo.

An interesting international incident involving Egypt occurred in 1966. The facts behind the events are not clear, but after the Communist Chinese had unsuccessfully attempted to infiltrate Malawi in 1964 through deposed Cabinet Ministers led by Kanyama Chiume, the next big case of interference in Malawi's internal affairs came from Egypt. Dr. Hastings Banda, Prime Minister of Malawi, was regarded by Nasser and his friends as a "moderate", but it seemed that Nasser himself stood to achieve little through an anti-Banda revolution. Nevertheless, Egypt moved to overthrow the Banda Government. When the true facts are known, it would not be surprising to learn that the Egyptian Ambassador in Zomba had been acting, through instructions from Cairo, merely as the agent of the Communists. The history of Banda's administration of Malawi would have made it clear to Moscow

that it would have little chance of succeeding in an open attempt at subverting Malawians. Was Egypt being used as a Red agent for what, in the wake of the unsuccessful Chinese attempts to overthrow Banda, was intended as a dramatic Russian coup right in the middle of Africa? Nasser's position and future will be among the most interesting developments in Africa in the years immediately ahead. Despite the camouflage of non-alignment and of anti-Communist moves on the domestic scene, it is clear that Communism has a substantial hold on the bureaucratic machinery in Cairo. Nasser's position and strength in Egypt are difficult to judge, but certainly he has lost two of his bosom friends on the African continent in Nkrumah and Ben Bella and has not achieved the position he sought as leader of all-Africa. At the same time, he has lost considerable ground recently in his struggle for the leadership of the Arab world.

All along, Nasser's aspirations in Africa have had less chance of succeeding than have his dreams of ruling the Arab world. It was in the latter sphere that he exerted greater pressure and influence. But, although he has stuck doggedly to his self-imposed image as the "United" Arab Republic, his empirical ambitions in the Middle East have not been fulfilled, and, indeed, have received several set-backs, notably in the Yemen and in Syria and Iraq, where the Communists have not been slow in exploiting Nasser's failures.

It would not be stretching the point too far to assume that if Nasser does not soon go the whole hog to Communism, the Kremlin leadership will be prepared to throw him overboard. The Brezhnev-Kosygin combination has not been as pro-Nasser as was Khrushchev. In fact, it is said that Khrushchev's huge handouts from the Kremlin coffers to Cairo was a contributory factor in the fall of the Russian dictator. More likely, Khrushchev's wooing of Nasser was good strategy in the Khrushchev years, but now the Communist bosses have re-assessed the worth of Nasser and have found that he is expendable if he does not accelerate "socialism" in Egypt.

In Black Africa, Nasser is a spent force; in the Arab world, his image is tarnished, perhaps beyond repair. It is said that Moscow values Nasser's support as a bridge between Communism and the so-called "non-aligned" nations such as India, but the strength of this bridge is also suspect. It might well be that with Nasser's image as an international figure whose bonds with Russia have proved advantageous to his country played out and with the substantial infiltration of Communists in the Government, Press and academic life of Cairo, a Communist take-over bid in Egypt will not be an unpleasant prospect to Moscow.

ALGERIA

President Nasser found a great friend in Ahmed Ben Bella, the youthful-looking anti-French rebel who, after the bloody Franco-Algerian war, succeeded in reaching the top at the expense of his former comrades-in-arms. Ben Bella achieved little for Algeria in the two years he was at the top before being overthrown by Colonel Houari Boumedienne on June 19, 1965. About the only concrete result of the Ben Bella regime was to set the country on the road to becoming a Communist state.

Although all the customary denials were constantly forthcoming, as were the cries of "not Communism, but African socialism", there is little doubt that Ben Bella, at heart, was a Marxist.

Under Ben Bella, the Press and Radio poured out Marxist-style propaganda about the totalitarian right of the only political party, the F.L.N.; the virtues of the "Democratic People's Republic of Algeria"; and the warm links with "our brothers" in Communist China, Russia and other Communist states. "Frere", the Algerian equivalent of "comrade", was commonly used by senior officials and the man-in-the-street.

The origins of the F.L.N., or National Liberation Front, which is the only political organism allowed to function in Algeria, are worthy of more than passing interest. The French Communist Party set up a branch in Algeria in 1924, and 12 years later the Algerian Communists formed their own Communist Party. The Algerian Communist Party was subsequently outlawed by the French Government for illegal activities but surfaced again after World War II along with the Party for Victory of Freedom and Democracy and other minor parties such as the Democratic League for the Algerian Manifesto, the Islamic Association of Sages and so on.

At this time, the Algerian Communist Party was active among the masses, stirring up nationwide unrest. Its activities made it unpopular not only with the French authorities, but also with the other parties in Algeria, and so, following the classic Communist technique of taking one step backwards in order to take two steps forward, the Algerian Communists faded away and instructed their members to infiltrate the Party for Victory of Freedom and Democracy. So successful was this infiltration that in 1951 the "All-Algerian Front for Defence of Freedom" was formed as a united front. It was composed mainly of members of the Party for Victory of Freedom and Democracy but the Communists had engineered themselves into key positions. The vital role played by the Algerian Communists in this united front was obvious when, within a year, it was outlawed by the French administration because of illegal activities. The Communists now went underground in earnest, concentrating once more on infiltrating the Party for Victory of Freedom and Democracy. So intense did the Communist infiltration become that the party split into two: the anti-Communist Algerian National Movement Party led by Labbi Buhaili, and the pro-Communist Revolutionary Council for Unity and Action whose leader was Ferhat Abbas.

This Revolutionary Council for Unity and Action went into operation on November 1, 1954, when 3,000 of its members took part in strikes and demonstrations. The Council became the Algerian National Liberation Army and then the Algerian National Liberation Front (F.L.N.). The leader of this organization was Ferhat Abbas. In 1958 Ferhat Abbas announced that the F.L.N. had formed the "Algerian Provisional Government", which was to wage a bitter and bloody war against France for seven long years. When the war was over, Ferhat Abbas emerged as the ruler of an independent Algeria. But even he was too moderate for Ben Bella and Boumedienne. They shunted him aside and took over. If Ferhat Abbas was too moderate a Communist, it can readily be appreciated to what degree Ben Bella and Boumedienne are Communists.

It is true that Ben Bella, like Nasser, professed to being anti- Communist and outlawed the Communist Party. But it is also true that the Communist-operated newspaper, Alger Republican, was the only newspaper not nationalized in a 1963 swoop against French-owned newspapers; it is true that Ben Bella had a cluster of hard-core foreign Communist advisers known as "Les Affreux" (The Ghastly Ones) led by Greek-born Michael Raptis, a one-time Secretary-General of the Trotskyist Fourth International; it is true that Ben Bella praised the Communists who "co-operate loyally with us"; it is true that he was much in the favour of the Communist leaders in Russia; it is

also true that Ben Bella carefully created a Castro-style personality cult and became deliberately and consciously a one-man Government.

Ben Bella revelled in the role of dictator. To strengthen his position, he ruthlessly liquidated opponents, most of them his erstwhile friends, and made no secret of his desire for supreme authority. He carried out intensive nationalization of French farms, businesses and other property as well as nationalizing the property of his own subjects. But, economically, he could achieve little to bolster Algeria in the face of the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen after the Evian agreements which ended the seven-year Algerian war.

The one man Ben Bella did not dare move against was Colonel Boumedienne, who controlled the Army, which was fiercely loyal to Boumedienne. The reasons prompting Boumedienne's overthrow of Ben Bella, and the immediate aftermath, are both interesting and significant.

Boumedienne acted on the eve of the "Second Bandung" conference in Algiers of Afro-Asian states that Ben Bella had called for in an attempt to assert himself as a leader of Africa. The conference was postponed, but interestingly enough not without strenuous attempts by Boumedienne and Communist China to continue plans to hold the meeting in Algiers. Communist China saw the conference as a good platform for her propaganda campaign. Peking had recognized the Boumedienne regime almost immediately. Russia, on the other hand, refused recognition and Izvestia condemned the coup d'etat out of hand. Nasser was incensed at the coup and would have nothing further to do with Boumedienne. Castro's Havana Radio was scathing in its comments on the Boumedienne regime.

The Western Press made much play of this anti-Boumedienne feeling in the Communist camp and generally interpreted it as signifying acceptance that the coup was a set-back to the Communists. This interpretation cannot, however, be accepted so glibly.

Boumedienne has always been something of a mystery man, withdrawn and anything but talkative. Before Algeria's independence, the French Secret Service had their eyes on him and reported officially in 1961 that he had pro-Marxist tendencies. It is known that he received some of his military training in Communist Czechoslovakia. It is also known that he shared Ben Bella's preference for Communist China and Communist Cuba to Russia, although the consignments of Russian aircraft, tanks and artillery that he received when Defence Minister may have changed his outlook somewhat. Indeed, before the coup, there were Western newsmen who were prepared to consider Boumedienne a Communist threat to Ben Bella.

Boumedienne's exact political philosophy is not known for certain but there is no reason to believe that he is any more to the right of Ben Bella than the latter was when he ruled Algeria. After his overthrow of Ben Bella, Boumedienne harked on the appalling personal dictatorship and mismanagement that had been Algeria's lot under Ben Bella, but made no allusion to a difference in policy-thinking with the former Algerian President. As of to-day, there is no concrete evidence that the political philosophy of Boumedienne is any different to the Marxism of Ben Bella. Indeed, apart from dictatorship rule and the poverty-stricken economy, neither of which Boumedienne has changed to any marked degree, there appears to be no reason why he overthrew Ben Bella anyway.

Perhaps he was even more to the left than Ben Bella was. Probably it was because of Ben Bella's nauseating personality cult.

If the leopard has not changed its spots, why the anti-Boumedienne campaign in Communist countries after the overthrow of Ben Bella? Here, again, the position is cloudy, but it could have been merely a matter of paying lip-service to Ben Bella, who was, after all, regarded as the Castro of North Africa. Possibly, Boumedienne's move was resented because it was a personal act without the prior approval of International Communism.

Boumedienne, like Ben Bella, has cracked down on Communists officially, but he has also publicly called members of his Revolutionary Council "brothers", and has had the F.L.N. pass (in 1964) a 3,500 word economic and political document flooded with Marxist terms. He has paid the customary visit to Moscow (in December 1965). Although some of the Communists in organs such as the Radio and Press reportedly fled after the overthrow of Ben Bella, the tone of articles and talks is still Marxist under Boumedienne.

If Boumedienne is bent on leading Algeria further towards Communism, as seems likely, he has not shown his hand publicly. The main reason for this is the international displeasure shown at his coup coupled with the internal dissatisfaction at the coup and the internal disaffection with the economic situation. There were violent pro-Ben Bella demonstrations in Algeria after Boumedienne took over and it was estimated that 70% of the population supported Ben Bella against Boumedienne. Boumedienne has to obtain greater strength on the local political scene, as well as in the economic sphere, before he can show his true colours. Furthermore, he has to consider that the Army, always loyally behind him, has to be geared to any new change of policy with caution, although indications are that important elements within the Army are, like Boumedienne, pro-Communist. Boumedienne has curried favour with the Army assiduously, ensuring that his soldiers are among the best-fed and best-paid labour force in Algeria.

Meanwhile, he is following Nasser in becoming increasingly dependent on Russia for arms supplies and will inevitably be subject to the same Communist pressures as those that have been exerted on Nasser. Between May and June 1966, alone, Algeria received 20 Russian M.I.G. jets for her air force, bringing the total number of M.I.G.'s in the Algerian Air Force to 60. In addition there are 18 Ilyushins and 28 light bombers. Boumedienne also has 30 SAM ground-to-air missiles and up to 300 Russian tanks. Algeria was the first country outside the Warsaw Pact grouping to be given 152 mm self-propelled guns. The Navy has Russian P6 torpedo boats. There has been an intensification both in the training of Algerian Army officers in Russia and of Russians in Algeria. In all there are believed to be about 1,500 Russian instructors at the tank training school at Batna in Eastern Algeria and at the M.I.G. base at Ouargla in the Sahara.

It is difficult to decide categorically whether Boumedienne is a Communist or not. He himself has not shown his hand politically. His dictatorship is absolute, with virtually no news permitted to reach the outside world on just what is happening in the political life of Algeria.

But Algeria is still a dictatorship...it is still ruled by the iron fist of military might...it is still tolerant of Communists... it still has Communist-style laws...it is still flooded by its own Press and Radio

with Communist propaganda...

LIBYA, MOROCCO, TUNISIA

The other states of North Africa merit little attention in a study of Communist infiltration of Africa, both because they have not been prime targets of Communist penetration and because they have not been as prominent as Egypt, or even Algeria, in world affairs. Furthermore, there is the theory that Africa should be divided into North Africa and Africa south of the Sahara on the grounds that the North African countries are not really part of the rest of Africa in respect of spheres of interest. North Africa leans more towards the Middle East and the Arab world than to Africa proper and although the creation of a fully-fledged Communist satellite state in North Africa would be as disastrous to the continent as a whole as would such a development elsewhere on the land mass, I subscribe to the Africa south of the Sahara theory and, accordingly, have devoted more attention to the latter part of the continent than to North Africa.

Apart from Egypt and Algeria, Communism has made little impact in other North African territories. It is firmly resisted in Spanish possessions such as Rio de Oro (as it is in the other Spanish territories such as Spanish Guinea along the west coast of Africa).

In Libya, ageing King Idris appears to be genuinely pro-Western and anti-Communist and has been bolstered in this outlook by the sudden and dramatic advent of oil riches to his kingdom in the early 1960's. His only external threat of any moment is that posed by Nasser of Egypt, which has a long border with Libya, and the influence Nasser wields on a substantial segment of the population. This influence was shown, for instance, in 1964 when Nasser's public tirades forced Idris to demand the liquidation of United States and British bases on Libyan soil long before the expiry of the treaties concerned in 1973. The extent of the leftist movement in Libya, though substantial, is difficult to assess in respect of the potential forces it can draw on with or without Nasser's aid to take over from the childless Idris, and thus usurp power from the latter's nephew, Crown Prince Hassan, who has political opponents within the Royal House as well as outside. Libya's oil wealth (R200,000,000 in oil revenues in 1965-66) has acted as a bulwark against Nasserite agitation.

The Communists are unlikely to exploit the position in Libya in the foreseeable future, but rather to wait until Idris departs from the scene before making a move.

A rough parallel can be drawn between the situation in Libya and that in Morocco, separated from each other by Algerian territory. Here the threat is not so much from Egypt as from Algeria, although with the eclipse of Nasser's friend Ben Bella, Nasser may wish to take a stronger personal interest in Morocco. The new ruler of Algeria, Colonel Boumedienne, has not shown his hand in practice in dealings with Morocco, but there is no reason to believe that the border war between Algeria and Morocco which erupted in 1963 (with Boumedienne the top Algerian strategist) will not become a sporadic feature of life between these two North African neighbours.

In Morocco, as in Libya, there are substantial leftist forces but King Hassan has kept these forces well under control and, not only as a monarch but also (and in spite of being a monarch) as a staunch nationalist, he is opposed to Communism. King Hassan, in fact, has done a good job in Morocco in

the relatively short period since he sobered up his playboy image and succeeded his late father on the throne. He can be ruthless in crushing opposition to his Government but at the same time he appears to be progressive and keenly attuned to the wishes and capacities of his people. If he can keep the leftists at bay, he should lead his country well away from the grasping claws of Communism. The picture is not quite as rosy in Tunisia, the smallest of the North African states, wedged in between Algeria and Libya on the Mediterranean Sea. President Habib Bourguiba has outlawed the Communist Party. But only a handful of the Communists who were sent to prison in 1962 when Bourguiba began his "purge" languished in prison for more than a few months before being released. Tunisia is a one-party state, with the Neo-Destour Party closely modelled on the Communist pattern. The party has totalitarian control over all forms of propaganda, including the Press, and serves as a Government agency to organize "popular participation in national affairs". So all the trappings of Communism are present in Tunisia, which did not endear itself to the West when, in 1964, Bourguiba followed Ben Bella's example and nationalized 1,000,000 acres of land owned by foreigners, chiefly Frenchmen, nor earlier, in 1962, when Bourguiba gave France marching orders from the Bizerta base.

And yet, it is on the cards that Bourguiba will not tolerate too much Communist influence in his country. He appears to have his people solidly behind him and to be a strong ruler. In fact, he is something of an enigma. He has infuriated Nasser by tilting his nose at the much-vaunted concept of Arab unity and by suggesting appeasement with the hated Jewish state of Israel - and yet he is closer to Nasser than either Hassan or Idris. At times, he has appeared anti-French, and yet is in favour (in contrast to Algeria, for instance) of the "Francophonie" concept of a commonwealth of French-speaking states.

As far as Communism is concerned, Tunisia is unlikely to haul up the Red Flag during Bourguiba's reign, but, as in so many of the African states, politics change overnight and certainly Bourguiba's party machinery is exceptionally well geared for an aspiring Communist dictator who might be standing smiling in the wings dressed in pure white with his red vestments concealed underneath.

MAURITANIA

Mauritania is usually classified as a West African state but is really part of North Africa ideologically. Mauritania, despite its not inconsiderable size, is a country which neither the West nor the East appears to be over-interested in and one's first reaction would be to reject any suggestion of it being a Communist beachhead to other African states. But perhaps that would be a mistake, as it is often the quiet, silent countries that cause the biggest surprises. In Mauritania, 99.9% of the population is Moslem (it has the smallest percentage of Christians of all the states of Africa) but there is a vocal Negro minority. Fears by the latter at the actions of the Moslem majority led to considerable unpleasantness for some months during 1966 although exact details of the unrest were snuffed out before they reached the outside world. The unrest was caused by a Government decision to make Arabic a compulsory subject in schools, and the Negro community set off a wave of strikes at secondary schools resulting in the temporary closing of the schools. Race riots also erupted in the capital, Nouakchott, resulting in the death of seven people and the wounding of 70. It would appear that the Government has suppressed the unrest but racism is always an ingredient eagerly sought after by the Communists when selecting target areas and, although at present there are no indications

of such a move, Mauritania would be well advised to keep on her guard.

THE SUDAN

The Sudan, a country that is part of Arab North Africa and part of Bantu East Africa, is unique in several respects. It is the only independent state in Africa where a substantial Negroid section is swamped by an Arab-dominated Government (a parallel situation in Zanzibar lasted only a month after independence before the Arab rulers were deposed); it is one of the few African countries in this decade that has permitted a Communist Party to operate openly; it was governed before independence by a European and an African country (the so-called Anglo-Egyptian Condominium); and it is the only country in Africa where a civilian revolution overthrew a military administration. Though not unique, it also has a pressing racial problem.

The racism laid naked in the Sudan is probably the worst in a racist continent. Although stringent measures were taken to keep the slaughter of thousands of human beings from the world - which in any case turned a blind eye - the racism in the Sudan constitutes the most sustained campaign of brutality in modern-day Africa.

The basic problem is very simple. The Northern Sudan is inhabited by 9,000,000 Moslem Arabs; the Southern Sudan by 4,000,000 Negroids. The two territories should really be two different countries. The Northerners, who once traded in Southerners in slave markets, look down on the Southerners as inferior; and, governing from Khartoum, suppress the Southerners with ruthless military might. The Southerners resent the Northerners whom they accuse of keeping them out of Government administration and of trying to impose their beliefs, including religious beliefs, on them. The Southerners regard the Northerners' tyrannic rule as worse than that of the "colonialists" and want an independent state.

The racism in the Sudan is basic to the problems of the country and to the vast Communist influence that is exerted and requires a brief summary. The big revolt of the Southerners came in 1955, when civilians joined Southern troops and police in a mutiny. More than 1,000 people were massacred in the racial war that was to set the pattern for North-South relations ever since. The racial war continued sporadically, with the burning down of Southern villages, the rape of Southern women, the murder of Southern children. The atrocities perpetrated by Northern soldiers are legend. The Southerners were not slow in contributing their share of arson and murder. In September 1963 there was an intensification of the war. The military authorities launched an all-out campaign to wipe out the rebels, but were unsuccessful. They then turned their wrath on the clergy, who were openly persecuted and humiliated before eventually being driven out of the country. In one month alone - March 1964 - 272 Roman Catholic and 28 Protestant missionaries were expelled, and the missionary field was left bare. Of these, 135 were herded into open trucks like livestock by machine-gun toting policemen and driven hundreds of miles without food in the hot sun and were robbed of money and personal possessions. One of the Roman Catholics didn't make it back to civilization. A nun, who had spent 32 years in Africa, she died in Khartoum as a result of maltreatment.

By October 1964 the tinderbox was bone dry and the Communists, who had reasons of their own for wanting a change in government, sparked riots in the capital, Khartoum, which left hundreds dead -

and the dissolution of the military regime that had ruled the Sudan since 1958. General Abboud, the military President, disbanded his Government but remained on as titular President before resigning the following month to be succeeded by a completely civilian government.

It is not surprising that in this situation of rabid racialism, Communism thrived. The Communists have always been active and strong in the Sudan. Although they were subdued during Abboud's regime, they provided the only political opposition to the military rulers, whom they constantly harassed. Doctors, lawyers, university professors and university students rushed into the Communist Party to such an extent that when Abboud resigned his military dictatorship, the Communists were well in the picture and managed to get two Cabinet seats as well as squeezing some of their undercover leftists into the Cabinet. This they regarded as their just reward, as they had fomented the unrest that had brought about the downfall of Abboud.

Although they had drawn their strength from intellectual and professional circles, the Communists had not neglected to cultivate the working classes and had infiltrated and taken over more than one trade union, notably the railways union. It was the latter that, making use of Southern complaints and protests from the so-called student intelligentsia about the slowness of political reforms, pressured Abboud into resigning by threatening to cut off vital rail supplies to Khartoum.

The Communists had planned their strategy well, and of all the Communists in Africa, had some outstanding "brains" in their midst. The Communist Party, although a schism appeared to develop later, was well organized and well disciplined and had highly-skilled men in charge. (Among these were Shafiq Ahmad al-Shaikh, vice-President of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1957; Ahmad Muhammad Kheir, secretary of the World Council of Peace in the same year; Muhammad Babakr Jaafar, vice-President of the Federation of Democratic Youth in 1958; and Abdel Khalig Mahboub, who became leader of the Communist Party and was held in high regard by his masters behind the Iron Curtain.)

After the overthrow of Abboud, the British Press, which had never been particularly interested in the barbaric genocide in the Sudan, did its best to discredit the "repressive" regime of the military authorities and to express the confident hope that the civilian rulers, for whom it had only praise, would solve the racial hatred between North and South. As it turned out, matters only deteriorated, with racism rampant once again and the Communists virtually gaining control of the Government through devious methods of employing undercover politicians.

In fact, so bad did the situation become that by February 1965 right-wing pressure within the Government forced the Prime Minister, Serr al-Khatim Khalifa, to form a new government to cut back the Communists. However, when he eventually succeeded after several days of political haggling in forming a Cabinet, he found it necessary to offer the leftists four of the 15 portfolios. The Communists promptly spurned the offer, indicating that they would try to get their own way through violence and bloodshed. In elections later that year, the Communists were able to muster 11 members in the new Parliament, but in November 1965 the Communist Party was dissolved by order of the Constituent Assembly and the Communists were driven underground because Prime Minister Mahboub feared the increasing support they were obtaining.

The Communists, however, have built up such a powerful force in recent years and have infiltrated academic and workers' life to such a marked extent that their presence will long be felt in the Sudan. Besides, there is considerable sympathy within the Government for Communism, despite the banning of the Communist Party. Not only did the Government actively support the Communist rebels in the Congo and permit large-scale shipment through the Sudan of Communist arms for the rebels, but it has thrown its Army open to Communist "advice" and "assistance" in respect of training and equipment, and values the open support given it in its pogroms against the Negroid South by Communist countries.

Indeed, Communist influence, both from the side of the now banned Communist Party and from circles in the Government not to mention the tremendous influence exerted by the Communists in academic spheres and amongst trade unionists, is such that the Sudan is ear-marked for early Communist domination. This is a contributory reason why Ethiopia and Kenya are wary of Communist governments, as (especially when Haile Selassie goes in Ethiopia) it is quite on the cards that a Communist puppet regime in the Sudan would take active steps to incorporate parts of Ethiopia and Kenya into the Sudan.

And, as far as the long-term interests of Communism in the Sudan are concerned, it should be remembered that the racial war is continuing and shows no signs of abating. Despite the confident predictions in Britain about the future of the Sudan after the overthrow of Abboud, racialism has intensified. In July 1965, for instance, it was reported that more than 400 people were killed in heavy fighting in a single week-end clash at Juba in South Sudan between Southerners and security forces. Within a week, another 300 Southern men, women and children were slaughtered by Government forces at Mide. Subsequent news reports suggest that the massacres were an organized pogrom by the Khartoum Government which claimed the lives of more than a thousand men, women and children in four days. The Government eventually admitted to 650 deaths - a staggering figure for an official admission. In addition, the Government's actions have led, down the years, to the flight of up to 250,000 refugees - again a staggering figure in the modern world. Eighty per cent of the Army is at present encamped in the South and the plundering continues to the extent that one British journalist reported in early 1966 that in a "war of immense ferocity . . . half the population of a great tract of Africa has either been destroyed by murder, starvation and disease, or has fled across the borders".

A good idea of the racism in the Sudan was given in an eyewitness report on October 4, 1966 when 30-year-old Willie Akunda told newsmen in Nairobi that he had fled from a "race hate" campaign in the Sudan waged by Arab soldiers. He told of brutalities against Negro inhabitants of the South and said: "The root of the trouble is racism. The Arabs are killing us because we are Black." Black Africans, said Akunda, were forced to live "in the bush, like animals, eating the leaves of trees" and were treated "worse than slaves" by the Arabs.

In December 1966, the Verona Missionary Fathers, a Roman Catholic society, published an article in their Bulletin which said inter alia:

"The Arab soldiers continue to burn villages, to kill indiscriminately old men and children, to recruit for their harems like war booty the women who are not quick enough to escape. The Sudanese army,

composed of Arabs from the North without any control, commits atrocities worthy of barbarians." They added that if southern Sudanese escaped massacres they faced "misery, hunger and death" as refugees.

Much of the news on the genocide never reaches the outside world, and, in any case, even if it does both Western and Black African news media prefer to ignore this embarrassing situation as it could upset anti-South African and anti-Rhodesian strategy. The latter attitude, naturally, fits in nicely with Communist plans for, if the world refuses to take notice of what is happening in the Sudan, Communist campaigns will be that much easier. Where the world has ventured forth to express an opinion on the Sudan, it has, surprisingly, been largely a favourable one.

Queen Elizabeth, who with Prince Philip, visited the Sudan in February 1965 immediately after Communist-fomented troubles, said at a State Banquet in London on May 26, 1964 during an official visit by General Abboud that Britain held the Sudanese people in great esteem. Speaking immediately after the deportation of hundreds of missionaries under barbaric conditions and while naked racism was rampant in the Sudan, she told Abboud: "You will see many changes since you were here before, but you will find unchanged our respect and admiration for the Sudan."

There is an old Arab proverb which says: "Allah laughed when he created the Sudan". Doubtless it will be the Communists who will soon have the last laugh at the strange ways of the West which permits doors to swing open so easily for the Red flood.

ETHIOPIA

The position in two other North-East African countries, Ethiopia and Somalia, presents an intriguing picture in so far as possible future spheres of Communist activities are concerned. In Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie, 225th in line of succession to the throne of the world's oldest monarchy, has firmly resisted down the years any opposition, Communist-orientated or otherwise, to his autocratic rule. Political parties are banned and the situation is even worse than in a monarchy like Morocco as there are no true democratic processes.

In 1960 an attempt was made by the Imperial bodyguard to oust Selassie while he was on a State visit to Brazil, but the Army and populace rallied round their ruler, who hurried home to resume the tight reins of control. The episode appears to have been a shock to the Emperor, who indicated that he would permit democratic institutions at a gradual pace. On paper, the trappings of Parliamentary government have since been introduced but by 1967 the farthest Selassie had progressed was to the stage where the Prime Minister was permitted to choose his own Cabinet which would be responsible to Parliament as well as to the Emperor. But the Emperor can still appoint whomever he pleases as Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister is still responsible to the Emperor as well as to Parliament. Political parties are still banned. As in so many countries in Africa, democracy in Ethiopia is an extremely hollow concept.

Despite the lack of democracy and the feudal nature of Selassie's rule, Ethiopia has never been in much danger of going Communist. Selassie himself has preferred Western aid (Britain, the United States, France, West Germany) to Eastern aid, although in very recent years he has appeared to be

succumbing to the lure of roubles which Russia would anxiously use to counter the considerable United States influence in Ethiopia. Selassie has been promised R66,500,000 in loans from Russia whenever he wants the money, and he has allowed 200 Russian engineers and technicians to build him a gigantic R10,000,000 oil refinery on the Red Sea. Other Communist nations are also assisting in Ethiopia (Bulgaria was asked to build a deep-water harbour at Massawa, Czechoslovakia multi-million rand factories, Yugoslavia extensions at the port of Assab as well as a cement factory in Addis Ababa) but so far Selassie has resisted Communist Chinese pressure to establish diplomatic relations in fear of American reaction.

It would appear, therefore, that Ethiopia still leans Westwards. It would also appear that, although the Communists have a toehold in Ethiopia, they are not planning to move for a take-over - yet. A direct challenge to Selassie would be foolhardy, as was demonstrated at the time of the abortive 1960 revolt and, more recently, in November 1966, when a conspiracy of Army and Police officers, disenchanted with feudalism, was smashed by Selassie. Nasser is already acting as an advance guard for the Communists by channeling military supplies and money to Eritrean rebels and to anti-Selassie forces in the Ogaden province. Perhaps the future will be more accommodating for the Communists.

Ethiopia is a poor country, with the lives led by the vast majority of her people in striking contrast to the splendour of Addis Ababa revealed to heads of state when they have converged for Summit conferences on a capital cleared of beggars and draped in artificial finery for the occasion. Nor has the public been slow to wonder at the "new order" that the African delegates to these conferences have advocated in their own lands. The seeds of public discontent, though unlikely to germinate in Selassie's time, are already in the hard ground of mass poverty. Selassie, nevertheless, is in his mid-70's and when he goes the Communists might well try to exploit the situation.

The position is aggravated by the fact that the governmental future of Ethiopia is uncertain when Selassie goes. Selassie's eldest son is the Crown Prince but he does not have the stature, nor the drive and ambition of his father, and would be an easier prey to Communist wiles than the hardy "Lion of Judah". Other contenders for the throne might also emerge, and civil strife would play into the hands of the Communists. At this stage, Ethiopia is not a potential Communist prize, but crucial times will come to the ancient kingdom once Selassie leaves the scene.

SOMALIA

Far more of an immediate problem is likely to be Somalia, Ethiopia's neighbour which occupies the Horn of Africa. Communist aid has been heavy in Somalia, which also has a large Communist-inclined segment in the population led by an extreme Russian-favouring left-wing party, the Somali Democratic Party, and fanned by tribal dissatisfactions.

Somaliland was formed in 1960 from British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, and the Communist forces were particularly strong in the latter where the Italian Communist Party was permitted to be active between the end of World War II and independence. The local Communists were bolstered and well "worked on" by Italian Communists expelled to Somalia by Mussolini. The Communists worked at various times through their own Party, through the Somali Youth League and through the

Democratic Party. They also infiltrated trade unions with effect.

Somalia is conveniently situated across from Yemen and Aden, where the Communist forces have recently scored notable advances, and Russia has not been slow in realizing the potential importance of Somalia as a Communist gateway to East, and eventually Central and Southern, Africa. Somalia is building up an impressive army with Russian help, which under an October 1963 agreement provided for a huge (by African standards) R22,000,000 in military aid including tanks, M.I.G. jet fighters, armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft and field artillery and large quantities of infantry and heavy weapons. Bright young Somali army officers are being sent in considerable numbers to Russia for training (600 were estimated to be in Russia in 1966) and hundreds of Russian military men have flooded Somalia to train the Army (1,200 were said to be in Somalia in 1966). Communist China, too, has been active and in 1965 gave Somalia a R1 5,000,000 interest-free loan and a R2,000,000 budget subsidy when Britain withdrew financial aid. By August 1966, Somalia had a 25,000-man Army and 1,200 Russian military advisers were seconded to the Army. Her Air Force had 150 M.I.G. fighters and 20 helicopters and the Army was supplied with Russian T-34 tanks. (In addition to her Army, Somalia could reportedly muster 5,000 military police, 500 members of the Finance Guard and tribal levies totalling 20,000, at least 5,000 of whom would be armed with modern rifles and machine-guns.)

The country is, for the Communists, conveniently poor and the external political situation dovetails with Communist tactics. Somalia claims the Ogaden area of Ethiopia as well as the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. There have been numerous and bloody battles in both areas in recent years. There is considerable resentment in Somalia at the thought that a Western country - Britain - has failed to play ball with Somalia and help settle these disputes. In fact, it is believed that Britain has gone out of her way to side with Ethiopia and Kenya, and has even broken solemn pledges to "rectify" these matters. In these circumstances, there has been a warming to the Russians who have successfully projected the image of being only too willing to help the Somalis right the wrongs "perpetrated" against them by the "imperialists". (And help them they do - in 1963 Russian pilots flew combat missions over Ogaden.)

In Somalia, the Communists have shown yet another technique in the wide range of intrigues and plotting ploys in the Red armoury. Concentration has been almost exclusively on the Army with local Communists left to sow the seeds of Communism among the populace. The Communist influence in the Army is alarming.

Is Somalia destined to become the first African state to be subjected to the iron rule of a Communist Army?

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NURSERIES FOR SUBVERSION

(West Africa)

Where North Africa was the first area of intensive Communist concentration on Africa, West Africa was the second geographical region to be exposed to Communist designs. In selecting their targets, the Communists chose wisely. All three men they selected as bearers of the Communist cause — Nkrumah, Touré and Keita — led their countries, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, into the Communist stooge states club. (The new military rulers of Ghana have pulled their country out of this club.)

Not that the Communists concentrated exclusively on these three states in their West African offensive. They were active in most of the other states as well.

In their campaign in West Africa, the Communists were assisted by the concentration of French-speaking states in the region. A good slice of the upper crust politicians, educationalists and other intellectuals had studied in France and many of them had been cultivated by the French Communist Party during their stay in Europe. To a lesser degree, the Russians were also assisted by the European influences of intellectuals from former British colonies in West Africa, where the level of sophistication tended to be higher than in British colonies in East or Central Africa, but the influence of the British Communist Party was not as strong on Black Africans temporarily in Europe as was the influence of the French Communist Party.

The role played by the European Communist parties in influencing Black Africans has, on occasions, been a considerable one, especially in the case of the French Communist Party and the Italian Communist Party. Their importance was acknowledged in 1960 by the late Professor Ivan Potekhin, the foremost Russian expert on Africa, when he wrote in *Sovremennii Vostok*: "The Communist parties of the metropolitan territories, especially those of Britain and France, have made a valuable contribution to the cause of spreading Leninist ideas in Africa. Many thousands of Africans coming to the metropolitan territories learn many new things about the communist movement, read Marxist literature and return home enriched with progressive ideas."

On the other hand, French interest has generally continued to be strong in France's former colonies in West Africa (in some of them there are more Frenchmen to-day than there were in pre-independence days) and this has had a stabilizing effect on these countries which, with the exception of the Ivory Coast and Gabon, suffer from the same blights of economic poverty and tribalism that plague other Black states on the continent. On balance it would seem that the close association between France and her African colonies will be detrimental rather than beneficial to the Communist cause. There will be exceptions, and one can only hope that in not too many cases will the exceptions turn out to be Tourés or Keitas.

GHANA

Ghana provides a singular lesson of how easy it is for Communism to be implanted in an African state. The lesson has been repeated in other Black African states, but nowhere has the shock been

greater than in Ghana, because when the Gold Coast became independent on March 6, 1957, it was potentially a rich country in resources and human material; it was the first of Britain's colonies in Black Africa to be granted independence; and it was led by the current "darling" of Westminster.

Kwame Nkrumah stage-managed his campaign in Ghana with foresight and not a little brilliance. He had been in the vanguard of the Black "nationalists" of Africa — and on the world stage, on which he so revelled in strutting, he was regarded as a "statesman" fighting for justice and equity while at home he was looked upon as a determined fighter for the rights of his people, never hesitating to go against the grain of the "colonial imperialists". He had gone to prison and, true to his Communist training, had made good use of the propaganda value of being a "Prison Graduate". He projected an image of being the "Redeemer" of his country and people.

The wise men of the West had considerable respect for Nkrumah and lauded and feted him before and after Ghana's independence. But Nkrumah was to be the Castro of West Africa: the fiery nationalist who paid lip-service to democracy while working hard at building his Communist state. Even his passionate, and sometimes involved and complicated discourses on "African socialism", failed to serve as a warning light to the West, which was only too eager to accept his doctrines as a new type of political ideology based on African traditions rather than for what they really were: blatant Communism.

Since his student days, Nkrumah had been dedicated to Communism, but when he became Prime Minister of independent Ghana in 1957 he realized that he could not rush implementation of his Communist ideologies. First, before he could publicly declare that he was a Communist, he had to ensure that the population had been sufficiently brainwashed, he had to have enough Ghanaians orientated towards Communism to run the country, and he had to build up a reasonably industrialized state and effect agrarian reforms. He advanced towards his Communist goal step by step, engineering his campaign with such brilliance that as he tightened each screw the West merely found a new excuse with which to white-wash his tyrannic rule.

Nkrumah's first step came early after independence. In the same year as independence, he introduced the Ghana Nationality Bill which enabled him to declare any of his opponents stateless. Then came the Preventive Detention Act, whereby he could imprison his personal enemies for five years without trial (the Act was later amended to enable Nkrumah to send his political opponents at his personal whim to jail for life). Nkrumah concentrated power in his Government's hands by abolishing the eight regional assemblies. He appointed special political courts with the power to impose the death sentence. There was no jury and no appeal against the verdict of these courts, whose members were responsible personally to Nkrumah. In 1963, when Sir Arku Korsah, the Chief Justice, dared to acquit three V.I.P. defendants in a treason trial, Nkrumah promptly sacked Sir Arku, even though his own Attorney-General had only the previous day given a public assurance that Parliament alone could dismiss a judge. After being found not guilty by Sir Arku, the defendants were promptly imprisoned under the Preventive Detention Act. (Nkrumah did have the "decency" to have his dismissal of Sir Arku ratified by his subservient Parliament later, and at the same time he instructed Parliament to give him the right to dismiss any judge at his personal discretion.) Trade Unions were forced in 1961 to take orders from the Convention People's Party, Nkrumah's political arm.

Ostensibly, Parliamentary opposition functioned for some time in Ghana, it only being in 1964 that Nkrumah formally established a one-party state. However, opposition members of Parliament knew full well that if they became too vocal and persisted in attacking Nkrumah, they would end up where hundreds of their predecessors were to be found — the country's jails. Among the opposition politicians detained by Nkrumah were Joe Appiah, a prominent lawyer and son-in-law of the late Sir Stafford Cripps of Britain, and Dr. J. B. Danquah, the elder statesman of Ghana and the man who had brought Nkrumah back from London to help him build up political support for the Gold Coast's independence. Dr. Danquah later died in prison. It was reported that Nkrumah had had his political godfather tortured; Krobo Edusei, one of Nkrumah's Cabinet Ministers, declared that Russian doctors had injected Danquah with poison drugs. By the time he was eventually deposed on February 24, 1966, Nkrumah had 2,000 political prisoners behind bars.

The plight of the political prisoners in Ghana was graphically illustrated in March 1965 when 600 political detainees smuggled a letter from prison that was eventually passed on to the British Prime Minister. The prisoners complained that the conditions under which they were detained were worse than those laid down by law and that they were treated worse than hardened convicts. "Our lives", they declared, "are recklessly exposed to danger and death... Torture and ill-treatment are ordered against us at will: recently M. K. Apaloo (a Member of Parliament who had then been in prison for seven years) Bafour Osei Akoto (a politician detained for six years) and S. G. Antor (another M.P., behind bars for four years) were without any apparent cause removed to Nsawam prison where they were ill-treated for five-six months each in a 'special block'. Apaloo nearly died of the ill-treatment, having become so ill that at one stage he lost awareness of his own actions for some two days. They were later returned in emaciated and weakened condition."

The letter says Dr. Danquah "obviously died as a result of the 'exercise' which he endured for some 13 months and, as reported by certain warders, in chains. He was once seen by fellow detainees chained for merely standing up in his cell to stretch his limbs and exercise his body. He was an asthmatic, and had frequent attacks because he was kept in a cell quite unsuitable for his condition".

Nkrumah's build-up of his personal image was tremendous, and the personality cult surrounding Nkrumah was far greater than that found in Russia. He had a string of impressive titles, notably "His Messianic Dedication Osagyefo". Osagyefo means Redeemer, and Nkrumah took particular delight in being referred to as Osagyefo. And he made sure that everyone called him that.

At an early stage, Nkrumah commandeered all newspapers and the radio and news agencies for the projection of his personal image. These news media were also expected to, and indeed did, issue vituperative outpourings of abuse at Britain, the United States and other Western countries (despite the aid that came to Ghana from the West) and were instructed to say only nice things about Nkrumah's comrades behind the Iron Curtain. Periodically, Ghanaian demonstrators took to the streets to shout further abuse at United States Embassy officials, and on one occasion a prominent newspaper editor, with Nkrumah's blessing, led the wild rioters. Statues and posters of the dictator and the "Redeemer's" name in neon signs were manifold.

These and other moves (such as having himself appointed Life President of the only political party, the Convention People's Party, and elected to the secretary-generalship each year) were the outward

manifestations of the building-up of the Nkrumah personality cult. On a lower volume, Nkrumah was busy turning Ghana into a Communist state.

State and collective farms were established on a large scale, chiefly with Russian but also with Israeli assistance. At an early stage, the Boy Scouts movement was abolished and replaced with a Communist-style "Young Pioneers" movement. A sinister network of secret police was formed with tentacles stretching into every facet of private life and the regular opening of letters sent to and from Ghana and telephone-tapping being the mildest form of secret police intervention. Typical of Nkrumah's secret police measures was the rigorous surveillance to which students returning from overseas were subjected for months after they had arrived back in Ghana. In 1964, all Ghanaian students studying abroad were ordered to hand in their passports so that Nkrumah's secret police could keep them in line while they were abroad. The secret police were responsible for mass deportations of foreigners.

On one occasion, when Nkrumah was having difficulty in persuading his African brothers that they should allow him to lead the whole of Africa, he played host to an Organization for African Unity conference — late in 1965 — and his secret police, who had infiltrated the O.A.U. secretariat as stenographers and clerks, provided the "Redeemer" with copies of the private conversations of his fellow heads of state in their off-conference hours. In Accra alone, Nkrumah had 700 secret police.

Nkrumah's undercover armed might also lay in the secret army he raised. The core of this army was his 1,500-strong Presidential Bodyguard which formed part of the President's Own Guard Regiment and in which Russian, Chinese and Egyptian Communists had the key posts under a Russian, Colonel Zanlegu. This Communist force was well equipped with the latest armaments, smuggled into Ghana under cover of darkness at the ports of Tema, Takaradia and Elma. The regular army, in contrast, was deliberately starved of modern weapons. (Nkrumah, indeed, distrusted all his senior military men and did not allow anyone to stay too long in a position of authority. Likewise, he carried out regular Communist-style Cabinet purges. He trusted no one, and it is significant that his closest advisers were White men who because of the colour of their skins had no hope of ever assuming power — men like the ultra-leftist, Geoffrey Bing, a former British Labour Party Member of Parliament, and Hymie Basner, a onetime South African senator.)

Communists were also relied upon greatly to spread ideologies in the schools and in academic circles. More than 100 Russians held key teaching posts and there were also two do/en Russian doctors in the country. Nkrumah successfully controlled all seats of learning. The backbone of his intellectual infiltration campaign was centred on NASSO, the National Association of Socialist Students, a hard-core group of Communists who filled all the vital roles in propaganda media and regulated the dispensation of propaganda designed to expand the Nkrumah personality cult.

Nkrumah himself was an utterly immoral character, although this fact was successfully kept away from his countrymen and the world at large. Although he always felt himself inferior and inadequate with women, he kept a string of mistresses, including a middle-aged priestess; Genovese Marais, the notorious South African woman on whom he squandered money; and a 16-year-old schoolgirl, whom he once gave R20,000 in real estate for services rendered. His marriage to an Egyptian woman, Fathia, was merely a marriage of convenience, which he entered upon after being told by a

ju-ju man that he must marry an Egyptian if he wanted to become ruler of all of Africa.

Nkrumah practised corruption on a large scale, and even formed a company, NADECO, to act, in the words of Krobo Edusei, "as a channel of bribery and corruption". Edusei, who himself rocketed into the world headlines when his wife bought a luxurious gold bed on a shopping expedition in London, said he knew of one instance where Nkrumah bribed a businessman to the tune of R3,000,000 for a contract. Nkrumah, according to Edusei, was "so greedy, so corrupt and likes money more than even his mother" (a reference to the affection Nkrumah, an only child, felt for his mother, in which is thought to lie his fear of women). According to Mr. J. W. K. Hartley, the Police Commissioner who became vice-President of the National Liberation Council after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the dictator eagerly grabbed Hartley's files on corrupt officials and then promptly used the files to blackmail the person concerned who he was able to retain in office to acquiesce to his will at all times.

So inefficient and corrupt had been Nkrumah's administration of Ghana that whereas he had inherited a kitty of R400,000,000, he left Ghana R800,000,000 in the red. But his personal fortune was estimated at R90,000,000. To such a degree did he mesmerize his countrymen that Parliament granted him R4,000,000 a year for his personal use for which he did not have to account and which he used to pay for things ranging from subverting other nations to the favours of his schoolgirl plaything.

Nkrumah was a perfect tool in the hands of the Russians, who became increasingly powerful within Ghana. Through Nkrumah they built up an impressive organization for exporting subversion to other African states that were regarded as too pro-Western. Among the chief targets of Nkrumah and the Russians were Nigeria, Dahomey, Togo, Niger, the Camerouns and the Ivory Coast. He was also intent on destroying any moves towards an East African Federation as this would jeopardize his own plans for a Union of Africa, and often had bitter words on this point with otherwise firm friends like Julius Nyerere and Milton Obote. Nkrumah's spies kept their fingers on the pulse of East Africa and faithfully reported to Nkrumah any danger signs that could signify federation.

Among the Nkrumah-sponsored attempts to overthrow other regimes was an agreement, accompanied by a gift of R18,000, between Nkrumah henchmen and Dahomeyan trade unionists in July 1963 to overthrow the Government of Dahomey. Nkrumah also gave support to the anti-Federal group in the Nigerian Parliament and to Pierre Mulele, the Communist leader in the Kwilu province of the Congo. His encouragement of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo was blatant. President Hamani Diori of Niger was almost killed in an Nkrumah-sponsored plot in 1965 and ex-President Maurice Yameogo of the Upper Volta claimed in the same year that Nkrumah had even gone so far as to appoint a new President to succeed Yameogo after his assassination that had been ordered by Nkrumah.

The basis of Nkrumah's subversive organization against other African states was a series of training camps for terrorists. One of the camps was at Konongo, 30 miles north of Accra, where 200 "students", most of them from South Africa, had "graduated" in guerilla warfare and terrorism. Up till October 1965, there had been 13 Communist Chinese instructors at the camp, but they, as well as most of the "students", had left by the time the anti-Nkrumah coup was staged. The Ghanaian Army

found 20 inmates, 10 from the Camerouns and 10 from Fernando Po undergoing training in subversion.

Another camp found by the Army housed 13 "students" from Niger, who fled on hearing of the coup, leaving behind 32 barrels of gunpowder and five Russian-built vehicles.

Nkrumah also had special schools at which spies were trained by experts from behind the Iron Curtain. The chief espionage organization was the Bureau of African Affairs, which had a special unit called the "Special African Service" equipped with Communist arms and spying equipment. Another front for Nkrumah's espionage network was the "National Scientific Research Laboratory" in Accra, which did nothing about national scientific research but turned out plenty of spies who were sent to other parts of Africa. Two king-pins in the espionage training at the "Laboratory" were Jurgen Kruger and Rolf Stollmayer, two Communist East Germans.

The Communists became so powerful in Nkrumah's Ghana that, according to some experts, there was a danger that they would take over complete control of Ghana through the appointment of puppets in a military government. London Press reports in April 1966 indicated that if the Ghanaian Army had not staged its coup d'etat on February 24, 1966 the Russians would have staged their own coup, using the Presidential Bodyguard as the basis for their operation.

The wealth of evidence produced since the coup d'etat that ousted Nkrumah is so overwhelming that even the strongest erstwhile Nkrumah supporter must appreciate that Ghana was in effect, if not in fact, a Communist state under Nkrumah. The frightening thought, however, is that right until the end, the West refused to believe that Ghana was going Communist — despite the mounting evidence that made the picture crystal clear to objective observers of the African scene. The thought is frightening for, unless the West learns the lesson of Nkrumah and Nkrumahism, the sordid nine years of Ghana's history will be repeated elsewhere on the continent.

It was Britain's winds-of-change Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who declared of Ghana when she became independent that he was gratified because Ghana had "chosen the path of Parliamentary democracy and accepted the political values which we in Britain, irrespective of party, hold dear". That was in 1957, and Mr. Macmillan can be pardoned because Nkrumah had played his cards well before independence, and Mr. Macmillan, as his wind-of-change speech showed, was not very accurate in his political prophecies at the best of times. After all, when Nkrumah successfully hoodwinked the world on such an unsubtle point as his claim that he had gained academic laurels from Lincoln University in the United States when he had never been a student there, how could a world statesman appreciate the subtlety of twisting Communist ideologies to sound like "African socialism"?

But right through the tyranny of the filth-surrounded dictatorship of Nkrumah the West refused to believe that its "darling" had gone Communist. Typical examples of pro-Nkrumah image-building in the Western Press came from the Daily Telegraph (June 6, 1963): "It (Ghana) is not a police state — yet"; the Guardian (November 5, 1963): "President Nkrumah has performed great services for Africa"; the Guardian (November 18, 1963): "...little credit is given Ghana for the businesslike way it has prepared itself to develop as a modern industrialized state"; and the Daily Telegraph (January

29, 1964): "...with all his faults, he (Nkrumah) has contributed something to his country. Ghana to-day is not only politically independent but also has a sense of economic independence".

Even after the overthrow of Nkrumah, the London Financial Times wrote on February 25, 1966: "He is a man of great charm and real brilliance, a passionate idealist and theorist. His writings on Africa would be distinguished even if he were not a world statesman. He is not even a cruel or, despite the inevitable rumours, a corrupt man."

When the Communists use men for such important tasks as taking a nation into the Communist fold, they seek out men of "great charm", they use men of "real brilliance", they use men with "passionate" idealism.

And they do not hesitate to stoop to use cruel, immoral, corrupt men.

It was refreshing for Africa to see in the first year after Nkrumah that Ghana was following a sane policy under her new, military, rulers. The pattern of government set by Lieutenant-General Joseph Ankrah could well serve as a model for other African states. Ankrah, in his first year, relied heavily on trained economists in his civil service to restore sanity to the country's tottering economy and did not hesitate to cut down on such prestige trappings as a big diplomatic corps and government bureaucratic institutions. Ankrah's lesson for Africa was: forget about image-building and shop-dressing; get on with the job of giving the man in the street a chance of a decent living.

Ankrah also went out of his way to restore some of the influence of the tribal chiefs, ignored completely by Nkrumah. He regards the chieftaincy as vital in ensuring a peaceful and orderly life in an African democracy and has urged the chiefs to regain the dignity that their class lost under Nkrumah.

This is a promising development, as a combination of tribal authority (exerted by the chiefs) and civilian authority (exerted by the Government) would seem to be the best means of ensuring stability in modern-day Africa.

GUINEA

Where Ghana represented a sorry tale of Communist infiltration under the blind eyes of the West in British West Africa, Guinea represented no less a sorry tale in French West Africa. Apologists in the West have grabbed at all sorts of tempting straws thrown into the wind by President Touré of Guinea in an effort to show that Touré has repented of his Communist ways, but the stark reality of Guinea to-day is that it is a Communist stooge state par excellence.

Touré shares with Mr. Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, the role of an African head of government who has led his country in a unilateral declaration of independence. But there the similarity ends.

Touré was born in 1922 of poor Moslem parents, but he had a strong political asset in that his grandfather was the legendary Guinean tribal chief, Samory, who had been one of the leaders of the

fight against French rule. After being expelled from a technical college at the age of 15 for leading a students' strike, Touré became a civil servant, working in the Post Office as a clerk. After World War II, he entered politics by way of the trade union movement, organizing workers on Guinea's banana, coffee and cocoa plantations into a solid political force. He took these workers into the World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.), a Communist-controlled organization of which he became a vice-President at the age of 27. It was at this stage that Touré made frequent trips behind the Iron Curtain, visiting Moscow and Prague and attending courses at the Prague Political Institute, a special training school for Afro-Asian political agitators. He was vehement in his denunciation of the West.

In the 1950's, Touré broke with the W.F.T.U. to found and become President of a French West African trade union, Union Generale des Travailleurs de l'Afrique noire. His move was applauded in the West, which eagerly seized upon it as a rejection by Touré of Communism.

The falsity of this analysis makes it necessary to digress for a moment to show how easy it is for Western apologists to mislead the world; and, at the same time, to underline the importance that International Communism places on trade unions as a vehicle for subversion in Africa.

The instructions for African states to disaffiliate from the W.F.T.U. came from Russia, which was becoming alarmed at the growing influence of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (I.C.F.T.U.), the pro-Western rival to the W.F.T.U. The Communist thinking was that rather than risk a take-over of African loyalties by the I.C.F.T.U., it would be better to split Africa from international trade unionism and form African trade unions into organizations that could be controlled from Moscow. (This was in line with the general lack of integrity in Russian policy towards Africa which was prepared to see Africa move in a different stream to the generally accepted Communist stream so that further along the river bed a diversion wall could be built and the African stream diverted into the Communist stream.)

After many months of intensive activity behind the scenes, the Communists managed to have formed and gain control of the All-African Trade Union Federation (A.A.T.U.F.). The secretariat consisted of eight members of whom no less than seven were W.F.T.U. supporters. (The eighth was Kenya's Tom Mboya, who had been elected without his knowledge in a shrewd Communist bid to exert influence through his standing in trade union circles in East Africa.)

The numerous congratulatory tributes to the A.A.T.U.F. from Communists and the open welcoming of the formation of the A.A.T.U.F. by the W.F.T.U. bore testimony to the neat coup the Communists had achieved in African trade unionism.

In French West Africa, trade unionism was neatly sewed up in the pockets of the Communists through the activities of Touré of Guinea. But Touré was already bent on becoming political leader of Guinea. As far back as 1951 he had been elected to the French National Assembly but the French authorities had prevented him from taking his seat until 1956. By then, Touré was more interested in Africa than in being a member of the French National Assembly. In 1957 he became Prime Minister of Guinea and his first step was to break the tribal authority of the chiefs and establish Communist-orientated local bodies such as "peasants co-operatives". It was at about this time that he began

asserting that he was "finished with Communism" but it was obvious that these laments represented tactical expediency rather than political sincerity.

On September 28, 1958, Guinea rejected membership of the French Community, the only African state to say "no" in the French referendum on the issue, and on October 2 came Touré's unilateral declaration of independence from France.

President de Gaulle, in one of the earliest of his foreign policy misjudgements, reacted with fury and vengeance. He took all steps, diplomatically normal and otherwise, to break Guinea. Within six weeks, all but a dozen of the 4,000 French administrators had returned to Mother France on de Gaulle's orders; most Government and municipal records had been destroyed; telephones had been ripped out of walls, electricity generators put out of action, and vaccine phials smashed. De Gaulle brought pressure to bear on Western nations around the world to follow his lead in denying diplomatic recognition or any aid whatsoever to Guinea.

Touré smiled. And in faraway Moscow, Khrushchev smiled a smile, too. Touré knew who would come running to his aid. And Khrushchev knew who he had in Touré of Guinea, and he was not disappointed when the two men met the following year in Moscow. At that meeting, Khrushchev was greatly impressed by the potentialities offered by Touré as a Communist stooge and immediately started thinking of Guinea in terms of a stooge state.

Almost immediately after Touré's U.D.I., the Communists were on the doorstep. The first to arrive were the East Germans with supplies of goods and the inevitable "technicians" and "scientists". Russia came to light with R26,000,000 and instructed Nkrumah to advance a R20,000,000 loan to Touré (never repaid). Poland and Bulgaria promised aid, and later Communist China advanced R17,000,000 as an interest-free loan — plus "experts", "skilled workers" and "technicians".

Communist Czechoslovakia played an interesting role in Guinea. In March 1959, a Czechoslovakian military mission arrived in Conakry. The mission left behind a big arms gift for Guinea and also left behind a permanent "military advisory mission". The Czechoslovakian advisers immediately started training the Guinean Army.

The importance that Khrushchev attached to Guinea was reflected in the man he chose as Russia's first Ambassador to Conakry. He was Daniel Solod, a top Russian expert on Africa who had had long experience of Communist intrigue in the Middle East, including Cairo. Solod not only laid the framework for a Marxist state in Guinea but he turned Conakry into a Russian-base for the export of subversion. He paid considerable attention to the activities of organizations such as the Front Revolutionnaire pour l'Independence Nationale des Colonies Portugaises (FRAIN), one of the first of the anti-Portuguese movements in Africa, as well as to organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the governments of Black African states such as those in the Ivory Coast and the Camerouns.

Touré, in his early days, was a jittery ruler. In April 1960 he announced that French authorities had been involved in a plot against him. Late in 1961 he announced that the teachers union led by Meita Koumendian, regarded as a Communist, was stirring up trouble with the aid of French and Communist authorities. As a result of the latter revelations by Touré, Solod withdrew from Guinea

on December 16, 1961, and his departure was immediately hailed by Western apologists as a sure sign that Touré had seen the light and would veer back to the West.

Touré himself seemed a bit confused in his own mind as to just who was plotting against him and to what extent he should be friendly or unfriendly towards the Russians. In any event he was already deeply committed to the Russians, and within a month Anastas Mikoyan, then first Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, was in Conakry soothing over any troubles that had arisen over the Solod affair and telling Touré who the next Russian Ambassador to Conakry would be. The Guinean Government, meanwhile, had through its Ambassador in Paris, Tibou Tounuare, absolved Solod of any blame in connexion with the plot against Touré and had said that Solod had left for personal reasons and had not been expelled. Whatever the exact details of the Solod affair were, the comradeship displayed by Guinea and Russia within a matter of weeks certainly did not give the impression that Touré's relations with the Kremlin were strained.

Another straw seized upon in the West was that some months later, Touré started making new overtures to Paris. It is true that the Russians had let Touré down badly. Nowhere else in Africa had the Russians made such a monumental mess of their aid programmes as in Guinea. Conakry was degenerating into a city where virtually all machinery and electrical installations were standing idle, buildings were being left half-completed, agriculture was in a chaotic state, and the economy, once a strong one, was skidding downhill at a rapid pace. Touré did look towards the West, and to France in particular, when he saw the predicament he was in, and his rapprochement with France lasted for more than two years until November 1965 when relations were broken off after Touré had alleged French involvement in an anti- Guinean plot.

Touré also accused the Ivory Coast, Niger and Upper Volta of complicity in the plot — accusations angrily denied by these governments, with Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast openly deriding Touré as a liar, who, like Nkrumah, was trying to camouflage the political, economic and human bankruptcy of his country.

The United States also came under the Touré whip. In November 1966, Touré expelled 64 Peace Corps workers because it was a Pan-American aircraft that was being used by 19 Guineans when they were arrested at Accra airport by the Ghanaian military authorities while en route to Addis Ababa. Touré also harassed the United States Ambassador in Conakry with a spell of house arrest.

It is true that Touré did seek a rapprochement with France and that he did become disenchanted with the Russians. But this certainly did not imply deviation from his Marxist path. It is significant that Guinean/Russian relations could stand the strain of friction and prosper whereas Guinean/French relations could not. In any case the facts speak for themselves. By the early 1960's, Touré had set up a rigid one-party dictatorship under the Parti Democratique de Guinee, which had all the trappings of a Marxist party; his courts of law were known as "people's courts" and some political crimes were referred to secret tribunals; a wide range of industries had been nationalized including a good slice of the important mineral industry, as well as all banks, insurance firms and key transport concerns; economic development had been put in a further straitjacket with the establishment of a Communist-style "Economic Police Force" under the control of the Minister of National Defence and Security to guard against economic malpractices; the four separate police forces had Communist-

style uniforms; the Guinean Army had been placed under the effective control of Communists from Czechoslovakia and it was said that Russia had been permitted to build a modern airfield, capable of taking modern Russian aircraft, and a submarine base, of inestimable value to Moscow.

An indication of the high regard in which International Communism held Touré was the significant reference by Chou En-lai on his 1964 African tour to the "broad identity of views" he held with Touré. The value of Touré was amply demonstrated in 1966 when Nkrumah was overthrown in Ghana and sought refuge. Touré was designated by International Communism as the man to play host to the Ghanaian Communist.

MALI

Ghana and Guinea were always on close terms under Nkrumah and Touré. Soon after their independence, they joined forces in the ill-fated Ghana-Guinea union which later became the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union when the Federation of Mali joined for a brief period. With the overthrow of Nkrumah, Modibo Keita of Mali, a huge country bordering on Guinea, became the kindred spirit of Touré in West Africa. Keita, leader of the former French Sudan, merged his country and Senegal into the Federation of Mali, as an independent state within the French Community, on June 20, 1960. On August 20, however, the Senegalese leaders, led by Mamadou Dia, fearing that the Sudanese group — already dominant in the Federation — planned to tighten its grip on the country, decided to secede and five days later adopted a new constitution for the independent state of Senegal with Leopold Senghor as President and Dia as Prime Minister. (In December 1962, Dia tried to take over supreme control of Senegal, but was thwarted by Senghor, who thereupon dismissed Dia and assumed the premiership as well as remaining President.)

The secession of Senegal had been opposed violently by Keita, but he had played his cards badly, and in fact was in such a weak position when the showdown came that he was placed under house arrest in Dakar (capital of Senegal and of the Federation). He had called in French troops to restore the Federation, but General de Gaulle refused his request. Eventually, Keita was sent back to Bamako, his regional capital, where he formed the Republic of Mali. Keita made a last attempt to gain foreign intervention (through the United Nations) to force Senegal to remain in the Federation, but was again rejected. On September 22, the Sudanese Assembly proclaimed Sudan an independent republic to be known as Mali, and Keita broke all links with France in retaliation for France's pro-Senegalese outlook and refusal to send in troops to maintain the Federation.

Keita, a 6'4" tall man, did not appear to have the political acumen of Touré or Nkrumah and bungled the Federation issue. Nevertheless, he was good stooge material, and was assiduously wooed by the Kremlin which even went to the length of giving him a Lenin Peace Prize. Russia's patience with Keita paid dividends, as he led Mali into the fold of Communist stooge states in Africa. (Mali has another claim to fame, as the home of the legendary Timbuktu.)

On the breakup of the Federation of Mali, International Communism set in motion its classic pattern of assistance to the fledgling stooge state. Czechoslovakia played a major role and within a short time the first batch of 20 Mali students were on their way to Czechoslovakian universities, Czechoslovakian doctors and nurses were at work in Mali hospitals and supervising a public health

scheme, the Czechoslovakian news agency was "helping" the Mali news agency and Czechoslovakian "officials" were "improving" the Mali communications system, the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Education was undertaking a complete re-organization of the Mali educational system, and Czechoslovakians were training Mali civil pilots.

On January 20, 1961, the French Government was ordered to disband its military bases at Bamako, Kati, Gao, and Tessalit, and the Russians moved in to build up air and rail communications. The Russians also pumped into Mali substantial amounts of agricultural aid, channeled through the State-controlled agricultural enterprises. Immediately afterwards, an extensive Russian/Mali technical and economic aid programme was undertaken. Yugoslavia and Poland moved in with offers of economic and technical assistance as well as scholarships and Communist China followed later. Even Egypt came to light with R12,000,000 in credits.

Keita worked quietly, almost unobtrusively, to transform Mali into a Marxist state. In addition to the Communist-style control of agriculture, a chain of subsidized "people's shops" appeared and "people's tribunals" were established to mete out rough justice. Keita's hand on the single political party was a heavy one and he brooked no opposition. Even a pro-French civilian demonstration in 1962 resulted in three top opposition politicians being sentenced to death (their sentences were later commuted) and 73 people sentenced to imprisonment by a "people's court".

If he was an unobtrusive leader, Keita has nevertheless achieved the results the Communists were hoping for. Not only has he established the Marxist pattern in Mali's internal life but he proved a valuable ally for the Communist rebels in the Congo, whom he openly supported. His success can be gauged from the fact that when Chou En-lai visited Africa in 1964, the 40,000 people who massed in Bamako gave the Chinese the most heartwarming reception of his entire visit to the continent. If any further proof of Keita's political affiliations was required, it was provided in 1966 when Nkrumah was overthrown in Ghana. The only countries Nkrumah has visited since are Communist China, Russia, Guinea and Mali. (I was recently informed by a Black African diplomat stationed in Cairo that Nkrumah has also visited Egypt, where his wife sought refuge after the coup, but this information has not been confirmed.)

NIGERIA

Nigeria has always shown promise of being a bulwark against Communism in West Africa, rather oddly so as the continent's most populous state suffers from acute forms of regionalism and racial antagonism which would appear to be ready-made for Communist exploitation. It has faced manifold post-independence problems of government and paraded before the world have been treason trials, major strikes, restrictive legislation, electoral violence and thuggery, widespread bribery and corruption, boycotting of elections after accusations that they had been rigged, and bloody military coup d'etats that cost the lives of respected leaders of the country. And yet the actions taken by the civilian Government, and later by the military authorities, and the manner in which accused were brought to trial and restrictive legislation presented, managed to create confidence in the future of the country and the hope that, even though Nigeria has many of the economic ills that could be exploited by Communism, she would emerge from her teething troubles on the opposite side of the net to the Communists.

Much of this confidence stemmed from the person of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Federal Prime Minister, who had the reputation of being a moderate and dedicated leader who had a high degree of personal integrity. His own personal standing has never been disputed and the military rulers who replaced him have gone out of their way to elevate him to national hero-ship, but he did nothing to stamp out, and even turned a blind eye to, the widespread corruption that was a part of the daily life of Nigeria — even permitting a free hand to Chief Okotie-Eboh, his Finance Minister and close friend who was known as the "king of dash" for his insistence on remuneration for official favours bestowed.

Not that the Communists did not try to exploit the situation in Nigeria, but the outlook of the Government — and perhaps respect for the efficient forces of law and order — kept them very much underground. On the attainment of independence on October 1, 1960, there was a party known as the Socialistic Workers and Farmers Party under the leadership of Dr. Tunji Otegbeye, a leader of the Nigerian Youth Congress, that showed open Communist objectives. But it was not permitted to become an effective force. In July 1964, a Nigerian court was told that a British university lecturer had plotted with two Nigerian trade unionists and a Nigerian schoolteacher to overthrow the Federal Government. Documents in court referred to the programme of the Communist Party of Nigeria and the constitution of the Revolutionary Socialist Party. The Government was attacked as a capitalist one; and the documents called on Nigerian Marxists to prepare for revolution. (The Nigerian Marxists had earlier found their spiritual home in the People's Party and the pro-Russian Communist Party.) Although trade unionists were implicated and there was evidence that the accused had plotted with labour leaders to introduce a leftist slant to labour unrest, there is no reason to believe that the official trade union movement has been infiltrated to any marked degree in Nigeria despite concerted efforts by Russian Communists.

It is inconceivable that 100% peace and calm will ever come to Nigeria, tortured as it is by the regional and racialist differences that have plagued it down the years. The only hope for Nigeria would be to split the country into ethnic nation-states. But Sir Abubakar was generally regarded as a man who was trying to do something for his country under difficult circumstances. It came as a shock, therefore, when on January 15, 1966 a flash military coup d'etat took place in Lagos and other parts of the country immediately after the first-ever Commonwealth Prime Minister's conference to be held outside London. Sir Abubakar, the host at the conference, was killed as were Chief Okotie-Eboh; Sir Ahmadu Bello, the politically powerful Sardauna of Sokoto; and Chief Samuel Akintola, Prime Minister of Western Nigeria.

The coup was staged by a group of young Army officers, led by Major Chukwuma Nzegwu, but Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, the Army commander — who had been ignorant of the move by the "Young Turks" — moved quickly to neutralize his junior officers and climbed into the saddle. Although little is known of Major Nzegwu and his conspirators, early indications were that it would prove to be a good thing that General Ironsi came out on top. A dedicated military officer in the British tradition with a good reputation as a professional soldier — he was, inter alia, commander of United Nations Forces in the Congo — he was very much a reluctant ruler whose actions were prompted by what he thought best for his country. In the few months he was in power, he showed strength of purpose, and, particularly promising, made extensive use of the civil service personnel to help him in his task of governing.

But within months, tribal animosities, always smouldering under the surface, erupted. On July 29, elements of the Nigerian Army mutinied, kidnapped Ironsi and several of his aides and formed a new government headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a 31-year-old Sandhurst-trained soldier.

The coup was a revolt by the Hausa, a Moslem tribe from the North, against the Ibo tribe of the South-East who had sparked the January revolution and had seen Ironsi, an Ibo, gain power after toppling the (Northern-dominated) civilian government. Ibo officers had become increasingly concerned about Ironsi since the January revolt as they felt he was not moving fast enough in asserting Ibo power over Nigeria. In the North, however, there was growing fear that the South was preparing to dominate the North and this fear was intensified on May 24 when General Ironsi announced that he had ended the federal structure of Nigeria and would in future rule Nigeria as a unitary state through centralized authority. Ironsi's decision sparked renewed violence in the North and in the first two weeks of June alone, 306 people were killed, 604 injured and 4,000 evacuated to the South.

Matters came to a head on July 29 when Hausa officers took over control of Nigeria. Touchy about the impression created by tribalism, they put Gowon, who is not of the Hausa tribe but is nevertheless a Northerner, in power. One of Gowon's first moves was to end the unitary structure of government and restore federalism to Nigeria.

Gowon was unable to bring peace to Nigeria and within weeks hundreds of Nigerians lay dead in the streets of tribalism as Hausa massacred Ibo and Ibo took revenge on Hausa. In the Ibo East, the military governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, refused to recognize the Hausa regime. In 1967 relations between Gowon and Ojukwu deteriorated rapidly and by April they virtually headed different states. By May, observers were talking of a "Katanga-style" secession and war in Nigeria.

Eventually, Gowon will either have to use force to maintain his position or split the country into at least three independent states. The latter step would be the logical one to take. But Gowon does not have the promise that Ironsi had of making a success of Nigeria.

The danger in Nigeria is that unless there is a realistic demarcation of boundaries along ethnic lines, the situation will deteriorate from month to month and year to year until it is so rotten that the Communists will march in.

CAMEROUNS, C.A.F., DAHOMEY, UPPER VOLTA

Of the non-stooge states in West Africa, the closest shave was that experienced by the Camerouns. The Union des Populations Camerounaises (U.P.C.) is probably the most openly Communist organization in French Africa outside Guinea and Mali. Led first by Reuben Um Nyobe and then Felix Moumie (Nyobe died during a terrorist operation in 1958 and Dr. Moumie died in Switzerland in 1960 accusing French right-wingers of having poisoned him) the U.P.C. first launched terrorists attacks in May 1955, the year it was banned by the French authorities, with an onslaught in the

Bamileke Province. The U.P.C., complete with its National Liberation Army of Kamerun (A.L.N.K.) received assistance from Russia and Communist Czechoslovakia and later from Communist China. Moumie was also a favourite son of Nkrumah, Touré and Nasser. The A.L.N.K. has been responsible for several thousand deaths during the past 11 or 12 years. Of late its activities have quietened down.

Much of the confidence that can be shown in the Camerouns, despite the determined efforts of the U.P.C. to subvert law and order, is due to President Ahmadou Adhidjo, a virtual unknown who was a reluctant hero when he led the Camerouns into independence in 1961 but who has since done a creditable job with a not very impressive heritage left by the French. He is a realistic politician and if given sufficient time to get the economy moving well should be able to thwart Communist aspirations.

But the Camerouns is not out of the wood yet. With Communist China showing an interest in the U.P.C., the quietening down of the A.L.N.K. may merely be the lull before the storm. The Camerouns has the misfortune of being next door to a key Communist stooge state, the Congo-Brazzaville, and a Sword of Damocles will accordingly always hang over her head.

Communist agents have been active in the Camerouns' neighbour, the Central African Republic, in Upper Volta and in Dahomey, but in all three cases, the military, led by anti-Communists, stepped in to prevent the Communists getting out of hand. In all three cases, the military coup d'etats can be regarded as tangible set-backs for Communism. While many Western observers have viewed with alarm the increasing military take-overs in Black Africa in recent years, it is worth noting that in the coups in French Equatorial Africa, the ousting of civilian governments has not been accompanied by the bloodshed, bitterness and barbarity that has accompanied military intervention in some of the former Belgian and British colonies.

In the Central African Republic, Colonel Bedel Bokassa, the Army chief of staff, seized power from President David Dacko in January 1966 to "put an end to a certain number of social injustices". In effect, this was a mild way of saying that Dacko, himself against Communism, had been powerless to stop his "angry young men" with leftist ideologies and the army had, accordingly, felt it necessary to step in to end the tolerance of Communism by the Government.

In Dahomey, the armed forces strong man, General Christophe Soglo, was almost reluctant about seizing power, and, in fact, gave two warnings to the politicians before taking power permanently into his own hands. Soglo first staged a coup d'etat in October 1963 when he ousted President Hubert Maga. The latter was politely treated and merely placed under house arrest and publicly accepted his dismissal as a good thing for the country. Soglo quickly handed over power to two civilians. Maga's vice-President, Mignan Apithy, became titular President and Justin Ahomadegbe, who had been a political prisoner of Maga at the time of the coup, was made vice-President in a post which amounted to an executive Premiership. Apithy at one stage appeared to be leaning leftwards and was proving an embarrassment to Ahomadegbe by currying favour with Communist countries but eventually Ahomadegbe curbed his powers.

But Ahomadegbe did not prove strong enough against the continued Communist infiltration of

Dahomey and eventually, in November 1965, Soglo deposed both Ahomadegbe and Apithy and replaced them with the President of the National Assembly — with a final warning that unless the civilians created a stable government, he would take over personally. Within a month, he staged the third of his coup d'etats and became head of government, making it quite clear that he would have no truck with Communist wiles.

In Upper Volta, the Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Sangoule Lamizana, seized power in January 1966 after a general strike and demonstrations had caused unrest and had precipitated the declaration of a nationwide state of emergency by President Maurice Yameogo. President Yameogo was an able and respected leader of Upper Volta and was genuinely pro-Western. But in his case, too, he had failed to be strong enough in dealing with Communism and even a last minute effort to save his position by publicly condemning Communist subversion and citing Joseph Onedrago, President of the National Assembly, as the leader of a subversive band, was not convincing enough for Colonel Lamizana. The latter took over the government, with the clear intention of stamping out Communism from Upper Volta.

GABON, THE IVORY COAST

Another coup d'etat in a French West African country took place in Gabon in 1964 and President Leon Mba was, again, politely treated and taken unharmed to Lambarene, the village near which Dr. Albert Schweitzer had his famed hospital. French troops were rushed into Gabon and restored Mba to power. Mba has always had to contend with a sprinkling of leftists headed by the Marxist Parti de l'Unite Gabonaise, but even before the coup he had started tightening his grip on the country. Mba has a fairly sound country, economically, to rule but the future of Gabon is difficult to assess as Mba appears to be becoming increasingly dictatorial. This could prove a good thing if Mba wants to keep the Communists at bay, but there is always the danger of power corrupting.

Gabon is, in fact, second in riches in French West Africa only to the Ivory Coast, the "jewel" of West Africa. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast is a one-time Communist, turned pro-Westerner, who was one of Africa's "Redeemer" heroes, is respected as a moderate, has considerable popular appeal despite more than one known plot against his life including at least one involving Communists, but nevertheless does not hesitate to rule his country with an iron hand and has a severe one-party set-up. Commentators wax lyrical about the thriving economy of the Ivory Coast and certainly the dramatic rise in the standard of living, the per capita income of the country, the domestic product and other indices of progress are impressive. Houphouet-Boigny's success can provide a lesson for other African states, for it is success achieved through close co-operation with France and Frenchmen (Houphouet-Boigny was once a Minister in the Fourth Republic). He has scorned rapid advance of Black Africans into top positions and has made liberal use of Frenchmen in senior Government posts. He has also rejected nationalization and other tenets of "African Socialism", a vague term at the best of times anyway, and has permitted free enterprise a free rein with emphasis on the participation in the economy of the peasant farmers. Despite his erstwhile Communist connexions, Houphouet-Boigny rules probably the most capitalist state in Black Africa. His policies have paid rich dividends for the Ivory Coast and for the people of the Ivory Coast, who are jealous of their high standards of living. Although he is very much a dictator, Houphouet-Boigny is likely to keep the Ivory Coast a West African bastion against Communism.

LIBERIA

The atmosphere in the Ivory Coast is in sharp contrast to that in next-door Liberia. Liberia is the African country most commonly associated with the United States. Although never an American colony, it was settled by former American slaves and United States influence has always been strong. To-day, after more than a century of independence (only four African countries — Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia and South Africa — were independent before World War II) Liberia still has much to remind one of America. Many Liberians speak pidgin-English with an American accent and the economy relies heavily on American investment.

So great has American influence in Liberia been that one would expect a progressive, enterprising and flourishing country politically and economically. But the drum beats of the Mennen Williams' and the Robert Kennedys' do not find an echo in the African state of Liberia. Liberty, equality and fraternity are dead in Liberia. So is government for the people, of the people by the people. Perhaps it is because the Americans have failed so dismally to implant their political way of life in Liberia that the clarion call for liberty, equality and fraternity is directed southwards away from Liberia.

President Tubman, who lives in splendid isolation in a R16,000,000 palace, is in his third decade of rule which he has achieved, inter alia, through blatant rigging of elections and by banning the only party, the True Whig Party, which had previously governed the country for a century. Tubman's Government, composed of descendants of American slaves who form only one-fifth of the total population, imposes a ruthless form of racialism on the other four-fifths of the population. Barbaric forms of voodooism and ju-ju are practised and it is reported that two American Peace Corps workers were once able, with little difficulty, to purchase human flesh for 20 dollars. Stringent electoral laws ensure that the majority has no say in government. The couple of newspapers permitted are strictly Government controlled.

Tubman has done little to uplift his people during his lengthy control of the country. Economic and literacy statistics are poor; racism is rampant, the Americans having failed to impress the Liberians with the Charter of Human Rights. Tubman has just turned 70 and could doubtless continue his repressive regime until he died. If the Communists played around with Liberia, the United States would no doubt consider it her duty to intervene and protect the country. Liberia is conceivably the only country in Africa that the United States would find analogous to Cuba and Vietnam and be prepared to use force to keep out the Communists. But the economic, political and racial situation in Liberia to-day is such that if Washington does not keep its eyes open, a Communist within the Liberian hierarchy would find a take-over bid a piece of cake.

For Liberia, like many other African countries, has allowed her head of government to set up such totalitarian machinery that a Communist would find conditions ideal for dominating the people.

SIERRA LEONE

Liberia's neighbour, Sierra Leone, was taken into independence in 1960 by Sir Milton Margai, a respected medical practitioner who was one of the few genuine "moderates" in Black African

politics. Sir Milton was widely respected and proved a good leader of his country. He took his time over independence, having virtually been pushed into freedom, had shown a disdain for rapid promotion for Black Africans purely on the basis of the colour of their skin and had built up close links with the former mother country, Britain.

Also in politics was his half-brother, Albert Margai, a Louis Armstrong-type lawyer (Albert was the first Sierra Leonean to become a qualified lawyer, Milton the first qualified doctor). Albert Margai was more militant and Sir Milton, although working closely with his brother after the latter had taken his former Opposition People's National Party into the government with Sir Milton's Sierra Leone People's Party (S.L.P.P.) at the time of independence, had to keep a perpetually restraining hand on ebullient Albert. When Sir Milton Margai died in April 1964, Albert Margai (later knighted) was appointed Prime Minister.

The appointment immediately sparked off protests and plunged the Government into a crisis. Once again, racism had reared its ugly head in an African state.

The Margai brothers were members of the Mende tribe, which with the Temne tribe was the biggest in Sierra Leone but differed radically from one another, and Sir Milton had managed to keep the various tribal jealousies under control within the S.L.P.P. Government. But when he died, the Temnes felt that their leader, External Affairs Minister John Karefa-Smart, should be given a chance while the large Moslem population urged that Social Welfare Minister M. S. Mustapha should become Premier, thus giving the Moslems a chance of the Premiership after it had been held by a Christian. However, Albert Margai, dropping both Dr. Karefa-Smart and Mr. Mustapha from his cabinet, carried the day.

Racism in Sierra Leone is aggravated by the fact that the Creoles, of the former "Colony" area, were once the traditional political leaders but were replaced by the "Protectorate" politicians and esented this as well as their exclusion from commerce; and, furthermore, there is a strong Lebanese group which has a big stake in the economy but resists any fraternization with the Black peoples and, in turn, is denied civic rights. The latter situation causes much racial friction.

With Sir Milton's death, all these racist hatreds came to the fore and threatened the stability of Albert Margai's regime. Furthermore, the economy had not shown any appreciable improvement since independence, and this was an added cause of friction.

Albert Margai, an enthusiastic supporter of Nkrumah and Touré subscribed to Nkrumahist doctrines, including that of a one-party state, and it was only the overthrow of Nkrumah that made him shelve plans for a one-party state (his brother, Milton, had strongly opposed a single party state). Margai ran up a public debt of R260,000,000 and made Sierra Leone bankrupt. He was also guilty of nepotism, bribery and corruption.

By 1967, the Army, which had watched the coups in West Africa with interest, was restless. There was a half-hearted attempt to challenge Margai in February and then in March the storm broke. On March 17, a General Election was held to decide whether Margai should be permitted to establish a republic in which he would have wide-ranging powers. He had rigged the results of four

constituencies to ensure the return of himself, his brother Sam, his Finance Minister and his Foreign Minister.

On March 31, with Election returns incomplete, Mr. Siaka Stevens, Leader of the Opposition, was sworn in by the Governor-General, Sir Henry Lightfoot-Boston, as Prime Minister. Immediately, Brigadier David Lansana, the Army commander, staged a coup d'etat.

The reason for Lansana's action was simple. He was a Mende, like Margai, and was determined that his tribe would stay in power. Tribal tempers flared, Lansana was deposed and in a series of moves, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Juxon-Smith emerged as head of government. Juxon-Smith was forced to take immediate steps to prevent tribalism getting out of hand.

Juxon-Smith is a Creole, and the re-appearance of this group into the corridors of power in any large numbers could cause unrest and further bloodshed. For Juxon-Smith, the financial mess he has inherited from Margai is another headache. One thing is certain: Sierra Leone is well rid of Albert Margai.

SENEGAL, GAMBIA, CHAD, TOGO, NIGER

Senegal and Gambia are two separate countries, the former French-speaking and the latter English-speaking that could well be united into one state. Gambia slides into the middle of Senegal like a tiny, crooked finger and every now and then attempts have been made to forge the two units into one nation but these attempts have never materialized into anything concrete. Both countries are poor and need heavy injections of foreign aid, which they receive from their respective mother countries.

Gambia (the last of the British colonies in Africa to be granted independence except for the three protectorates in Southern Africa) has been virtually free of subversive movements. Senegal, on the other hand, has had her bad moments. While a member of the short-lived Mali Federation (consisting of Senegal and the French Sudan, now Mali, in which the latter was dominant), Senegal had been subjected to Communist influences. With the break-up of the Federation, the Communists worked through the Parti Africain de l'Indépendance (P.A.I.). The P.A.I., banned in Senegal in June 1960, is now an underground subversive movement concentrating on several countries of West Africa. Up to now, it has been relatively ineffectual except for election riots it triggered in Senegal in December 1963 but has the potential to become a real threat.

Despite the activities of the P.A.I., current indications are that Senegal, like Gambia, will escape the clutches of the Communists for the foreseeable future.

Much the same can be said for Chad, with her pro-Western, go-ahead President, Francois Tombalbaye, Togo and Niger. The Niger Government appears to have squashed the terrorist organization led by Djibo Bokary of the banned opposition party Sawaba. Bokary, a disgruntled political foe of President Hamani Diori, left Niger in 1959 and made contact with the right circles in Ghana and Algeria, and later was passed on to Peking. Assisted by substantial sums of Communist money, he formed a terrorist gang from men he had trained in Algeria and Communist China. At the beginning of 1965, the terrorists launched a series of attacks which were intended to culminate in the

overthrow of the Diiori Government. But the raids had been badly organized, the men sent into action too hastily; and when the tough, warlike Haoussa tribesmen turned on the invaders, the tiny Niger army was able to stamp out the revolt.

Togo, a thumb-like projection snuggling between Ghana and Dahomey, has managed to survive such critical years that it is likely to manage to survive any future onslaughts by the Communists. The critical years were those when Nkrumah ruled Ghana. Nkrumah had an insatiable longing for Togo, which he regarded as rightfully Ghanaian territory and the tiny land was on the top of Nkrumah's priority list for subversion against other African states.

In fact it is surprising that Nkrumah did not manage to obtain greater success through exploitation of the ethnically-related tribes living along the Ghana/Togo frontier. It is also surprising that he did not provoke a border incident serious enough for him to use as a screen to march in an annex Togo.

In 1963, President Olympie of Togo was assassinated during an Army coup d'etat. In the initial confusion it was taken for granted that Nkrumah's hand was behind the coup and assassination. But it appeared subsequently that the coup had been merely an internal uprising spurred by discontent over conditions of service in the Army. This analysis was strengthened when the Army invited Nicolas Grunitzky, a former Prime Minister then living in exile in Dahomey after quarelling with Olympie, to return and take over the Government. Grunitzky, son of a Polish father and a Togolese mother, was more right-wing than Olympie and his installation as President was a set-back for Nkrumah.

Grunitzky was not a particularly strong ruler. His most notable achievement was to obtain considerable foreign investment (mainly West German, French and United States) for his tiny land but the domestic economic picture remained bleak. A moderate in the true sense of the word, he tried his best to bring about unity but without success. He tried hard to find some accommodation with supporters of ex-President Olympie but efforts to form coalition governments with them and with other political groupings failed and there was continual political friction in the country. Eventually, after having two months earlier supported Grunitzky in an open civilian clash between Grunitzky and Olympie's followers, the Army stepped in and deposed Grunitzky in a bloodless coup on January 13, 1967.

The Army chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Etienne Eyadema, led the coup. He is a professional soldier who, despite his youthful 30 years, has had a distinguished career including spells in Indo-China and Algeria. There is no reason to believe that Eyadema disapproved of Grunitzky's policies and no startling change in alignment can be expected from the new ruler of Togo.

Since the fall of Nkrumah, the only danger to Togo has been from the Parti de la Revolution Socialiste du Benin. Designated to work for the overthrow of Togo and Dahomey, it takes its name from the fact that both countries are on the Bay of Benin. It has not at this stage shown any potential of becoming a danger in the near future to either country, especially so since the two coups in the Benin lands.

MALAGASY AND OTHER ISLANDS

Malagasy is an island (one of the world's largest) on the east coast of Africa but is generally grouped with French West Africa not only because of the French connexion but also because of the ideological similarities of the leaders of these states. It was in Tananarive, capital of Malagasy, for example, that the French-speaking African states decided to meet in June 1966 to ratify the Charter of OCAM, their regional grouping.

President Philibert Tsiranana is pro-Western and has taken elaborate steps to steer his country well away from Communist clutches. He has also served notice that he will deal promptly with any local undermining of power — at the time of the East African mutinies in Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar, for instance, he made it clear that he would call in French military help if any trouble was brewed on Malagasy.

In his anti-Communist battle, Tsiranana is beset by acute economic problems and by growing disenchantment with the Government from the Hova tribe, the traditional rulers of Malagasy and still the most influential of the tribes. Furthermore, there are undercurrents of Communist influence through infiltration of the A.K.F.M., the chief opposition party, and a left-wing trade union FISEMA. Not only do Tsiranana's close links with France lay his countrymen visiting France open to overtures from the French Communist Party, but Communist China does her best to influence the Chinese living on the island. However, Tsiranana is so staunchly anti-Communist that he is likely to be able to resist any Communist advances from within or outside Malagasy.

Communist influence is also at work on several of Africa's other islands, such as Reunion (where the Communists are orientated to Peking), Mauritius (which has an active Communist Youth League which favours Russia), the four Comoro Islands (with their "Comoro Islands Liberation Front"), and the Seychelles. These islands have little significance in the Cold War at this stage, and as far as can be gauged Communist influence is unlikely to be a major factor for the foreseeable future. But it would be as well to remember that it was on an island, Zanzibar, that the Communists staged a spectacular coup.

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THE UNITED NATIONS INSPANNED

(Congo-Kinshasa)

Of all the countries in Africa, the Congo-Kinshasa stands out as the most striking example of all the ills that have beset Africa in this decade concentrated in a single country. In sharp tones, the Congo reflects the dismal failure of European colonial policy in Africa, the weak-kneedness and duplicity of contemporary Western politicians, the agonies of a multi-racial and multi-tribal community trying to survive within a single political structure, the dangerous threat of Communism, and the chaos that results when inexperienced people are suddenly confronted with the complexities of managing a 20th Century state.

The tragedy of the Congo is that it was a rich country on independence both in mineral deposits (copper, cobalt, diamonds) and in the agricultural sphere (a wide range of tropical crops). In 1959, the year before independence, the Congo exported R106,000,000 in agricultural products and R.200,000,000 worth of minerals. It produced one-third of the world's cobalt and 60% of the industrial diamonds. Its wealth, and its strategic position in the centre of Africa, could have made the Congo a leading nation in Africa. Instead, her people live from year to year in one of the most precarious states on the continent.

The Congo is the third largest country in Africa, next to the Sudan and Algeria. Over its 905,000 square miles it has five regions, each differing radically from the others. It has 200 tribes and 300 principal languages plus numerous dialects. (Less than 10% of Congolese speak French, the official language.) These tribes have vastly different outlooks.

It is in her geographic and tribal disparities that the problems of the Congo are rooted. And it is because these problems were shied away from rather than solved before independence that the tragedy of the Congo occurred.

Up to 1959, no one in Belgium, the mother land, had seriously considered that the Congo should become independent. Up until then, the Belgian rulers had thought that they would have the Congo as a colony for as long as they wished. As Catherine Hoskyns points out in "The Congo since Independence" (Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1965), no one in Belgium "envisaged a time when final responsibility for the Congo would be out of Belgian hands". She continues: "To the Belgians, the idea of handing over a show of power to an African minister while the real work was done by a European permanent secretary was abhorrent; they intended that the Africans should take responsibility slowly and gradually from the bottom up and that in the meantime the top position in all sections of society should be held by expatriate Belgians. No African should hold a post until he was as well qualified as the Belgian he replaced. In this way they hoped to build up a local administration which would be the equal of that operating in metropolitan Belgium."

In 1959, however, a series of riots occurred in the Congo and the Belgians capitulated immediately. The "Western statesmen" in Brussels hastily summoned a constitutional conference in the Belgian

capital in January 1960 and equally hastily agreed to give independence to the Congo by June 30. Even the Congolese were taken aback and surprised that they were to be given independence at so early a date.

Apologists in the West were quick to point out that Belgium had no choice because of the "climate of freedom" in Africa, where all the Congo's neighbours were being given independence. That thought might have soothed a few consciences, but the ugly truth of the matter is that Belgium did a disservice to Africa and the world when she gave precipitous independence to the Congo. However honest the intentions of Belgium might have been, it is a sad reflection on the principles and values of Western nations that one of their number could have buckled so easily. Worse still that in falling into the mire she had to take such a promising African country with her. The Congo fiasco showed that the problems of Africa are for solving by men of steel.

Despite growing doubts and misgivings in Belgium about the granting of independence so quickly, the Government pressed forward regardlessly and another independent state was born in Africa on June 30, 1960. This new state had hardly any Congolese trained for Government administration. (Up to 1954, there had been only about 20 university graduates, little secondary and no university facilities.) The Army did not have a single Congolese officer; no one who had been trained in the traditions of Sandhurst or St. Cyr as in other African countries.

And the man the Belgians handed over control of the Congo to was unfit to be a junior clerk in a modern government, let alone a Prime Minister. The rise of this man was as sudden as the decision to give independence to the Congo had been.

Patrice Lumumba was born of humble origins in the village of Katako-Kombe in North Kasai in 1925. A member of the warlike but insignificant Batetela tribe, his parents were Catholics and sent the young Lumumba to a Catholic mission school. He soon rebelled and went to a Protestant school but rebelled there, too, and became atheistic. After a rudimentary education, Lumumba became a clerk in the post office in Stanleyville (now Kisangani). In 1956, he was sentenced to two years imprisonment for embezzling R1,500 from the post office and was in jail in Jadotville for a year (his sentence was reduced). As a child, Lumumba had stolen a watch and cash from a Protestant missionary.

While in Stanleyville, Lumumba became active in local politics and later moved to Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) where he was given a job as a beer salesman, and once again entered political life. He also became addicted to gin, drugs and haschisch (dagga) and was a frequenter of Leopoldville bars.

In October 1958, Lumumba took the lead with Joseph Ileo and Cyrille Adoula (both later to become Prime Ministers) in forming the Mouvement National Congolais. Lumumba became President and Adoula vice-President of the M.N.C.

At the outset, Lumumba strove hard to make the M.N.C. a "national", i.e. non-tribal party, in sharp contrast to other political parties of the day such as Joseph Kasavubu's ABAKO (Association des Bakongo pour l'Unification, l'Expansion et la Defense de la Langue Kikongo) which represented the

Bakongo tribe and its interests only and Moise Tshombe's CONAKAT (Confederation des Associations du Katanga) formed of more than a dozen Katangan tribes but dominated by Tshombe's Lunda tribe. Indeed, within a year of the formation of the M.N.C., Lumumba clashed with one of his leading lights, Albert Kalonji, the M.N.C. boss in Kasai, because Kalonji wanted to make the M.N.C. in Kasai a tribal party dedicated to the promotion of the interests of the Baluba. This split was a heavy blow to Lumumba as, although the weight of the M.N.C. remained with him, he lost some outstanding men. Kalonji was to become one of his bitterest foes and built up appreciable support as leader of the M.N.C.-K. (Kalonji); another who was to desert him was Adoula, who henceforth adopted an independent line; Joseph Ileo also deserted Lumumba.

Lumumba countered this set-back by becoming even more racist and whipping his supporters into a frenzy of incitement, and leaning ever more heavily towards Communism for support. But it appeared that Lumumba was losing the battle. Firstly, he was an aggressive, domineering, sneering man who ruled his party like a Communist dictator and it was believed that further internal dissension would occur in the M.N.C. Secondly, in November 1959, he was jailed for six months on a charge of sedition. His prospects, on the eve of the 1960 round table conference in Brussels that decided the future of the Congo, looked dim and few would have said that within months he would emerge victorious at a General Election and become Prime Minister. But the Belgians, who had always looked on Lumumba as a "moderate" and likeable fellow, released him from jail after he had served only a couple of days so that he could attend the Brussels conference. Lumumba went to Brussels, outshone Kasavubu, Tshombe and everyone else and, capitalizing on tactical mistakes by Kasavubu and Tshombe, emerged as the leader of the Congolese politicians. He returned to win the most seats in the General Election and, after a tricky period with the local anti-Lumumba Belgian representative, became Prime Minister.

Who was this moderate, likeable fellow, Lumumba? Lumumba, far from being a fit person to become head of an independent state, was a rogue, a petty thief, a drug addict. He was also a dedicated Communist.

Lumumba was not only a dedicated Communist, but he was also a shrewd one, dressing himself in the finery of a Congolese "nationalist" and hiding, very successfully, his true political colours.

In her book, "Who Killed the Congo" (the Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1962), Philippa Schuyler quotes Joseph Yav, one of Lumumba's Cabinet Ministers, as follows:

"Yes, Lumumba is a Communist! I know it. I have proof... On his visit to Russia and East Germany, he was given money, presents, girls and lavish hospitality. He never looked behind the glitter to see the real foundation of these slave states."

Lumumba himself is on record as having written: "I am convinced that with the unreserved support of the Soviets, I shall win the day in spite of everything."

The Communists, in fact, tried hard to take over the Congo through Lumumba. Apart from the prostitutes and presents they gave him on his visits behind the Iron Curtain, they provided him with an estimated R300,000 a month for use in the traditional Communist strategy of buying supporters.

(It is said that before independence, Lumumba's party had 38 motor-cars, mostly big American models, and R1,300,000 in a Swiss bank.) Russian arms, ammunition, military vehicles and other supplies were smuggled into the Congo for Lumumba's use, and Communist agents were sent into the country to spread Communist/Lumumbist propaganda. (For instance, after assuming power on September 14, 1960, one of the first acts of Army commander Mobutu was to expel seven Russian "officers" who, in Mobutu's words, had been "disguised as technicians" for spreading Communist propaganda at Camp Leopold. Mobutu also revealed a fortnight later that when Lumumba was on a sticky wicket, Communist China had given him a pledge of R2,000,000.)

The Communists also instructed Nkrumah to take Lumumba under his wing at the all-African People's conference in Accra in December 1958. Nkrumah did a good job and from then on exerted tremendous influence on Lumumba. (Nkrumah is reported to have written to Lumumba on one occasion with the advice that the only "colonialist and imperialist" that should be trusted was "a dead one".)

Lumumba, it should be noted, was not a weakling politician who had been swayed into acceptance of Communism through wine, women and roubles. His whole record, from his early rejection of Christianity, through his political activities on the tribal level among the Batetelas, to his days in the M.N.C. and eventually as Prime Minister, seethes with Communist ideology. Among the Batetelas, he had set up an organization based on Communist thuggery methods of intimidation and had sought to persuade the tribesmen that he was an incarnation of his ancestors. In the M.N.C., he was a ruthless dictator preaching a Communist-inspired racialism. As Prime Minister, his ideology was that of a Communist tyrant. His views on how to become dictator of the Congo were identical to those of the Communists: stir up racist feelings among the population, grievances in the Army; blame the resultant outbreak of violence on the "colonialists"; seize power and impose a rule of iron. The tragedy for the Communists is that they pushed Lumumba too far too fast; the greater tragedy for the Congo, Africa and the world, is that Belgium cowered and surrendered unconditionally in the first wave of Lumumba's Communist onslaught.

An outstanding example of Lumumba's political ideology is given in the following excerpt from a United Nations document (A/471 I/ADD 2 of March 20, 1961) which quotes the following confidential instructions to the heads of the Congo's provinces, signed by "P. Lumumba, Prime Minister":

"SUBJECT: Measures To Be Applied During the First Stages of the Dictatorship.

"Sir,

I have the honour and the pleasure to inform you that with a view to the rapid restoration of order in the country, the House of Representatives and the Senate (of the central government), meeting in special session on 13 September of this year, decided to grant the government full powers.

Full powers should be understood to mean that the government is free to act as it thinks fit in all respects, for the purpose of suppressing abuses, disorders and any action which is contrary to the will of the government over which I have presided

legally since the attainment of independence by the Congo.

The most effective and direct means of succeeding rapidly in our task may be summarized as follows:

1. Establish an absolute dictatorship and apply it in all its forms.
2. Terrorism, essential to subdue the population.
3. Proceed systematically, using the army, to arrest all members of the opposition. I will be personally responsible for those at Leopoldville including the Head of State... Tshombe and Kalonji...
4. Imprison the ministers, deputies and senators, who sometimes abuse their parliamentary immunity. In such a case I should be glad if you would not spare them but arrest them all without pity and treat them with ten times more severity than ordinary individuals.
5. Revive the system of flogging and give the rebels 10 lashes, morning and evening, for a maximum of 7 consecutive days. N.B. Double the number in the case of ministers, senators, and deputies, reducing the number gradually according to the condition of each individual.
6. Inflict profound humiliations on the people thus arrested, in addition to the obligatory treatment described above. For example, strip them in public, if possible in the presence of their wives and children. Make them carry heavy loads and force them to walk about in that state. In case of such a walk, however, drawers may be worn.
7. In view of the seriousness of the situation of the country, which is in danger of sinking into anarchy, it would be well to imprison repeated offenders in underground cells or prisons for at least six months, never allowing them out to breathe fresh air. N.B. If some of them succumb as a result of certain atrocities, which is possible and desirable, the truth should not be divulged but it should be announced, for instance, that Mr. X has escaped and cannot be found.
8. Those who do not succumb in prison should not be released for at least a year. In this case they shall be exiled to a country to be determined by me in agreement with certain foreign countries which have already signified their agreement in principle.

Some of the provincial presidents (to whom this directive was addressed) will say that the measures described are severe. In reply I would point out to them that certain politicians have attained power by means of dictatorship. Moreover, the measures of execution that I have indicated above constitute only the first stage of the basic regime that we hope will succeed in the Congo..."

This, then, was the man who became a "darling" in Belgium and was warmly embraced and honoured in the United States by the Eisenhower administration. This was the man who actively worked to promote chaos in the Congo so that he could make his country a Communist state.

Within a week of the Congo obtaining independence, units of the Army mutinied and soon the whole country was aflame with lawlessness, anarchy and chaos. Belgium and other Western nations were to learn a bitter lesson of what happens when a country acting as a guardian leaves a dependent country in the lurch without having trained the people in the art of government. The Belgians had

not seen a single Congolese through the ranks of the Army to a commission and the price that was paid was a high one. Within three weeks of the Army mutiny, a Belgian inquiry reported that Congolese had raped 291 White women and girls in the Congo "most of them 12, 15, 20 or more times. Some were raped so frequently they could not remember how many times... there is much evidence of the raping of pregnant women..." Hundreds of other Whites were molested, humiliated and brutally beaten. In many cases, those guilty of atrocities were Congolese soldiers.

On July 9, Kasavubu, the President, and Lumumba asked the United States for assistance in restoring law and order. Eisenhower referred them to the United Nations, and the Security Council authorized a United Nations "peace-keeping mission".

At this stage, an important question must be answered: if Lumumba was a Communist lackey, why did he not call in Russian assistance ? Why did he go running to the United States ? No one seems to know just what strategy Lumumba worked out in those crucial days of independence and what motivations or advice prompted his actions. Even taking into account the fact that he was in his first days of Premiership and had not found his feet properly, that he did not have a solidly united Government, or even Cabinet, behind him, that he had to find some sort of accommodation with the less radical Kasavubu in coming to a decision on outside assistance, Lumumba could have taken a gamble and asked for Russian troops. (At a later stage, Kasavubu was, in fact, persuaded by Lumumba to call for Russian assistance but by then the United Nations was in control and simply tore up the request from Kasavubu and Lumumba before it got to the Russians, who, in any case, would not have acceded at a stage when the U.N. was already in the Congo.)

Perhaps he did ask for Russian troops, but was rejected. The exact political and diplomatic manoeuvrings in Leopoldville in the first week of July might never be known, but one is inclined to assume that Lumumba, as a dedicated Communist, must have thought seriously, if he did not actually make an approach, about the use of Russian forces. If Lumumba did approach Russia, why did the Communists not step into Africa?

Several factors might have persuaded the Kremlin against going to Lumumba's aid. There was the same consideration that prompted Eisenhower to veto U.S. intervention, namely the fear of an East-West "confrontation". From a military point of view, Russia's isolation from Africa might have made it difficult to send in troops and certainly she would have had the odds loaded against her if her troops were resisted by another Congolese faction with aid from another foreign source and a conventional war had erupted on Congolese soil. It should be remembered that in 1960, Russia was still feeling her way in Africa and might have considered that the progress she had already made through Nasser, Nkrumah and company might receive a set-back and her image in Afro-Asian eyes dealt a blow if she forcibly took over an African state precisely at a moment when Black Africa was extremely sensitive about its newly-won independence and about outside interference in African affairs.

Military, political and diplomatic considerations would appear to have ruled out Russian intervention in the Congo in 1960. This, as it must be in the absence of any clear indication of what went on in Leopoldville in the first days of July 1960, is speculative. But however close to or wide from the mark it is, it would not be amiss for the West to think hard about Russian reluctance to

intervene openly in the Congo in 1960. For if a parallel case occurs later in Africa, it is on the cards that the Communists will not be as hesitant to interfere and send armed troops to an African state.

Although Lumumba's request to the United States Government to help restore law and order must have caused the Kremlin some anxious moments, it must have had prior knowledge of the request and must have thought the chances of Eisenhower referring it to the United Nations would be high enough to take that risk. Once the request was in the hands of the United Nations, the Russians were able to breathe a sigh of relief.

International news media have done their utmost to persuade the general public that the United Nations is primarily a vehicle of United States foreign policy. The Communists have gone to great pains to perpetuate this belief, for this is the image they would like the United Nations to have. In actual fact, the United Nations is primarily an agent for Communism, and the best example of all was paraded before the public eye in the Congo. The red tint of the United Nations is too vast a subject to be covered within the ambit of this book, but suffice it to say that the tint has been there since the inception of the organization and that to-day it is of a deeper hue than ever. As far as the Communists are concerned, the United Nations has two important organs: the General Assembly and the Secretariat. (The Security Council, although it can, and has, under specific circumstances, been used to the full as the executive arm of the United Nations to carry out Communist-devised schemes, is not regarded as a vehicle for continuous Communist propaganda.) The General Assembly, unlike the select-membership Security Council, is the forum for all the nations of the world and is not as a general rule bound by voting restrictions. The General Assembly, therefore, is the propaganda weapon within the Communists' United Nations arsenal, and with the advent of an increasing number of left-wing states on the world scene in recent years, the United Nations General Assembly has increasingly become a valuable machine for Communist propaganda. The Secretariat is the silent weapon in the Communists' United Nations armoury. It is literally riddled with Communists, fellow travellers and undercover Communists from top to bottom and is a powerful organism that sends its silent tentacles into all corners of the world on behalf of the Communists.

The Communists were thus quite happy for the United Nations to intervene in the Congo in 1960, and to make doubly sure of their case, they sent their own agents and military equipment into that country despite their prior agreement to leave the "peace-keeping mission" to the United Nations. Unfortunately for them, they pushed Lumumba too far too fast and failed to secure the Communist state they and Lumumba had schemed to bring about.

In the meantime, Lumumba worked feverishly to establish a totalitarian state along Communist lines, his strategy being to instal himself as dictator and then use the Ghanaian, Guinean and other United Nations troops to bolster his regime. Nkrumah gave Lumumba advice regularly and his ambassadors, Andrew Djin and Nathaniel Welbeck, interfered openly in the political life of Leopoldville giving instructions to Lumumba and to the Ghanaian troops who were supposed to be under United Nations command. The Ghanaian officers resented this political intervention by their head of government when they were supposed to be part of an international peace force and thereafter many of them had little time for Nkrumah.

Lumumba imposed martial law, introduced Press censorship, banned political meetings, threw his

political opponents into jail and expelled the Belgian Ambassador whilst opening the flood-gates to Communist diplomats and militarists.

He came increasingly into conflict with Kasavubu, against whom he had not dared to take action and on September 5 the clash came right into the open when Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba. In a hectic series of events, Lumumba returned the compliment; both Kasavubu and Lumumba ignored the other. On September 10, Joseph Ileo announced that he had accepted an invitation to form a new government and two days later he arrested Lumumba, who, however, was released by his guards; on September 14, Mobutu who had just been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army in place of Victor Lundula, took over power and appointed a college of commissioners to run the country until the end of the year while the "politicians cooled off". On September 18, Lumumba emerged from a two-day hideaway period and attacked Mobutu's administration, claiming to be the lawful ruler of the Congo; Mobutu rejected Lumumba's outcry as "smacking of Russian propaganda".

A final showdown between Kasavubu and Mobutu who were having disputes of their own on who should run the Congo, and Lumumba, was delayed because the United Nations was openly supporting Lumumba and preventing Mobutu from arresting him. Ghanaians guarded the Prime Minister's official residence where Lumumba had sought shelter, Guinean troops had protected him while he had disappeared to the Guinean Embassy for two days in mid-September for consultations with his Communist bosses, and Ghanaians had rushed to his aid on September 14, when, in a desperate, final bid to rally the support of the Army for his cause against Mobutu, he had gone to Camp Leopold and Baluba tribesmen had tried to mete out summary punishment: execution.

Lumumba's campaign received a grievous set-back when Mobutu, on assuming power, ordered all Communist diplomats to quit within 48 hours (on September 17, 70 Russian "diplomats" left Leopoldville with large quantities of documents after spending most of the previous night burning documents). Both the Army and the public were clearly turning against Lumumba and the Communist influences that were at work. Mobutu's anti-Communist actions, the serious unrest and anti-Lumumbism in the Army, and the attitude of the population prevented the Communists from using the United Nations machinery in the Congo effectively to reinstate Lumumba; at the same time, the United Nations troops effectively blocked Mobutu's efforts to deal the death blow to Lumumba and his followers and thus perpetuated a deadlock.

This situation wore on until the end of November. Then on November 27, the brief but stormy saga of Patrice Lumumba entered its final chapter. On that date, Lumumba left the security of his U.N.-guarded residence and fled to Stanleyville, his political stronghold. On December 1, he was arrested by Mobutu's men at Port Francqui and taken back to Leopoldville. On January 17, 1961, he was transferred to Elisabethville and taken to the Thysville army camp in Katanga. On February 10 it was announced that he had escaped with two of his aides. Two days later, all three were killed by villagers near Kolwezi.

After Lumumba's death, the Communist bosses in the Kremlin sent the message all over the world: mass demonstrations. Demonstrators took the streets in a number of countries to protest at the death of a hero of International Communism.

To the outside world, Lumumba's political actions made him the Congolese to watch in 1960. In 1961 his place was taken by Tshombe of Katanga.

Of the political leaders of the Congo, the only really true anti-Communist was Moïse Kapenda Tshombe. Born in November 1919 of royal blood and a wealthy father at Masumba, the royal capital of Katanga's most important tribe, the Lunda, Tshombe strengthened his blue-blood pedigree with a marriage to a daughter of the Paramount Chief of the Lunda. He was educated at schools run by American Methodist missionaries, and then went into his father's business - the largest Black African business in Katanga - but he did not prove to be a good businessman and went bankrupt on more than one occasion.

Eventually he decided to leave the world of commerce to the rest of the family and went into politics in 1947, being elected first to the Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) City Council and then to the Provincial Council. A few years later he formed CONAKAT, the first political party the Belgians had allowed in Katanga. When independence came to the Congo, Tshombe was the undisputed leader of Katanga.

Tshombe had been opposed to the unitary structure of government in the Congo all along, preferring a confederation, and as soon as the troubles erupted after independence he declared Katanga's secession (July 11, 1960).

Although he had declared Katanga independent, he did so reluctantly, and it is to his credit that he made a major effort to effect conciliation with his fellow Congolese leaders when the Congo was in a mess. This was in March 1961, when relations between Leopoldville and the United Nations were at the low-water mark and when much of the Congo was in foment through the activities of Gizenga and his fellow Communists.

Tshombe arranged a round table conference at Tananarive in the Malagasy Republic that was attended by Kasavubu, Ileo and Adoula. The only politician of any importance not present was Gizenga, who was recognized as a political leader, although in fact he only represented a handful of thugs. Gizenga had wanted to attend the conference but at the last minute was instructed by his Communist bosses to stay away.

Under Tshombe's guidance, the Tananarive conference worked out a confederate form of government that would satisfy the various states' desire for autonomy but would bind them to a common policy on foreign affairs, a common currency system and so on. Tshombe was prepared at this stage to sacrifice Katangan independence for the good of the Congo as a whole. All the leaders of the Congo endorsed this plan.

But the Communists had other ideas. The Tananarive plan would have given the Congo the only real chance she had had up to then but the Communists were not interested in a united Congo. They were interested only in dominating the Congo and Tshombe's plan would wreck their chances. They played their trump card: the absence of Gizenga from Tananarive obviously meant, said the Communists, that the conference had not been representative of the Congo. The United Nations dutifully rejected the decision taken by all the political leaders of the Congo on the grounds that

Gizenga was not present.

Pressure was put on Kasavubu to reject the Tananarive plan. Kasavubu, a weak politician at the best of times, bowed to the United Nations threats and renounced the Tananarive plan when a follow-up conference was held at Coquilhatville (now Mbandaka) in April. Disgusted, Tshombe walked out of the conference and prepared to leave for Elisabethville - and leave the rest of the Congo to her fate. But the Leopoldville Government, kowtowing to the United Nations, arrested Tshombe at Coquilhatville airport and held him prisoner for two months until he signed an agreement under duress to end Katanga's secession. Having aligned himself with Kasavubu, he was released on June 24, and immediately on his arrival in Elisabethville repudiated the agreement which he had signed under duress and on July 4 the Katangan Parliament re-affirmed Katanga's independence.

The United Nations, egged on by the Communists, immediately took action to end Katangan independence. In September and December 1961 they launched attacks on Katanga, but were repulsed in heavy fighting. Eventually, a temporary cease-fire was signed and negotiations began between Leopoldville and Elisabethville.

Ostensibly, the United Nations went into action in Katanga to keep the peace. In fact, it unleashed a savage onslaught on innocent civilians and went on a rampage of looting, raping and murder.

Operating in Katanga, United Nations troops cold-bloodedly killed unarmed civilians whose only crime had been to travel innocently and on lawful business to their homes or places of work. Some were shot at point-blank range while their arms were raised, others were shot in the back, and yet others were murdered while carrying United Nations indemnity or carrying out United Nations instructions. Others were beaten to death with truncheons, fists and shoes. Black and White, workmen, ambulance men, professors, businessmen, civil servants, all came under the ire and fire of the United Nations and were shot down in cold blood. Bazookas, machine-guns and hand grenades were used against unarmed civilians in motor vehicles.

The main offenders were Ethiopian, Indian and Irish soldiers. The Ethiopian and Irish soldiers were also in the vanguard of those soldiers of the United Nations "peace-keeping mission" who went on rampages of lust, raping women.

On December 5, 1961, for instance, Indian soldiers opened fire on cars carrying unarmed civilians. The occupants jumped from their vehicles and met the following fate: Gianni Mino, a 21-year-old Italian and a workman with him were shot in the back by the Indians and buried in a rough grave; Ermanno Prina, another Italian, after seeking refuge in a conduit, approached the Indian troops with both arms raised - he was shot through the left arm and killed with a bullet in the right lung; Charles Kreins, a 40-year-old Belgian, Georges Henrioul, a fellow countryman, and Gregoire Sunga, a Congolese, were murdered while lying in a ditch in which they had sought shelter; six Black Africans were slaughtered in a conduit in which they had hidden.

On December 13, 1961, Mr. Georges Olivet, the top Red Cross official in Katanga, was murdered and buried in a shallow grave after being killed by United Nations Ethiopian troops while on official duties. In his body were found 40-odd pieces of shrapnel; his skull, neck, thigh and left arm were

shattered.

In one of the most heinous of the crimes committed by United Nations troops, Ethiopian soldiers entered the home of Mr. Guillaume Derriks, head of Union Miniere, on December 16, 1961, and brutally murdered Derriks, his 87-year-old mother and a Congolese servant.

These are but a few of the examples of the way in which an international force, the United Nations "peace-keeping mission" conducted itself in keeping the "peace".

In addition to the manifold crimes of rape committed by United Nations troops, the U.N. systematically sent convoys into the streets of Elisabethville to fire on the houses of civilians, including houses marked with a Red Cross. In December 1961, for instance, eight machine-gun attacks were made on the house belonging to Dr. Szeles, at 1917 Stanley Avenue, despite the fact that the house was marked with a Red Cross sign. Afterwards, Dr. Szeles counted 355 bullet holes in the walls of his house.

The United Nations also attacked hospitals in Elisabethville with ground fire and air fire. The hospitals attacked were the Prince Leopold Hospital, the Reine Elisabeth Clinic, the Le Marinel Hospital, the Shinkolobwe Hospital, and the U.M.H.K. Lubumbashi Hospital. The Prince Leopold, for instance, was bombarded throughout the night of December 7, 1961, despite assurances by U.N. headquarters after the first shells had fallen that there had been a "mistake", and again on the night of December 13. Shinkolobwe, despite having a huge Red Cross painted on its roof, was attacked in broad daylight by United Nations Canberra jets on December 12. In that attack, the United Nations killed four people, including two children. The "peace-keepers" wounded another 48, including four pregnant women.

Smith Hempstone in his book "Katanga Report" (Faber and Faber, London) gives this description of life in Elisabethville in December:

"Mortar shells hailed down on the centre of the city... the gunnery was either disgracefully amateur or totally indiscriminate. Among the 'military' objectives hit: a beauty shop, the apartment of the French consul, Sabena airways office, the Roman Catholic cathedral, Elisabethville's museum. A car pulled up in front of the Grand Hotel Leopold II, where all of us were staying. 'Look at the work of the American criminals', sobbed the Belgian driver, 'take a picture and send it to that bastard Kennedy!' In the back seat, his eyes glazed with shock, sat a wounded African man cradling in his arms the body of his ten-year-old son. The child's face and belly had been smashed to jelly by mortar fragments. The war - and life - were over for him. His mother, also wounded, sat wordlessly beside her husband."

This is the sorry tale of United Nations "peace-keeping" actions as they affect Katanga in 1961.

Western apologists, such as Mennen Williams, have declared that it was essential for the United Nations to end the secession of Katanga, as otherwise there would have been a precedent for other secession movements including the Communist-controlled ones such as that operated by Gizenga at Stanleyville. In truth, the crime of Tshombe was that he was anti-Communist, and the United

Nations was accordingly determined to crush him.

Tshombe, of course, was also a believer in the maintenance of a broad tribal authority in the government of a present-day African state. This to Williams, and other Western Liberals, was a horrifying thought as it smacked too much of the South African race policy. Because he was a realist, therefore, Tshombe had to be removed. If this necessitated the rape of innocent women, the shooting of innocent people in the back, and the bombardment of hospitals, then the United States Liberals and the United Nations must condone such actions. The paramount consideration was that Liberal political convictions should prevail. (For surely a man like Mennen Williams or Fenner Brockway knew far more about the problems of Africa than a man of the African soil like Tshombe!) The fact that the Liberal political convictions and Communist targets co-incided did not deter the gentlemen in Washington and London.

One can only hope that the next time there is a call for United Nations intervention in an African country sober reasoning will prevail and the West will show some signs of responsibility. Africans, Black and White, have seen enough of United Nations troops in action to last them a century. They have also seen enough of United Nations efforts to "administer" a country to last them a century. The United Nations, in the Congo, made a hash of its administration efforts, and nowhere was this more striking than in respect of the infamous Baluba Camp at Elisabethville.

The United Nations expressed its concern at the assaults, looting and murders by Baluba tribesmen in Katanga and so decided to bring them together in a huge camp. This camp was situated outside Elisabethville. Unfortunately, the United Nations officials had no conception of how to organize food supplies, sanitary facilities, and housing in an African country and the result was chaos.

Within weeks, 40,000 Baluba were jammed into a small camp, living on top of one another. Vice, drunkenness and crime, with Baluba youths forming terrorist gangs, was rife. The Baluba camp became a ghetto that should serve as a lasting indictment of the little concern for humanity which the United Nations, like the Communist rulers of the world, have. But let the Supreme Health Council of Katanga speak. The following extract is from the minutes of the Council's meeting on November 29, 1961:

"The Council has noticed that its opinion has not been taken into consideration. Alarming information has come from various sources; on the one hand, that more than 1,000 dead have been buried in this (Baluba) camp during the months of September, October and November; on the other hand, that an average of 20 Baluba die each day in this camp, some being murdered by the 'bajeunesse' (youth gangs), others by the repressive firing of the U.N., and the great majority through congenital illness or weakness, mainly new-born children, infants, small children and miscarried foetuses.

"The Council feels that this information is highly probable in view of the indescribable living conditions of the 30,000 to 40,000 Baluba who are forced to live under the tropical sun, the rain, in the coolness of the nights with only a limited quantity of drinking water, without sanitary installations, without any drainage system, with no means of collecting the refuse. It is estimated that at present about 1,500 tons of faecal matter have accumulated and about 3,000 tons of urine has

soaked into the ground, causing a stench which one can well imagine.

"The Council has calculated that... the annual death rate (is) 170 to 180 per thousand ... the normal death rate in Elisabethville... (in) previous years, reached only 8 or 9 per thousand."

Another terrible indictment of the United Nations and its lack of concern for human beings.

After the cessation of hostilities in Katanga in December 1961, Tshombe made another effort to reach conciliation with Leopoldville. He met Cyrille Adoula, the Central Prime Minister, at Kitona from December 19 to 21. While Tshombe and Adoula conferred, Big Brother United Nations watched, breathing down their necks.

It must have become increasingly obvious to Tshombe at Kitona that the United Nations was interested only in crushing Katanga and was not sincerely anxious for an agreement between Tshombe and Adoula. For while Tshombe played a role in the affairs of the Congo, whether as a Katangan or as a Congolese leader, there was hope for the West. With Tshombe completely out of the picture, there was still some hope for the Communists. Moïse Tshombe, in short, was the only Congolese politician who had sufficient backbone and principle to act decisively to set Congolese affairs right and establish democracy in the Congo.

It must have become increasingly obvious to Tshombe, too, that Kasavubu and Adoula were being influenced completely by the United Nations. After much haggling, Tshombe eventually signed an eight-point agreement with Adoula that amounted to Katanga's unconditional surrender.

It seems that Tshombe was playing for time - remembering Coquilhatville, time to ensure his own safety and, remembering the first two U.N. onslaughts on Katanga, time to build up his forces for the next United Nations onslaught that was obviously inevitable. The Kitona agreement, subsequently ratified by the Katangan Parliament, gave him this breathing space.

But even 12 months did not prove sufficient breathing space to build up Katanga's hard-hit forces and when the next United Nations onslaught came in the last week of December 1962, it was all over in a couple of days. The U.N. declared all-out war on Katanga on December 28 and by December 30 it was all over bar the shouting. The secession of Katanga was finally at an end.

But Tshombe was not yet finished. Flitting in and out of Elisabethville under guarantees of safe conduct, he made desperate last minute efforts to negotiate with the U.N. to salvage something from the mess. But, predictably, his efforts came to naught. In January 1963, the Central Government moved in to Elisabethville and the following month Tshombe paid brief visits to Angola and Rhodesia before going to Europe for medical treatment. When he returned to Elisabethville in March, he was, in effect, a private citizen.

Three months later, Joseph Ileo, who had succeeded Adoula as Prime Minister, had made things so uncomfortable for Tshombe that, in fear of assassination, Tshombe fled to Europe and exile.

With Tshombe out of the way, the Communists were able to turn the screws tighter. With the fall,

and later death of Lumumba, the Communists had first re-grouped in December 1960 when Antoine Gizenga, leader of the Parti Solidaire Africain (P.S.A.) and a top Lumumba aide, set up headquarters in Stanleyville, Lumumba's stronghold, and recognized Russia. The Communists were back in business, preparing for a war of terrorism. In August 1961, a "national government of reconciliation" was formed in Leopoldville with Adoula, the "independent" and "moderate" as Prime Minister. Adoula named Gizenga Deputy Prime Minister but the latter indicated that he would co-operate with Adoula only if there was a "return to Lumumbist policies". When he was rejected, Gizenga returned to Stanleyville and on August 30 fused his P.S.A. with Lumumba's M.N.C. into a "National Party of Patrice Lumumba", an avowedly anti- Western political organ based in Stanleyville. He proclaimed independence and Congolese national army troops moved against him. Congolese troops entered Stanleyville in January 1962. Gizenga was arrested and taken to Leopoldville from where he was sent to various places for detention.

The Communists played things cool for a while, and Gizenga was released in December 1962. The first priority was to rid the Congo of Tshombe. With Tshombe safely out of the way in mid-1963, the Communists struck. On October 3, they formed the Comite National de Liberation (C.N.L.) which had its headquarters in the Communist stooge state of the Congo-Brazzaville, across the Congo River from Leopoldville.

The first manifesto of the C.N.L. made it clear that its leaders had aligned themselves unequivocally with Lumumba's ideology. It made no bones of the fact that it was a resuscitation of the "National Party of Patrice Lumumba", Gizenga's fusion of the M.N.C. and P.S.A.

The C.N.L. worked through the Communist Chinese embassies in Brazzaville and Bujumbura, capital of Burundi. In both cities, Communist Chinese provided the Congolese Communists with advice, arms and equipment, instructions on guerilla warfare - and hard cash. The Congolese also received supplies from Communist states and African states such as Ghana, Algeria and Egypt through the Sudan, which was to play an active role in the efforts to turn the Congo into a Communist state.

On November 20, 1963, Prime Minister Adoula expelled all 100 members of the Russian Embassy from Leopoldville after announcing that he had "irrefutable proof of the close links between the C.N.L. and Russia".

The C.N.L. launched guerilla warfare, sending its followers on a rampage of murder, rape and brutality against Whites and Congolese.

In Kwilu province, Pierre Mulele, a hard-core Peking-trained Communist who had been in Gizenga's P.S.A. and Lumumba's Cabinet as Minister of Education and Culture, returned from a "diplomatic assignment" in Cairo to launch a brutal reign of terror. His troops, armed with knives, spears, poisoned arrows and Mao Tse-tung's handbook on guerilla warfare, swept through the countryside pillaging, murdering and raping.

In Central Kivu, Gaston Soumialot was responsible for equally depraved raids; also to come into the picture was Christophe Gbenye, the "Butcher of Stanleyville".

Witchdoctors were an important element in these rebel bands, for the "soldiers" were told not to heed the enemies' bullets as the witchdoctors' powders would make them immune. The rebels were also fed with regular doses of "dawa" and, half-crazed with this drug, went into battle confident that they would win because dawa is a drug that gives one the illusion of being invulnerable.

A good example of this was reported in August 1964 when a Katangan police patrol came upon a lorry full of rebels. Trapped, the rebels jumped from the lorry one by one shouting: "We cannot die. We will be back in three days." One by one, they were killed, 27 in all.

By early 1964, the ravages of the Communist rebels in the Congo had become acute. By February, Mulele's young thugs were waging a full-scale terrorist war. On May 27, Mulele captured Albertville, a strategic centre, and this important victory served to spur on his warriors. Soumialot joined forces with Mulele and by the end of July they had captured several hundred square miles of territory around Albertville. On August 4, "General" Nicolas Olenga, Soumialot's chief aide, scored another major victory for the rebels when he captured Stanleyville. Soumialot immediately formed a "Revolutionary Government" and in an emotional outburst proclaimed himself leader of the Government with the words: "I am the new Lumumba." He added: "Lumumba said that some-one stronger than himself would come to complete his work. That man is me. I have taken Stanleyville. I will come soon to Leopoldville."

It was not just a boastful assertion. By now the Communists had impressive territorial strength in the Congo. Soumialot might have a chance to make good his threat. But, in the meantime, a ray of hope - the first for four long years - had entered Congolese politics. As the dark clouds had been packed on the horizon one after the other by the Communists, Kasavubu, in Leopoldville, had become increasingly concerned. The Communists were threatening a complete take-over of the Congo if they were given time. The Congolese were powerless to do anything about the rebellion and it just so happened, fortuitously for the Communists, that the United Nations was busy withdrawing its troops (by June 30, all U.N. troops were out of the Congo). The Red cards were falling into position. In desperation, Kasavubu called in the one man amongst Congolese politicians who could save the desperate situation.

Moise Tshombe arrived in Leopoldville on June 26, 1964; was formally invited to form a Cabinet on July 6 and became Prime Minister of the Congo on July 10.

In Africa, nothing is startling; not even the fact that a man is elevated by those who had held rifles at his head only the previous year. But in Tshombe's case, there were many who were startled. The Communists were enraged. So were the leaders of the Communist stooge states in Africa who successfully exerted pressure to have the Organization for African Unity reject a request by the new Congolese Prime Minister for Black African troops to help him rid his country of the menace of armed thugs trying to impose a foreign ideology on African soil. The United States, if not enraged, was certainly upset at the re-appearance on the African scene of the man she had tried so hard to destroy. Although the United States Government supported Tshombe on the surface when he was Prime Minister of the Congo it made no secret of its distaste for Tshombe. These sentiments were intensified when Tshombe, having been rejected by the O.A.U., called in the assistance of White mercenaries.

Much criticism has been levelled at Tshombe by critics of various shades of political belief at his decision to recruit mercenaries and in some ways it is perhaps a pity that White mercenaries were used. Without going into the merits and otherwise of Tshombe's decision, suffice it to say that Tshombe was left in the lurch by other African states at a crucial time in the history of the Congo and that he had a job to do. There was imminent danger of Communism being foisted on Africa, and the job Tshombe had to do was to rid the Congo of that danger. Black and White Africans joined forces and they successfully did the job, and in doing it they rendered a service to Africans of all races.

It was not an easy assignment that Tshombe had, but his troops, spearheaded by the mercenaries, systematically moved against the Communists, pushing back the rebels, rescuing thousands of Whites and Black Congolese. For thousands of others the troops arrived too late. By September 1964, the lines were being drawn for the battle of Stanleyville. On September 7, the "new Lumumba", Soumialot, carrying out instructions from the Communist bosses, handed over control of Stanleyville to Gbenye, who became "Prime Minister" of a "People's Republic of the Congo". Soumialot had to be content to pretend to be "Defence Minister".

In October Gbenye adopted his last desperate "hostages" and "mass killings" tactics and in November, Tshombe, the United States, Britain and Belgium joined forces in the relief of Stanleyville. (See chapter 2.)

After Stanleyville, Belgian paratroopers advanced towards Paulis (now Isiro) while Tshombe's forces fanned out against the Communist rebels.

By the end of January 1965, Tshombe's troops, still spearheaded by the White mercenaries under Major (later Colonel) Mike Hoare, had taken the principal towns in the northern and north-eastern Congo and were concentrating on wiping out rebel pockets. By the end of March, they had sealed off the frontier with the Sudan and continued to wipe out rebel bases in April. By May, the Communist revolt was virtually over, the last rebel stronghold, Buta, falling on June 1.

Moise Tshombe had successfully checked the last major Communist attempt to take over the Congo. Nevertheless, Communist terrorism has been sporadic since and will probably never die out completely. After the fall of Stanleyville, Gbenye, Soumialot, Olenga and Mulele had fled to the Sudan, from where they had fanned out, Gbenye, for instance, was in Khartoum for some time while Soumialot found refuge with Egypt's Nasser. Nasser, as well as Ben Bella and Nkrumah, willingly gave arms to these men and they were channeled, equally willingly, by the Sudan back to the struggling guerilla fighters who had been left to face the music by their leaders. With the Sudanese Government showing no change of policy on this matter and with the resurgence of Communist activity in Burundi towards the end of 1966, the Leopoldville authorities will probably be plagued for the foreseeable future by sporadic Communist terror raids in the northern and north-eastern Congo.

With the successful completion of the campaign against Gbenye, Soumialot and Mulele, it could have been expected that Tshombe would now be given a mandate to secure what, for the first time in

five years, looked like a promising future for the Congo. But Kasavubu, ever the political weakling, was succumbing to the inevitable pressures from the anti-Tshombe forces.

As early as July, the "Tshombe must go" boards were being hung up in Leopoldville. Kasavubu, on a political pretext, dismissed Godefroid Munongo, a loyal right-hand man to Tshombe through all the troubles of the past, as Minister of the Interior, and sent him back to a governorship in Katanga. Munongo's successor was Victor Nendaka, head of the Congolese secret police. Nendaka, on the left-wing of Congolese politics, emerged as a new "strongman" behind the scenes.

Kasavubu openly praised Tshombe as an "effective" Prime Minister but equally openly indicated that he was not happy with Tshombe's Government. On October 12, Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe - after acknowledging that it was Tshombe who had "got the country right"! Kasavubu's act was undemocratic as Tshombe still had the major support in Parliament and had won a General Election less than six months previously. Becoming even more ridiculous, Kasavubu named as the new Prime Minister, the leader of the Balubakat Party which had exactly two of the 166 seats in Parliament. As expected, the new Prime Minister lost his first confidence motion (the vote being interpreted as a motion of confidence in Tshombe). Kasavubu ignored the decision of the representatives of the people and continued to allow his nominee to hold office as Prime Minister. This man was the unfortunate Evariste Kimba, a political turncoat who had once been Tshombe's Foreign Minister in Katanga and who was to meet his death in May 1966, hanging from a gallows at a public hanging organized by General Mobutu.

Mobutu took over the government of the Congo on November 25 because, he said, of the "impotence" of the politicians, who had "failed miserably". It is true that all the politicians in the Congo, from Lumumba to Kimba, had failed miserably - except Tshombe. He had succeeded, only to be cast aside. Ironically, in throwing him aside, Kasavubu had signed his own letter of dismissal, for with Tshombe as his Prime Minister, Kasavubu would probably have remained President of the Congo far longer than he did.

Mobutu has not been a successful ruler, and there has been both a decline in the prospects for the Congo and a marked swing to the left under him. Where Tshombe was beginning to attract foreign interest in investments in the Congo, Mobutu's tirades and dictatorial actions against Belgian (particularly Union Miniere) companies as well as companies of other countries have had the effect of frightening away foreign capital.

Under Mobutu, food production dropped alarmingly (in 1966 the Congo had to import R 14,000,000 worth of food previously produced locally) prices of foodstuffs trebled in the first year of Mobutu's reign and the buying power of money was sliding downhill fast (a bag of maize cost more than half a month's salary to the average Congolese), unemployment had rocketed, and starvation was widespread. As the song says, the poor grow poorer and the rich grow richer. Under Mobutu, the Whites continue to live off the fat of the land - but for the average Congolese, independence is still a dark cloud that has brought nothing but hunger, misery - and worse.

Mobutu also failed to maintain discipline in his Army and at one stage (October 1966) it was reported that he had lost control over three-quarters of the Congo with gun-toting Army thugs on the

rampage attacking whomever they happened to come across in their drunken orgies. This was the unofficial reign of terror; but there was also an official one. Ostensibly, civil courts function in the Congo; but woe to the accused who is discharged by a civil court - if the military don't like him, he'll be hauled before a military court; if he escapes that and he is in the bad books of the Police, the Surete will arrange for his immediate deportation. The Surete is a sinister Gestapo-style secret police headed by Victor Nendaka, Minister of the Interior and later number two man to Mobutu himself.

Nendaka, with his left-wing political ideas that remind one of Communist beliefs, epitomises the swing to the left that has come about in the Congo since the overthrow of Tshombe. Why has Mobutu gone left; Mobutu who acted so decisively in expelling Communists from the Congo in 1960, who attacked Lumumba openly as a "Communist"? How come Lumumba has now been restored to a position where Kinshasa's Boulevard Leopold II can be re-named Boulevard Lumumba, where a statue can be erected to Lumumba's memory, and where Lumumba can officially be regarded as a hero?

The answer can be traced to the fact that Mobutu has never been a career soldier in the true sense of the word but rather has he always been a politician at heart. His adherence to the basic tenets of Lumumbism is obvious when it is remembered that he remained loyal to Lumumba when Adoula, Ileo and Kalonji deserted their leader. The wounds of the Lumumba/Mobutu dispute - said to be rooted largely in personal pique because Lumumba appointed Lundula, not Mobutu, as Army commander after the Force Publique revolt - have healed.

Mobutu's personal political mark he wants to leave on the country is "economic independence". Mobutuist thinking goes like this: "Lumumba brought political independence to the Congo; Mobutu will make the Congo economically independent". Economic independence has become an obsession with Mobutu and nothing is allowed to stand in the way of this goal. He has seen Belgium as the arch-enemy, economically speaking and as each successive move towards economic independence has failed, he has become increasingly embittered and increasingly leftist in his outlook.

A contributory cause to Mobutu's swing to the left has been his personal ambition to be accepted by the rest of Africa. The Congo under Tshombe was not looked upon with favour by the leaders of Africa who counted at that time - Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Nasser, Nyerere, etc. - and, to curry favour with these leaders, Mobutu had to show that he was a militant anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist politician. So successfully did he lean to the left that he was accepted with open arms by erstwhile enemies such as Milton Obote and Julius Nyerere when he attended a "Good Neighbours" conference of 11 East and Central African states at Nairobi in April 1966. The Organization for African Unity has even agreed to allow Mobutu to play host to a Summit conference in 1967.

Mobutu is likely to keep afloat for some time yet, but so serious are conditions in the Congo that when he falls the barometer for the Congo will read: "July 1960" all over again. And the Communists will be determined to do a better job, this time.

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OUR MEN FROM HAVANA

(Middle Africa)

RWANDA AND BURUNDI

Four centuries ago a tribe of giant cattle-owners moved south from Ethiopia to settle in lush country near Lake Tanganyika in what was to become known as the twin countries of Ruanda- Urundi and then, after independence, Rwanda and Burundi. The tribe was the Watutsi, whose height and lyre-horned cattle were so impressive that they were regarded as divine beings by the diminutive people of the Bahutu tribe who had previously settled in the area. The Bahutu, or Hutu, were so under the spell of the Tutsis that the latter easily enslaved the Hutu who became serfs of the monarchist Tutsis.

In the colonizing era, Belgian and German administrators perpetuated the master-servant relationship in Ruanda-Urundi although the Hutu, the serfs, comprised 85 % of the population. In 1959, however, the Hutu in Rwanda rose against the Tutsi and drove out about 100,000 Tutsi including the Mwami (king). When independence came to Ruanda-Urundi in 1962, therefore, the Hutu ruled a republican Rwanda and the Tutsi ruled a monarchial Burundi.

Racial tensions have been aflame ever since. Tutsi warriors have attempted several invasions of Rwanda, only to be repulsed by the Hutu, who in turn, have launched reprisal attacks against Tutsis still in Rwanda and against loyalist Hutu. The worst of these came in December 1963 when the Hutu wreaked terrible vengeance on the Tutsi. Estimates of those who died in the internecine conflict range from a few hundred to 50,000. Since then, genocide on a large scale has been a regular occurrence in Rwanda and the number of refugees who have fled to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and the Congo-Kinshasa runs into six figures.

In Burundi, there has been similar internecine strife though not on the same scale. (Burundi, whatever its other claims to fame, has had probably the biggest turn-over of heads of government in modern times and most of the Prime Ministers have had political bullets pumped into them).

This was the racial background to the advent of Communist China to the Rwanda-Burundi scene and, predictably, Burundi soon became a nest of Communist intrigue. In fact, the 1963 massacre was openly fanned by Communist China. Because it suited their purpose, the men from Peking sided with the royalist minority Tutsis against the "nationalistic" majority Hutu.

Burundi, with 3,000,000 people in 10,747 square miles of territory, is the most densely populated of all African states (and the third smallest after Gambia and Rwanda, in that order) and the Communist Chinese Embassy in the capital, Bujumbura, was equally densely populated for such a tiny nation with at least 16 staff members on duty at any one time in its R70,000 building. In a wink, the Communists had a foothold virtually in the centre of Africa and used this platform to the full to channel supplies and equipment to the Communist rebels in the Congo. A clearing house was one of the forks of Peking's two-pronged interest in Burundi. The second was the support it gave to the Tutsis through their warrior units known as the Inyenzi (cockroaches) and led not by a Tutsi but by a

Hutu named Rukeba.* The Communist Chinese Ambassador was Liu Yu-feng, a top Chinese expert on Africa and his military attache was the top Chinese military plotter, Colonel Kan-mai.

The Colonel had left a post in Nepal after the Nepalese Government had taken exception to his part in the building of a road from Communist China that looked for all the world like a future Chinese route of attack against Nepal. Later, he surfaced in the Congo-Brazzaville at a key stage in that country's swing to Communist China.

The first Communist Chinese payout to the Inyenzi, in December 1963, was R6.000 and regular amounts were supplied subsequently. Documents found in a Chinese diplomat's car revealed beyond doubt the role played by Peking in inciting the Inyenzi to launch the mass racial killings in December 1963. Ignoring the possible effects this would have on a "majority rule"-mad Black Africa, the Chinese gambled on the Tutsi aristocracy being bent to a subservient position where it would be realized that the only way it could retain power would be to do exactly as Peking said. Communist China would then provide the necessary force to keep the Hutu under serfdom and the Mwami would eventually become a puppet operated with long red strings from Peking. The Chinese also infiltrated the trade unions and youth movements, establishing effective control.

The Communist designs on Burundi were well summarized in 1964 by Tung Chi-ping, an interpreter at the Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura who defected to the West. He quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying: "Burundi is the way to the Congo, and when the Congo falls the whole of Africa will follow."

The Mwami of Burundi (Mwambutsa IV) who ruled Burundi since he was an infant way back in 1915 was not altogether happy with the situation, however, and refused to have anything to do with the Communists personally. Peking bided its time and managed to bribe sufficient leftists in the Mwami's Government to ensure that the Chinese Embassy could function effectively — even if the Mwami refused for a solid year to accept formally the credentials of the Chinese Ambassador. Successive governments permitted the Communist Chinese to dig themselves deeper and deeper into Burundi.

In January 1965, the Mwami had had enough. Sacking the pro-Peking Prime Minister, Alban Niamoya, he recalled a "moderate" former Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendandumwe, to try to put an end to the mounting Chinese influence on the Government. Ngendandumwe's appearance on the scene startled the Chinese, who declared all-out war against the Mwami. Within days of being asked to become Prime Minister, Ngendandumwe was killed as he was leaving a maternity hospital after visiting his wife.

In this adventure, the Chinese excelled themselves. The assassin the Communists hired was a clerk employed by the United States Embassy in Bujumbura.

The assassination rebounded on the Communists, however, and the Government immediately exonerated the United States from any blame for the murder while expelling the infuriated Chinese diplomats post-haste. After the assassination of Ngendandumwe, 30 tons of Communist arms were found in Bujumbura and hundreds of tons of weapons at Kilega, the former capital. It was also

discovered that the Communist Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura had financed four secret guerilla training camps in Burundi staffed by Chinese. They were at Rwigi, Musinga, Kirundo and Murore.

Communist China had undoubtedly blundered but she soon regrouped her forces and sent messages to her faithful lackeys within the Burundi Government to brew further trouble between Hutu and Tutsi. When the Reds bounded back it was with a vengeance.

On October 19, 1965, leftists within the Army mutinied and attacked the palace and the Prime Minister's residence. Although the mutiny was quickly put down by loyalist troops, the Mwami fled the country and the Prime Minister was critically wounded. Although there were mass executions of military and civilians involved in the plot it was only a matter of time before the fight was won by the Communists. The Mwami decided eventually that the flesh-pots of Europe were far more enjoyable than the backwaters of Africa, and a new strongman, Captain Michel Micombero, a soldier in his mid-twenties, emerged.

In a purge lasting a few months, all the top-ranking Hutu politicians and officials were executed. About 1,500 Hutu are estimated to have been killed. Relations with the United States deteriorated to such an extent that three United States envoys were ordered out of Burundi for no apparent reason. Despite the steel-fisted silence, it was obvious that Communist elements were cementing their position.

On July 8, 1966, Crown Prince Charles, aged 18, announced that he had taken over the government of the country and dismissed the Prime Minister, Leopold Biha, a "moderate". His father, still in Europe, repudiated his action, with no apparent effect. Charles, who later installed himself as Mwami, named Micombero as Prime Minister. According to Press reports, Watutsi extremists who were in close contact with Communist China, were included in Micombero's cabinet. These included External Affairs Minister Masumbuko and Youth Minister Niyongabo, who had powerful backing from the militant Youth movement. Biha was placed under house arrest, and all moderate elements were subdued. It was also revealed that young officers, well-known in Dar es Salaam circles, were coming to the fore in the Army.

Despite Western news media efforts to interpret Prince Charles' "coup" as a right-wing act, it soon became obvious that the new Government was Communist controlled and that Micombero was the real power in Burundi with Charles merely a stooge figure-head. The Communists were back in Burundi. Formal diplomatic relations with Communist China were restored at the end of August.

Micombero was doing well in his first months as Prime Minister but he had one problem. King Ntare was proving difficult and had inherited, it transpired, some of the weird Western ideas of his father. And so, in December 1966, Africa produced yet another coup d'etat, with Micombero taking over full control of Burundi. Shortly before he took over power, 2,000 Tutsi warriors from Burundi invaded Rwanda but were repelled. With Micombero in control of Burundi and Communist China arming and inciting the Tutsis in Burundi, more serious attacks on Rwanda can be expected to originate in Burundi.

CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE

The most spectacular Communist coup in Africa was in many ways that which Communist China executed in the former French Congo, the smaller of the two Congos, generally known as the Congo-Brazzaville. It was swift, brilliantly effective, and carried out despite the fact that a Western nation had merely to lift a finger to repulse the Communists.

The Western nation was France, which had given the Congo- Brazzaville independence in August 1960 under Fulbert Youlou, a defrocked Roman Catholic priest who became President and Prime Minister. Youlou cut a colourful figure in his priest's cassock under which he toted a gun, but his personal morals were not those normally associated in the public eye with a priest. Furthermore, his Government was not a particularly good one, and bribery and corruption were widespread with Cabinet Ministers indulging freely in the sweet life while the masses suffered from poverty and unemployment.

Youlou, however, was at least a moderate in foreign policy and followed a pro-Western line. At the same time he was no political weakling and he ruled ruthlessly, making full use of his prisons for housing political foes. But his problem was that the political and trade union life of his country was riddled with Marxists, and his only answer was the introduction of a one-party dictatorship that would give him full control of the country and effectively counter the Communist elements.

Youlou, strengthened probably in the belief that he would have the French behind him if he encountered trouble, decided to take the plunge but unfortunately he dived into a dry — and red-tiled — swimming bath. In the tense days preceding the third anniversary of independence, Communist rioters, led by Marxists in the trade unions, unleashed bloody demonstrations during which Youlou's chief political prisoners were released from behind bars. Youlou called for, and received, French military intervention. But unlike a parallel case in Gabon where the French Government ensured the re-instatement of President Mba, Paris decided to restrict French intervention in Brazzaville to a limited task force given a defensive role. On August 14, 1963, the third anniversary of independence, Youlou, having first offered to form a Government that would placate his opponents but having been rejected, stepped out of the saddle and was imprisoned before escaping to the Congo-Leopoldville in April 1965.

The Marxists put in charge of the government Alphonse Massemba-Debat, himself a leftist but not as dedicated to the cause of Communism as his compatriots who pulled the strings. His Prime Minister was Pascal Lissouba, a Marxist. Lissouba's wife, Annette, was a member of the French Communist Party and a writer for the Brazzaville Communist weekly, *Dipanda*.

The door was now wide open to Communist China. Massemba-Debat's Government recognized Communist China — the first French-speaking country in Africa to do so (in February 1964) and soon afterwards Peking sent R36,000,000 worth of goods to Brazzaville — a staggering amount considering the country only had 1,000,000 inhabitants. (In August 1965, Brazzaville broke relations with Portugal, relations which Youlou had carefully preserved as one by one of his fellow Black leaders broke with Lisbon.)

The evidence of Communist influence in the Congo-Brazzaville is everywhere to be seen. The *Jeunesse*, the youth wing of the solitary political party (one of the first acts of the Massemba- Debat

regime had been to introduce the one-party system it had so bitterly fought against when Youlou was in power) is one of the most militant in Africa and its members — dressed in Chinese-style uniforms — wage a reign of terror. Many of the Youth wingers are boys and girls not yet in their teens who have been armed with lethal automatic weapons.

The Congo-Brazzaville Government uses Peking and Moscow style diplomatic language and Radio Brazzaville is noted for its propaganda broadcasts. The leader of the Catholic Workers' Union, Fulgence Biyaoula, was jailed for opposing the Government's plan for a single trade union. The Army was renamed the "People's Army".

If any further proof was needed, the continuous flow of Communist Chinese arms and weapons to the Communist rebels across the river in the Congo-Leopoldville bore testimony to the red hue of the Massemba-Debat regime.

The extent to which the Chinese have taken over the Government of the Congo-Brazzaville has been noted by Western newsmen who reported in 1965 that the "two shiny new red and black Mercedes limousines belonging to China's two top diplomats can be seen almost daily outside the offices of the Premier and President of the Congo-Brazzaville".

The Communists merely walked into Brazzaville under the noses of French soldiers. On April 10, 1964, the first "diplomats" arrived — headed by Colonel Kan-mai, officially the charge d'affaires, but in fact the same Colonel Kan-mai who had been active in Nepal and Burundi. The Ambassador, Chew Chow-yeh, who arrived later, encouraged Colonel Kan-mai to undermine the local politicians and to build guerilla training centres for training Communist rebels from the Congo at Gambona and Impfondo. Kan-mai also built a training camp for Angolan rebels at Bouanga. Guerilla warfare teachings were intensified in mid-1965 with the arrival in Brazzaville of another top Chinese expert, General Wang Ping.

The Communist Chinese successfully took over full control of the terrorist youth movement (credited with the murder of three of Youlou's top officials — Chief Justice Joseph Puabou, Attorney-General Lazare Matsokota and Information Director Anselme Massouemi), and assumed effective control of the "People's Army" in which a Chinese liaison officer was attached to every command. Millions of rand have been poured into the country, to the extent where Brazzaville can do nicely without Western aid. The Communist New China News Agency sent personnel to "advise" Dipanda and Radio Brazzaville. In fact, the Red tentacles stretch into virtually every facet of life in the Congo-Brazzaville. To keep her hold on the country, Communist China has had to send in scores of supervisors. Officially, the strength of the Communist Chinese Embassy in Brazzaville should be half-a-dozen. At the latest count the number of diplomats exceeded 200.

The power position of the Communist forces in the Congo-Brazzaville, and the extent to which they run the country, was graphically illustrated on June 28, 1966 when about 300 tribesmen from the North protested about the demotion of one of their number, Captain Marien Ngouabi, commander of the paratroop battalion. They stormed the offices of the only political party, the Mouvement National de la revolution, smashing windows and furniture. Cuban soldiers, who had only recently been recruited to the Presidential Guard by Massemba-Debat (who was in Tananarive, attending a

meeting of OCAM at the time) rallied to the help of Ambroise Noumazalay, the 38-year-old Marxist who had become Prime Minister only the previous month. All reports suggested that the Cuban Communists, numbering 400 well-trained soldiers, took control of the entire anti-Army operation and soon quelled the soldiers and restored the position of the Government, which was tottering on the verge of defeat.

The Government immediately re-shuffled the Army hierarchy and pushed the number of Communist Cuban soldiers up to past the 1,000 mark. There seems little doubt that had it not been for the intervention of the Communist soldiers, Massemba-Debat's regime would have fallen. To-day, the Communists, Cuban brawn and Chinese brain, control the Congo-Brazzaville, in many ways the closest of all African stooge states to a Communist satellite state.

There was a sobering lesson for Black Africa in the events in the Congo that began on June 28, 1966. For the first time in African history, Communist troops had decided the future of an African state. The sober lesson: history can repeat itself.

* Although the tribal antagonism is usually between Tutsis and Hutus, there has been extensive crossing of the tribal line, mainly by Hutus who value the higher culture and, previously, the prestige attached to being in the Tutsi circle. Thus republican Hutu Rwanda has a President (Gregoire Kayibanda) and several Cabinet Ministers who are married to Tutsis and monarchial Burundi has had more than one Hutu Prime Minister serving a Tutsi monarch.

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SOLDIERS CAN SCARE

(East Africa)

The recognition by the Communists of the force of Black African nationalism was nowhere more expressive than in East Africa. Here, the analysts behind the Iron Curtain found two popular national leaders in Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and recognized that an outright challenge to their authority would do the Red cause more harm than good. The ploy, therefore, was to cultivate the popular image of both these men whilst at the same time secretly building up "strongmen" who could manoeuvre into a position from which they could challenge Kenyatta and Nyerere when the time was ripe. In the end, it was decided to wait until Kenyatta left the political scene and, in the case of Nyerere, to undermine his personal position within the Government.

KENYA

Chief amongst these "strongmen" stooges in East Africa was Oginga Odinga. In many ways, Jaramogi (a nickname meaning "Father of the Luo") Ajuma Oginga Odinga did not look like a suitable recruit to Communism among the Kenyan politicians who emerged during the last blood-spattered years of British rule over Kenya. His upbringing and early life did not suggest that he would become the number one Communist planner in East Africa, but Communist money did the trick and turned him into a menacing figure who on more than one occasion almost succeeded in establishing a Communist base in Kenya.

Odinga was born in the Sakwa Location in Central Nyanza, the son of a woodworker, in 1912, and was educated at the Maseno Secondary School, the Alliance High School and the Makerere College in Uganda from which he graduated in 1939 with a diploma in education. He was immediately posted to the headmastership of a missionary school. In 1947 he founded the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation, a construction and printing business which drew its support from small-time investors. This was to lay the basis for Odinga's political activities and from then on he assiduously cultivated the friendship of the influential in the Luo tribe (after the Kikuyu the largest in Kenya) becoming, eventually, the recognized "father" of the Luo. He had the advantage of a tribal upbringing, understood the Luo mind and throughout his life remained close to the Luo tribesmen. In 1948 he joined Kenyatta's fledgling Kenya African Union, holding sway over the Central Nyanza Province.

Odinga was in the mainstream of Kenya's subsequent political life.

He soon showed himself an astute politician. Not only was his cultivation of the Luo tribe's affections successful and complete but he went through the entire Mau Mau campaign without being detained - and by adroitness still managed to keep the respect of extremists. The only time he fell foul of the British rulers was in October 1960 when, after visits to Moscow and Peking, his passport was confiscated.

But in later years "Mr. Double-O" as he was known, was to pay many visits behind the Iron Curtain. In London in 1960, Odinga slipped away quietly from Ronald Ngala and Tom Mboya, his fellow

delegates at a Kenya constitutional conference, and when he returned to the British capital a few days later he explained that he had been checking on the progress of two Kenyan students (both members of the Luo tribe) at the Karl Marx University in Leipzig, East Germany. According to a newspaper report he arrived back in London with R20,000 in his pockets from the Communists.

This "gift" from the Communists was but one of many he was to receive from his comrades behind the Iron Curtain. (Just before independence, for example, he reportedly received R600,000 from a Communist source.) Odinga used the handouts to good account on behalf of his Communist masters. The Red money was channeled mainly into two avenues: to ensure mass public support and to win the allegiance of selected and key political figures.

Firstly, numerous amounts went on buying the support of so-called "Youth" wingers of the Kenya African National Union. It was generally accepted that the Youth Wing members who wore Odinga's uniform were the best paid and the toughest of the political thugs. Other moneys went on sending selected "students", invariably members of the Luo tribe, overseas to study politics at Iron Curtain universities or to receive "military training", with the accent on subversion and guerilla tactics. Often, the Kenyan Government was unaware of the trips. For instance, in April 1964, more than 100 Kenyan students left Nairobi in a special charter jet of Bulgarian Airlines for military training in Eastern Europe with the Kenyan Government announcing that it had "no knowledge" of the flight. On March 30, 1965, the Defence Minister and Acting Foreign Minister, Dr. Njoroge Mungai, told Parliament after being asked why three Russian-trained fighter pilots had had their applications to join the Kenyan Air Force delayed: "Many people have been trained in the armed forces in other countries and the first we know about it is when they get back." At the end of 1964, it was estimated that there were 1,200 young Kenyans "studying" behind the Iron Curtain.

Odinga was mainly connected with the university and military activities of these "students" who were being sent to Communist countries - despite a military and training agreement concluded with the British Government that stipulated that Britain would be responsible exclusively for the training of the Kenyan Army.

Secondly, Odinga, with the Luo tribe safely in his pocket, found it convenient to seek broader support from the Kenyan nation before staging any attempt at a Communist coup of the country. He appears to have been particularly anxious to obtain as substantial support as possible from the Kikuyu, the largest tribe in Kenya of which Kenyatta was the undisputed father, and from the Army and Police.

In the former case, he sought out, and obtained, the support of Bildad Kaggia, a fiery Kikuyu who had the "right" Mau Mau record and enjoyed tremendous popularity among the Kikuyu in Fort Hall district because of his fiery pronouncements that all land should be confiscated from the Whites and because of the image he had built up of a "freedom fighter" who had not, like other politicians, exploited the position after independence to own houses and estates but was in fact still a poor man fighting for true Uhuru. (Kenyatta had another version of this story. He once publicly castigated Kaggia when they appeared on the same platform for being lazy and doing nothing to help rebuild Kenya economically.) Odinga also obtained the support of Jesse Kariuki, another extremist Mau Mau and author of the "Mau Mau Detainee". The latter objective Odinga achieved by obtaining the

support of Paul Ngei, veteran Kamba leader and opportunist politician who had once been in opposition as leader of the African People's Party, which he dissolved in September 1963 to join KANU. The importance of Ngei's link with Odinga was that he pledged to Odinga the Kamba tribe, the fourth largest tribe, which provided 50 per cent of the country's police and army strength.

The basis of Odinga's planning, therefore, was to establish a foundation of public and political and military support for the time when the crunch eventually came. When Kenya obtained self-government on June 1, 1963 and full independence on December 12, 1963, Odinga had made great progress in preparing his political soil.

Odinga also realized that Kenyatta was, and would remain, a magic name in Kenya. He planned to use Kenyatta as the "father of the nation" until such time as he could eliminate all opposition to his own image. He probably thought that either Kenyatta, getting on in years, would not last long or that he would be too old to manage Kenya successfully and would be discredited in a short while. In private, Odinga described Kenyatta as too old and not militant enough. He saw his real enemy as Tom Mboya, the ebullient, ambitious, professedly pro-Western trade unionist who belonged to the Luo tribe but did not have particularly strong tribal connexions. He realized, too, that in the atmosphere of pre-independence Kenya it would be far more difficult for a non-Kikuyu to lead the country than it might be in later years.

Odinga, accordingly, led the campaign for the release from restriction of Kenyatta, and in later years when the feud between Mboya and Kenyatta on the one hand and Odinga on the other came to a head Odinga found it convenient to make much play of the fact that he had refused to go into any Kenyan Government without Kenyatta. In fact, it is probably true that Odinga did more than anyone else to achieve Kenyatta's release and his subsequent appointment as Prime Minister of Kenya. This is ironic in the light of later events, but was calculated as far as Odinga was concerned, and was something of an achievement because of the bitterness and hatred with which Kenyatta was viewed before independence - bitterness epitomised by Sir Patrick Renison, a former Governor of Kenya, who described Kenyatta in 1960 as a "leader to darkness and death".

Odinga's real battle, however, was against Mboya, whose meetings always seemed to have a section of the audience who refused, for payment rendered, to applaud him. Odinga's first victory against Mboya was sweet and quick. In Kenyatta's first Cabinet, Odinga became Minister of Home Affairs, a powerful position. Mboya, who had aspired to the Foreign Ministry, was made Minister of Labour, a post that necessitated his resignation as Secretary-General of the powerful Kenya Federation of Labour, which he had used as his springboard to success in politics, and which was a post not calculated to cement Mboya's popularity with the workers.

Odinga had foreseen the problems of Uhuru. The Kenyan Government, and Mboya as Minister of Labour, found themselves immediately after independence (December 1963) with an explosive unemployment situation. Up to 100,000 people were unemployed and hunger and disillusionment with Uhuru (and the leaders of Uhuru) were a nightmarish spectre for Kenyatta and Mboya. But the collapse which Odinga no doubt was hoping for did not come and in February 1964 Mboya adroitly steered away from the crisis by announcing an R11,000,000 plan to check unemployment in terms of which, in a 12-month period, the Government would increase its staff by 15 per cent, the private

sector would absorb an additional 10 per cent of its labour force, and the trade unions would not permit any strike action or demands for wage increases.

Once in the Cabinet, Odinga started consolidating his position and seeking allies. The most important ally he found was Achieng Oneko, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting. A fellow Luo, he was to become Odinga's right-hand man. Also in Parliament was Bildad Kaggia, whom Kenyatta appointed as an Assistant Minister before firing him for ineptitude.

In the first few months of independence, there was a flurry of exchanges of visits with Communist countries. A Kenyan agricultural mission visited Russia, East Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia and Hungary; Kenya signed a trade agreement with Russia; trade with Czechoslovakia was increased substantially through a trade and technical co-operation agreement; another economic and technical co-operation agreement was signed with Yugoslavia; and so on.

Not all these ventures were initiated by the Odinga camp, but it suited the Communist purpose of creating an atmosphere of Kenyan/Communist cordiality so that the masses would be impressed. The exodus of Kenyan students to the East continued, and Odinga, too, continued his visits to Moscow and Peking. Mboya, meanwhile, was seen to go to the other side of the globe, to Europe and the United States, and an insidious campaign developed underground against Mboya as a collaborator with what Odinga was wont to describe as the "arrogant Western powers" who were trying to "dupe the world" by pretending that they were concerned with Communist activity in Africa when, in fact, they were determined to maintain the "vile practice" of colonialism. Odinga, meanwhile, was becoming more and more committed to Communism. His annual personal income from Communist sources was estimated at R80,000, but far more was distributed in political largesse - an official Government estimate of the amount of money distributed in Kenya for the purpose of overthrowing the Kenyatta Government between June 1964 and December 1965 was given as R800,000. Typical of Odinga's speeches at this time was one at a rally in Peking on May 6, 1964 during a tour of Russia and Communist China during which he was feted by Chou En-lai and Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister and a top expert on Chinese guerilla tactics in Africa. "Comrades", declared Mr. Double-O, "the war in Africa needs your help. Imperialism is your enemy as well as ours. Together we stand in defence of freedom against imperialism and colonialism . . . now that we are free we must not shut our eyes to the intrigues of the imperialists, who would like to regain control even through the control of our economies ... In the Congo neo-colonialism of the worst type is firmly and ruthlessly entrenched. The wealth of this great country, which should be used to serve the need of the poverty-stricken country, is diverted to America to enrich even more the capitalist parasites."

Odinga's Communism was to be seen in other directions as well. Having spent vast sums on obtaining Communist training for young Kenyans overseas and on ensuring the support of a strong Youth Wing and of the Army, Odinga started a concerted brainwashing campaign on the internal scene.

Soon after independence, Information Minister Oneko announced that the Kenyan Government was to set up a news agency to "meet the needs of an independent Kenya". The "needs of an independent Kenya", it transpired, required the use of Russian and Czechoslovakian equipment and personnel,

and this soon arrived, inter alia in the person of Tass "experts". Oneko did not impose Press censorship but he achieved the same objective by the simple expedient of buying the services of overseas news agencies on behalf of the Government, as sole agent in Kenya, and then vetting and editing all news before it was passed on to the newspapers and Government-controlled Radio. Journalists were soon remarking that news from Western agencies, notably Reuter, seemed to be edited and delayed far more conscientiously by Oneko's men than was the case with reports from Tass. (The biggest uproar came at the time of the Stanleyville parachute landings when Reuter news was rejected as objectionable to Kenyans.)

The first apparent open clash between Kenyatta and Odinga came on January 24, 1964 when a battalion of the Kenya Rifles mutinied at Lanet, a camp in the Rift Valley north of Nairobi. Kenyatta sent an urgent appeal to London for troops, and the uprising was quickly quelled. There is no direct evidence of any involvement by Odinga in the mutiny, although it is significant that he launched a vituperative attack on Britain for her alleged part in disorders in East Africa and was immediately repudiated by Kenyatta. There were, too, rumours that Odinga had been in contact with the self-styled "Field Marshal" John Okello who claimed to have master-minded the Communist take-over of Zanzibar. It is conceivable that the Communists decided that, in the wake of the disorders in Zanzibar, Tanganyika and Uganda, it would be as well to strike while the iron was hot and foment trouble in Kenya as well. But certainly Odinga was nowhere ready to bring off a Communist coup in Kenya, and if this was the intention it failed dismally.

Odinga accused "British imperialists" and the British Press of trying to find scapegoats "in the form of Communists and people like myself" for the unrest in East Africa. "I strongly disagree with this claim, by which the British are trying to avoid responsibility for what took place in Zanzibar", he said. "It was the British who encouraged unjust policies in Zanzibar which were intended to make the minority rule over the majority. The constituencies in Zanzibar were demarcated in such a way as to frustrate the most popular party. It was these undemocratic practices that were at the root of all the violent explosion in Zanzibar."

Kenyatta promptly repudiated Odinga and said Odinga's allegations did not reflect the views of his Government. Odinga, it should be remembered, was then a senior Cabinet Minister.

Whatever the extent of Communist involvement in the Lanet mutiny, Odinga had received a setback and he now withdrew to do some thinking about his next line of attack. This came in 1964 when Kenyatta was in London attending a Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference. In July, Odinga suddenly deported Leslie Pridgeon, Assistant Commissioner of Police in Kenyatta's own Kikuyu-dominated Central Province, who was on friendly terms with the Prime Minister. It was an obvious challenge to Kenyatta, but Kenyatta was mum. Odinga, encouraged by Kenyatta's silence, sacked Ian Henderson, a third generation Kenyan, who despite having been responsible for the conviction of Kenyatta as manager of the Mau Mau, had since developed a close and intimate friendship with Kenyatta, who, it was said, had personally ensured his appointment to a senior position in the Security Police with the rank of Assistant Commissioner.

Kenyatta remained silent, and it appeared that Odinga had won a round in his anti-Kenyatta battle. But Kenyatta, despite his advancing age, was a wily politician and was merely biding his time.

In December 1964, Kenya became a republic with Kenyatta as President and Odinga as Vice-President. In theory, Odinga was now the second-in-command and well placed to succeed Kenyatta; but, in effect, he had been demoted. From his position of power as Home Minister he moved to a more or less titular post; and, at the same time, Mboya's star began to rise. The battle lines were being drawn.

Forced into the political background, Odinga played it cool. He showed no public resentment at his demotion and continued to praise Kenyatta, describing him as "God's masterpiece" and "a living legend". He sang another tune in private, however, and was also concentrating on building up an anti-Kenyatta climate through the Lumumba Institute.

The closest kept secret of the republican celebrations in Kenya in December 1964 was the erection of the Lumumba Institute; built at a cost of R54,000 on a 20-acre site. Although both Kenyatta and Odinga were patrons, and Oneko was a trustee, Odinga obtained control of the Institute through Kaggia, who became chairman. The Institute was built with funds from Communist sources (the exact sources were not disclosed, although the statue of Lumumba in front of the Institute was by a Hungarian sculptor and Russian cinema vans were observed on the "campus"). It was staffed partly by Russian lecturers and Kenyans trained in Russia. Subjects included party organization, the African road to socialism and the principles of socialism, the latter taught by two Russian economic science lecturers. Kaggia said of the Institute: "Many of us grew up reading about Churchill and Abraham Lincoln but we hope that if the students follow President Kenyatta's example..." But it immediately became obvious that the object of the Institute was to give Communist instruction to Party officials, journalists, teachers and civil servants with the aim of encouraging the "students" to challenge and repudiate Kenyatta's policies. (In July 1965, 27 people, most of them ex-students of the Lumumba Institute, were arrested after walking into the headquarters of KANU, announcing that all officials, with the exception of Kenyatta and Odinga, had been voted out of office in "national elections", and that they had taken over KANU.) Eventually, the tone of the Institute became so obvious that it was placed under the control of the Department of Education in mid-1965 and was subsequently closed down.

The tide was turning slowly but inexorably against Odinga. Events moved rapidly to a head during Easter 1965. In the early hours of one morning, armed troops marched into the Nairobi offices of the Vice-President and removed a large quantity of weapons and ammunition originating from Communist sources. At the same time, Kenyatta sent troops to Odinga's home province where illegal arms were seized. Within days it was announced that a Russian ship, the Fizik Lebedev, bearing a "small consignment of arms" as a gift from Russia was approaching Mombassa. As the ship steamed towards Mombassa, the 23,000 ton British aircraft carrier, Albion, cruised off the East African coast. The "small consignment" of arms turned out to be a consignment of large tanks and armoured personnel carriers, and also on board were Russian "experts" to demonstrate to Kenyans how to use the vehicles. It also turned out that the Kenyan Government had no need for the arms, and Kenyatta angrily sent the ship back to Russia on the grounds that the arms were "old and useless". He also promptly despatched home 17 "technicians" who had arrived from Russia by air to train the Kenyan Army.

Within a week, another consignment of arms arrived in Kenya. Again it was from a Communist

source, but this time it was being escorted by Ugandans and Tanzanians, who said they were taking it from Tanzania to Uganda. It so happened that the route went through Odinga's home province. There were 11 truckloads with 75 tons of Chinese small arms on board when the convoy was stopped in Odinga's home province. Kenyatta ordered the arrest of the convoy personnel and it was only after extreme pressure from Uganda's Prime Minister, Dr. Obote, and the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, that Kenyatta was persuaded that the violation of Kenyan soil was a genuine mistake and that the arms were genuinely bound for Uganda and had nothing to do with local elements in Kenya itself.

Despite denials by both the Government and Odinga, it would be fair to accept that Odinga had stacked a large amount of Communist arms in both his Nairobi office and his home-town hideaways; further, it would be fair to believe that the Kenyan Government had no advance knowledge of the Russian "gift" shipment of arms and that these, if things had gone according to plan, would have been received by and despatched to suitable destinations by Odinga; and it would be fair to assume that Odinga at least had some intimation that arms would be leaving Tanzania through Kenyan territory.

It was at about the time of the arms consignment from Tanzania, incidentally, that "Field Marshal" Okello was active in Kenya before being expelled by Kenyatta.

It was obvious that neither side could now hide behind diplomatic niceties or the demands of *auld lang syne*. They both came into the open. Odinga stomped the country, railing against the "imperialists" who wished to discredit him and telling the country that "Communism is like food to me". Kenyatta and Mboya addressed meetings and openly attacked the Communists in their midst. Kenyatta went so far as to invite Bildad Kaggia onto a platform with him, then hold him up to public ridicule in front of the crowd. Mboya also publicly repudiated Okelo Odongo, "Mr. Little Double-O", the Assistant Minister of Finance and a protege of Odinga, who had said at the Lumumba Institute that the Government should move economically to the East and away from the West adding that if there was an invasion of Kenya by Communists they would, economically speaking, be taking over American, British, West German and Asian property rather than Kenyan property. In May, five Members of Parliament publicly branded Odinga a Communist and called on him to resign. In Parliament itself, Tom Malinda publicly raised the question of the smuggling of Communist weapons into the country and announced that he would table a motion demanding that the Government halt the smuggling. Oneko intervened and blocked immediate debate; and when Malinda was due to table the motion formally he had, presumably under political pressures, disappeared for an hour or two.

In June, the anti-Odinga campaign was intensified with Cabinet Ministers, including Mboya, attacking him by name. Odinga, undaunted, continued his anti-Western speeches, accusing Britain and the United States of causing tensions in Kenya.

Odinga was replaced as head of the Kenyan delegation to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference in London in June. The position in the Government of Odinga was becoming precarious.

Odinga's masters in Peking were obviously becoming alarmed at this new trend that seemed to

signal the eventual eclipse of their East African agent. Wang Te-ming, a top Chinese spy, suddenly blossomed in Nairobi as a correspondent of the New China (Communist) news agency and was active in leftist circles in an apparent final bid to stem the wave of unpopularity against Odinga. Unfortunately for him, the Kenyan Security Branch found out his real identity and he was deported. The importance of the Te-ming mission was underlined by the fact that the Chinese Ambassador to Nairobi found it convenient to take a spot of leave at that precise moment and catch the same aircraft out of Nairobi as the spy. The upshot was Parliamentary motions calling on the Kenyan Government to expel all Chinese nationals and to close the Chinese Embassy in Kenya, which was described as the "agent number one of subversive activities".

Despite the overwhelming public rejection of Communist intrigues in Kenya and the virtual denigration of Odinga, Mr. Double-O held on desperately to his Government position for several months.

The final showdown came in March 1966. Mboya, now at the height of his power, put into motion a cool and calculated plan to topple Odinga. While the verbal campaign continued (including an open Odinga-Mboya clash in Parliament on February 15), Mboya planned a KANU "re-organization" congress at which it was planned to oust Odinga from the Party hierarchy, and the public was prepared for the anti-Communist purge by the expulsion of five Russians, two Czechoslovakians, two East Germans and a Communist Chinese. On March 9, Odinga issued a 2,000-word statement at a Press conference denying that he was planning a coup, criticizing the Government for not denying that he was implicated in such a coup, and accusing his colleagues of conspiring against him. The following day, 99 Members of Parliament replied to Odinga by calling on him to resign. Three days later, the KANU congress abolished Odinga's post as KANU Vice-President by 85 votes to 30; and to rub home the point re-appointed Mboya as Secretary-General on a 326-80 vote against Masinde Muliro, one of the former KADU members who had joined KANU.

Odinga had lost a decisive round in the battle against Kenyatta and Mboya, despite the fact, according to the London Sunday Express, that paymasters of Russia and Communist China had distributed R200,000 to certain Kenyan politicians in a bid to ensure that Odinga wrested control of the KANU congress from Kenyatta and Mboya. He resigned as Vice-President of Kenya on April 14, and went home to Kisumu to brood on his future.

A new party was formed, called the Kenya People's Union and Odinga became its leader with the support of 29 other Members of Parliament. Kenyatta forced them to resign their seats in Parliament and fight re-election, and in the subsequent by-elections in June nine, including Odinga, were returned to Parliament. Although Odinga had only a small official following from now on, he nevertheless had a political base in Parliament from which to operate and thus continued to pose a threat to the stability of Kenya. All indications are that Odinga is sitting quietly biding his time until Kenyatta passes from the scene. Kenyatta is aged and not in very good health, and when he goes a political crisis will descend on Kenya. Mboya, despite his position of strength within KANU, is unlikely to be accepted as a Presidential candidate because of tribal considerations and no other outstanding personalities have emerged. If Kenyatta goes suddenly, KANU is likely to be thrown into confusion. And this would be the time that Oginga Odinga, Mr. Double-O, makes his next move.

TANGANYIKA AND ZANZIBAR

There is every reason to believe that Peking at an early stage decided that in its plans for domination of Africa, Tanganyika would be a suitable beachhead. Geographically, it was the southernmost Black state in Africa with a sea outlet, and it gave direct access to no fewer than seven countries: Kenya, Uganda, the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia and Mozambique. It was a tempting proposition.

There was, of course, one problem, and that was that the Tanganyikan leader, Julius Nyerere, was known as a staunch Western-supporter and was, in fact, one of the darlinest of the West's darlings. Tanganyika might, therefore, not be such an easy prize. But there was always Zanzibar . . . Zanzibar became independent on December 10, 1963, with an Arab sultan being confirmed in his position of power by the British Government. An Arab sultan ruling a country, at the behest of Her Majesty's Government in London, that was predominantly Negroid? An Arab sultan ruling a country on the doorstep of Pan-Africanist Nyerere? Perhaps Tanganyika would not be so hard a prize after all, because there was always Zanzibar...

Peking had some good friends on the island of Zanzibar. There was Abeid Karume, who had been trained in Communist China, but was regarded as a "moderate" by his fellow politicians who included Kassim Hanga, trained at the Lumumba Institute in Russia, where he had taken a bride, and Abdul Rahman Mohammed, known as "Babu", a Marxist trained in Cuba and Communist China. There was that peculiar man John Okello, who with about 35 other Zanzibaris, had been trained in Communist Cuba. From Peking, Tanganyika looked positively rosy, because there was Zanzibar...

A month after Zanzibar became independent without Britain having ensured a "majority government", the Sultan was overthrown in a bloody coup d'etat on January 12, 1964 and fled to Britain. Okello, styling himself "Field Marshal", emerged as the hero of the revolution, claimed all the honour for having organized and carried out the coup, but he was subsequently kicked back to the mainland by Karume and Babu. Okello, breathing hell-fire about how he was going to "liberate" the entire continent of Africa, next turned up in Kenya, which very unbrotherly told him he was an unwanted guest and when he made another appearance in Kenya he was expelled. He then went to his native Uganda and obscurity until October 1966 when he bounced back with a naive suggestion that he could return Uganda to the correct path of "socialism". Okello, in his brief period of glory on the world stage, was one of the most bizarre figures thrown up by the upheavals in Africa in the present decade. A final analysis of the part he played in Zanzibar in 1964 will have to await the harsh investigation of history, but it would appear that he was merely a dedicated Communist guerilla fighter thrown into a momentary period of authority without the slightest ability to capitalize on his good luck of being in the right place at the right time. What chance he had he threw away by being outrageously boastful and egoistic.

The guns of the revolutionaries were hardly cold when Communist East Germany and Communist China were on the doorstep holding fat promises of aid. Within three months of the revolt on Zanzibar, the Marxists led by Babu had taken effective control of the Government of Zanzibar, having flooded the country with Russians and (especially) East Germans and Communist Chinese.

Karume was President of Zanzibar but the real power was exerted by Hanga, the Prime Minister, and (especially) by Babu, the Foreign Minister. Hanga's Russian wife, who was working as an assistant to the Director of the Russian Africa Institute, had written in the Moscow publication, "Trud", shortly before the revolt that there was a "potential revolutionary situation" in Zanzibar which she described as "the gateway into East Africa". Babu, who used to write Communist-inspired articles in the Zanzibar Nationalist Party newspaper and was on the editorial board of a Peking-financed magazine, "Revolution", published in Paris, had served a prison sentence for sedition while Zanzibar was under the administration of the British, who had marked him as a danger man. It was in "Revolution" that Babu admitted after the revolt, that his Umma Party was a "Marxist organization" that had taken the lead in the "socialist revolution". He was a prominent figure in international Communist circles and Communist-sympathiser bodies such as the Movement for Colonial Freedom in Britain.

On January 20, eight days after the revolt on Zanzibar, a mutiny broke out in the Tanganyikan Army (to be followed by mutinies among army units in Kenya and Uganda) and President Nyerere fled into hiding leaving Oscar Kambona, his Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs, to handle matters. A couple of days later, Nyerere surfaced and called on British troops to restore order. Nyerere was soon in firm control again, although he was visibly shaken by the thought that he, as the "father of the nation" had been challenged, and humiliated by the necessity to call in the help of the erstwhile enemy, Britain, to restore his throne.

Just when even the Western Press was becoming slightly perturbed at the Communist nature of the Government on Zanzibar, it was announced on April 23, 1964, that Tanganyika and Zanzibar had merged under the presidency of Nyerere with Karume as first vice-President into the "United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar", which, to the delight of the world Press, was shortened to the Tanzan Republic before becoming officially the Republic of Tanzania.

Sympathisers in the overseas Press had a field day hailing the union as being logical from a geographical point of view, and desirable from a political point of view because of the alarming preponderance of Communists in control of affairs in Zanzibar. Nyerere, it was reasoned, would be able to neutralize the effect of Communists in the Zanzibar administration and put an end to the Communist presence.

No one worried to answer the question why, if the union was so logical from a geographic point of view, Britain had not merged the two countries in colonial times and why the leaders of Zanzibar, fresh from the first flushes of a revolutionary victory and assured of abundant supplies of money and assistance from their friends in Peking and East Berlin, should so willingly and happily march into a union with a more powerful nation which would inevitably engulf them. True Babu was on a trip to Pakistan and Indonesia at the time of the merger. But he realized as well as his Iron Curtain masters that a union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar would ideally suit Communist purposes. And suit them it did. Where the Communists had succeeded in obtaining an African toe-hold in Zanzibar the Red foot had now moved forward with its heel firmly crunched on Zanzibar and not only the toe but also the sole casting a long shadow over Tanganyika.

The diplomatic repercussions were enormous. Zanzibar had officially decided to rid herself of all

British civil servants and had ordered the United States to close a space tracking station on Zanzibar. This unfriendly attitude was now brought into Tanzanian relations with Britain and the United States. Zanzibar had an East German diplomatic mission and Tanganyika a West German mission. After months of recriminations Nyerere permitted a consulate from East Berlin to be established in Dar es Salaam, straining relations between Tanzania and West Germany to breaking point. This type of friction between Dar es Salaam and the West, occasioned by the entry of Zanzibar, suited the Communists well.

The strategy employed by the Communists after the establishment of Tanzania was an interesting one. At no time did they openly challenge Nyerere or his leadership. Both Nyerere and Karume, the Zanzibar "moderate", were allowed to continue in harness and build up what popularity they could among the people. They even joined the forces of their political parties at one stage. But Nyerere was a weak politician and his character suited his politics, and so the strategy was to wear down Nyerere slowly and make him increasingly a puppet of Communist designs. A big role in this respect was played by Kambona, a fiery politician who had a knack of incurring the ire of the West.

A good example of Kambona's technique occurred in November 1964 when he made a startling disclosure of three documents purportedly involving the United States in an anti-Nyerere plot. American experts proved these to be amateurish forgeries. It transpired that Kambona had obtained the documents from Communist sources in the Congo and had passed them on to Nyerere. It is reported that in private, Nyerere accepted that they were forgeries, but refused to make a public apology.

Two months later, two senior American diplomats were expelled from Dar es Salaam in another Tanzanian-United States row after what appeared to be an innocent telephone conversation which was misconstrued as subversion plotting by Tanzanian security officials.

Although the United States was able to show innocence in these two cases, the Communists were no doubt pleased at the continuing rift between Nyerere and the West and the suspicion that the lies were creating in the minds of the people.

The strategy was going according to plan on the mainland as well as on Zanzibar where there was a torrent of Communist activity. Karume was allowed to go along preaching the doctrine of co-operation and harmony, but in front of his eyes East Germany was flooding Zanzibar with food, clothing and firearms and promises of interest-free loans; Russian military experts usually numbering about 30 to 40 at any particular time were scurrying around Zanzibar helping to build up a well-armed Army that was controlled not by Dar es Salaam but by Babu's Marxists; 200 Chinese Communists were said to be on the island and Peking was giving impressive quantities of cash to the island. Babu worked his fellow Marxists into power. For instance he sent two "conservative" Cabinet Ministers (Othman Shariff and Hasnu Makame) to diplomatic posts in London and Washington and replaced them with Marxists.

The Communist island was not interested in co-operation with the mainland. Despite the "union", the island had its own passports and set of rules on immigration. Once a film company was granted permission by the Government in Dar es Salaam to shoot scenes on Zanzibar for a film on tourist

attractions but was barred when it sought to land on Zanzibar. British passport holders needed visas for Zanzibar but not for Tanganyika. Citizens of Communist China, East Germany or Russia did not need visas to enter Zanzibar, but Tanganyikan citizens were denied free entry. Slowly information trickling through from Zanzibar became scarcer and scarcer as the island rulers were forced to curb mounting dissatisfaction among the local population at the replacement of the colonialists by hundreds of Communists who rode around in Government cars and lived in luxurious Government quarters while the slums which East Germany had promised to clear up remained as they were when inherited from Britain. By 1966, Zanzibar was to all intents and purposes a Communist state.

Things weren't going so badly for the Communists on the mainland, either. Both Kambona and Rashidi Kawawa, the second Vice-President, had tasted the sweet honey of Chinese money and were quite prepared to close their eyes to the plots being hatched by Communist agents. They had both been suspect since the army mutiny in January 1964 when their loyalties to Nyerere were tested and found not completely unblemished and on the advent of Zanzibar into their fold they bent a little more to the left. Nyerere was having the screw on him tightened ever so minutely and gently and was beginning to look and speak more like Nkrumah each month.

For Tanzania's five-year plan announced in 1964, Russia, Poland and Czechoslovakia gave R30,000,000 in machinery, as well as technicians; Communist China sent 11 military instructors to "train" the Army and 22 instructors to the Police Force as well as lorry-loads of arms; there was a R30,000,000 trade agreement between Communist China and Tanzania; Russia was pouring arms into the country. By March 1966, Russia and Communist China had each sent 11,000 tons of arms to Tanzania. In March 1965, for instance, five Russian aircraft landed in Dar es Salaam in 10 days with cargoes discreetly veiled and undeclared, and usually arms consignments were reported by late night revellers. Later that year the secrecy was abandoned and one foreign observer reported that he saw "how lorry-loads of modern anti-tank cannons, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition were unloaded from Chinese ships and taken openly to the Colito barracks". In November, observers saw 200 tons of small arms and ammunition as well as field kitchens being unloaded from a Chinese and a Russian vessel in Dar es Salaam and taken into delivery by the Tanzanian Army.

On the political front, Nyerere was proving a bright pupil. Early in 1965, he visited Communist China, where he professed great admiration for the Chinese Government and later when Chou En-lai wanted to pay one of his rare visits to Africa Nyerere was a willing host at a time when other African Governments were unwilling to consort with the Chinese leader. It was about this time that Nyerere discarded his Western and tribal dress and began appearing in public wearing the Chinese tunic that Nkrumah was so fond of.

Chinese influence is in fact predominant in Tanzania. Peking has given Nyerere a R32,000,000 interest-free loan for his five-year plan plus a R4,000,000 interest-free loan and a R2,000,000 "gift" for specific projects defined by Peking. The type of "specific project" defined by Communist China included an R800,000 150kw radio transmitter designed chiefly for broadcasting political propaganda southwards. Chinese agriculturalists - more than 200 of them - are working on the R 10,000,000 Ruvu State farm project, Chinese technicians have helped erect a R5,000,000 textile mill, and four Chinese patrol boats are now part of the Tanzanian Navy.

A general idea of Tanzania's swing to the left can be gauged from the fact that in four brief years, 1962-66, her trade with Communist countries almost trebled.

Slowly but surely Tanzania was moving into the Communist orbit, and, also important to the Communists, was becoming an important base for subversive activities against other African countries with huge amounts of arms and money channeled through Dar es Salaam. In September 1965, Kambona was released from his duties as Foreign Minister but remained in the Cabinet in a less important post and - significantly - was given more time to devote to his duties as Secretary-General of the only political party, the Tanzanian African National Union. This followed the Communist pattern of having a powerful man in charge of the Party machinery.

Tanzania's march towards Communism took another step forward in February 1967 when in one hectic week Nyerere nationalized all banks as well as import-export houses, insurance companies, flour mills and other companies. Nearly 40 companies were either seized outright or placed under effective Government control.

Still the apologists made their excuses for Nyerere, pleading that he was "the most misunderstood" of Africa's leaders and urging "sympathy" for him. After all, it was pointed out, Nyerere was merely a Socialist implementing Socialism.

How long, one wonders, will it take to progress from Socialism to Communism?

UGANDA

Milton Obote of Uganda is something of a riddle in East Africa. He is undoubtedly in favour of a single-party dictatorship for Uganda and of a pinkish type of socialism; yet he has made it clear that he would prefer to achieve the ideal of single-party government through the ballot box rather than through force and has not been slow in aligning himself with the Western world. He was once an admirer of Nkrumah and has made the usual trips to Communist China, Russia and other Communist countries (and once incurred the odium of the right-wing elements in his own country by laying a wreath on Lenin's tomb but not on the graves of Churchill and Kennedy on tours immediately afterwards to Britain and the United States); yet has expressed admiration for Western leaders, including Churchill, and once described John Kennedy as "my favourite President". He has upset strong tribal and racial affiliations in Uganda; and yet has emerged as a strong ruler, dedicated to the progress of his country. Accordingly, it is difficult to place Obote precisely in the context of Communism in Africa.

Uganda is beset by deep problems and divisions along racial lines (the Nilotic and Bantu elements - Obote is a northern Nilote, his wife a southern Bantu) along religious lines (Christians and Moslems) and along tribal lines. In connexion with the latter point, Obote has had considerable trouble with the small Bkamba and Bakanjo tribes in the Ruwenzori Mountains, where "Mad King Mukirane" declared himself "King of Ruwenzori" but his main problem was with the Buganda, a Bantu tribe, who were the most numerous, wealthiest and most powerful in Uganda on independence. Their ruler, the Kabaka (king) of Buganda, Sir Edward (King Freddie) Mutesa, was a revered monarch and his Palace a sacred shrine sitting atop one of the seven hills of the capital,

Kampala. So powerful was the Kabaka that he and his Buganda were treated with the utmost respect by the British colonial administrators and were always given a privileged position in political arrangements out of fear of offending the Kabaka.

Before independence, the Kabaka's royalist party, the Kabaka Yekka, joined with Obote's Uganda People's Congress (U.P.C.) to oust the Democratic Party led by the former Prime Minister, Mr. Joseph Kiwanuka. Obote could not have become Prime Minister of Uganda without the support of the Kabaka, whom he made titular President a year after independence in October 1963. He had seen, at first hand, the respect paid to the Kabaka by the British. And yet, once he had consolidated his position and felt he no longer needed the political support of the Kabaka Yekka (who in any case had joined the opposition party in 1964) Obote, with lightning speed, stripped the Kabaka of his constitutional powers in 1966, took over full control of the Government, and even razed the Kabaka's Palace to the ground. There was considerable violence and protest by the Bugandans, but Obote ruthlessly used his Army to mow down hundreds of Buganda tribesmen and emerged a strong ruler.

Strength of purpose has, indeed, been a hallmark of Obote's reign since he led Uganda into independence. On the economic plane, he has moved forward purposefully and with remarkable success, and despite being landlocked, Uganda has no frontier problems with neighbouring states and has been one of the most stable economically of the Black African countries.

On the political plane, he ruthlessly exterminated John Kakonge, a long-time political colleague and co-founder of the U.P.C., who had worked himself into a powerful position as Secretary-General of the U.P.C. and unofficial leader of the Youth Wing, and was probably the most powerful man in Uganda after Obote himself. But when Kakonge's Communist sympathies became intolerable in 1964, Obote showed no mercy and dismissed him promptly, replacing him as Secretary-General with Grace Ibingira, who was also a Cabinet Minister. In the course of the next two years, however, Ibingira, a Bantu but not a Bugandan, emerged as a right-winger and a champion of those elements who opposed the increasing prominence in the Government of the "inferior" northern Nilotes and as a rallying-point for those who thought that Obote was too leftist in his outlook. At the time of the Bugandan crisis, Ibingira was jailed with four other ministers on charges of plotting to overthrow the State and the right-wing influence in Ugandan politics received a nasty blow.

How far left has Obote, in fact, moved? If there is a threat of Communism in Uganda, it probably comes not from Obote but from the Youth wingers. Under Kakonge's unofficial patronage, the Youth wingers were outspokenly Communist. The Youth wingers, an official adjunct of the U.P.C., openly advocated a "revolution right from beginning to end... smash completely once and for all capitalist exploitation of race by race, class by class and if possible tribe by tribe". They called for a Communist state in Uganda, and invited Ugandan-born John Okello, the infamous "Field Marshal" of the Zanzibar revolution, to be their leader. Ibingira, shortly before his downfall, accused "certain party members and officials including some big guns" of protecting known paid agents of Communist countries. "There are certain young men without jobs or visible means of support", declared Ibingira, "who tour the country staying in the best hotels and drinking the most expensive liquors. We know for certain their funds are supplied by governments of certain Eastern countries yet some party officials seek to use them to take sides in internal problems."

Earlier, it had been reported that political thugs led by "mysterious White men" were responsible for a plague of Communist-style terrorism along Uganda's eastern frontier and chiefs had ordered their tribesmen to arm for combat. One chief said he had given the Police the names of 99 Communist lackeys, led by a jailbird who had spent six months "studying" in Moscow. The Opposition Chief Whip, Daudi Ocheng (who precipitated the crisis that led to the overthrow of the Kabaka of Buganda in 1966 by declaring that the Army second-in-command, Colonel Idi Amin, had made an illegal fortune by looting gold and ivory during the Congolese rebellion and had subsequently channeled some of the proceeds of his illicit loot to Cabinet Ministers including Obote), stated towards the end of 1965 that 26 Ugandans had returned from revolutionary courses in Communist countries to overthrow the Government by force. The U.P.C.'s secretary of Youth Affairs, Opio Nassau, declared at the same time that certain embassy officials in Kampala were training U.P.C. youth to foment a revolution.

In July 1966, London Press reports described a Russian gift of at least 12 M.I.G. jet fighters to Uganda as signalling "a perilous new phase in the affairs of East and Central Africa". The reports said that Ugandan pilots were being trained in Russia to fly the jets. The reports quoted Western authorities as taking the view that although "these warplanes in themselves are unlikely at the moment to make any significant political differences" they expected "other Soviet gifts bearing greater immediate meaning to follow in the months ahead". Ominous news indeed.

There is, therefore, evidence of substantial Communist support within Uganda. Obote acted firmly when this Communist threat came into the open for the first time on a large scale by dismissing Kakonge; but his case was subsequently weakened by the removal of Ibingira, who in his two-year tenure at U.P.C. headquarters had managed to weed out most of the Communist infiltrators. If anything, Obote has in the last year or two shown a softer line towards the left-wing elements in his country and has been less inclined to "persecute" them. In this attitude, he may be sowing the seeds of his own destruction. On the other hand, he has shown tremendous strength in ruling the country, and his successful political coup against the Kabaka of Buganda and his strong economic position are likely to see him through. There remains the questionmark of the Army, which had a minor mutiny over wages at the time of the mutinies in Tanzania and Kenya in January 1964 but Obote managed to find money to increase soldiers' pay and at the same time succeeded in consolidating his position with the Army, which supported him at the time of the Bugandan crisis in 1966. There is no reason to believe that senior Army officers feel antagonism towards Obote, but then either Obote might become too much of a dictator in the future or the Army might get revolutionary ideas through the Communist elements operating in Uganda.

In this respect, a crucial test for Obote came in January 1967, when an attempt was made to assassinate him. Taking the bull by the horns, Obote summoned Brigadier Amin (who had been promoted to Army Chief subsequent to the money scandal) and had a showdown with him on exactly where the loyalties of the Army were. He also gave Amin a verbal lashing after hearing that a complete truckload of arms and ammunition had been stolen from Army headquarters shortly before the abortive assassination attempt. Amin accepted the dressing down without resorting to tactics that some of his colleagues elsewhere in Africa would have adopted in similar circumstances.

The apparent loyalty of the Army at this stage was vital for Obote, as the assassination attempt had

co-incided with reports of increasing tribal unrest and antagonism in the country. The Baganda and other tribes opposed to Obote were said to be becoming increasingly restless at Obote's dictatorial rule and this sentiment was said to have spread to tribesmen in the Army itself.

The other aspect is Obote's alleged involvement in the money scandal concerning gold and ivory smuggled out of the Congo during the rebellion there. Obote hushed up the whole matter so that it was never satisfactorily aired in a public tribunal, and he rid himself of the politicians who could exploit the scandal. Despite this, there is, again, no reason to believe that Obote personally received money but the stigma will no doubt stick for some years to come.

Obviously, the Communists would like to gain control of any African state, including Uganda. Obote could be practising brilliant political deception in the Nkrumah mould. But current indications are to the contrary, and, if he can keep the Army happy, continue to ensure economic stability as in the past, and not relax too much on Party, especially Youth wing, discipline, Uganda is unlikely to go Communist and should remain a fairly reliable friend of the Western world.

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OF FAILURES AND NEW DANGERS

(Central Africa)

RHODESIA

Communist objectives in Rhodesia have blurred with terrorism instigated by the two Native political parties, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole. Whether these parties, both now banned and preceded by organizations with different names, started out deliberately as Communist front organizations or not, there is little doubt that they operate to-day as agents for Communism in Rhodesia.

Rhodesia has had her fair share of terrorism, both in urban and rural areas, and in the last year or two there has been a Communist connexion with this terrorism to an increasing extent. A significant fact about terrorism in Rhodesia is that whenever the authorities have acted against ZAPU and ZANU leaders the incidence of terrorism has dropped appreciably. There is little doubt that the mass of the Black Rhodesian population is law-abiding and feels safe in the knowledge that Nkomo, Sithole and their henchmen are being prevented from causing more misery to the people of Rhodesia.

What the majority of Black Rhodesians fear most is the intimidator. Intimidation is rife in the Native townships if the authorities show the slightest leniency to ZAPU and ZANU leaders, who promptly send thugs into the streets. It is these thugs who form the "vast support" that the Communists and Western Liberal supporters would apportion to Nkomo. In fact, the support that Nkomo has consists of a hard core of racists who have intimidated law-abiding Natives into buying membership cards and toeing the party line. If they refuse, there is always the petrol bomb thrown at their houses late at night, or perhaps the sharpened blade or even just brute force with a hunk of wood. The same situation applied in the rural areas, where thugs were sent to maim cattle and burn down huts. Whatever political motivations might have been present in the Nkomo and Sithole organizations quickly degenerated into open thuggery with the objective to beat the people into submissive acceptance of a dictatorship in which they were to be robots - and peasant robots at that - while the leaders would live lives of luxury.

This is the society Mr. Harold Wilson has gone to such extraordinary lengths to try to impose on Rhodesia. This is what "majority rule" would be in Rhodesia: a dictatorship foisted on Rhodesia by Nkomo not far removed from a Communist dictatorship. The "majority government" would consist of Nkomo and a small clique of his friends, subjecting the masses to dictatorship of the rifle. Wilson, in short, has been working actively in all these months past to give the people of Rhodesia another Nkrumah.

The evidence of Communist involvement and even direction of the Rhodesian terrorist campaign is overwhelming: Communist weapons found in arms caches, training of Rhodesian Natives in Communist countries, recruitment of Rhodesian Natives with the use of financial resources and so on. The type of financial aid given to Nkomo was amply demonstrated by a report in the "Central

African Mail", Lusaka, on February 21, 1964 in which James Chikerema, one of Nkomo's lieutenants, was quoted as saying that he had collected R14,000 for ZAPU on a visit to Peking.

Communist influence in the terrorist movements in Rhodesia is well illustrated by the fact that when Nkomo's ZAPU, the more important of the two main groups, published its official organ, the "Zimbabwe Review", in London in January 1966, its advertising support was exclusively from Communist sources with the exception of advertisements placed by two North African states, Tunisia and Ethiopia. The Communist advertisements were from Russia (tourism and Russian propaganda publications) Poland (Chamber of Foreign Trade) Yugoslavia (tourism) Czechoslovakia (tourism) and Bulgaria (tourism).

The first evidence of Communist weapons being used by the terrorists in Rhodesia was provided in December 1962 when two members of ZAPU were arrested near Shabani. In the boot of their motor-car were three sub-machine guns and two revolvers. On the same day, another car (bearing Zambian registration numbers) was found near Wankie and two ZAPU representatives were arrested when a large amount of explosives was discovered in the car. The following year, one of the earliest of the Communist-trained terrorists was revealed. His name was Johnson Ndebele, and he had been trained in Communist China. He was killed while trying to put together a time bomb.

While terrorism continued in Rhodesia in the next few years, the Communists concentrated on training Black Rhodesians for terrorist raids on their homeland. The onslaught came in 1965 (when 80 terrorists were arrested in Rhodesia) and continued in 1966.

On August 24, 1965, for instance, the Salisbury High Court was told how 28 Rhodesian Natives had been recruited "to go to America" but had been sent instead to Ghana, where they had been trained in subversive warfare by Communist Chinese instructors. The 28 men were jailed for 10 years. Between April and October of that year, 20 men were rounded up and charged for subversive activities. They had spent two years training in Russia, Communist China and North Korea, where they had been given courses in Communism as well as in terrorism. On May 13, 1966, they were sentenced by a Salisbury court to 10 years imprisonment.

As the decision to declare independence in Rhodesia became increasingly inevitable, the activities of the "across the border" subversion organizers were intensified. A fortnight after the Declaration of Independence, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, the Minister of Law and Order, told the Rhodesian Parliament that there had been a sharp increase in subversive activities and that a number of Russian-trained spies, ferried across the Zambesi River from Zambia, had been captured.

Stating that all anti-Rhodesian terrorism was directed from Zambia or Tanzania, Mr. Lardner-Burke said that in recent weeks a number of Black Rhodesians, who had undergone a comprehensive course in Russia between April and August, had been caught after secretly crossing the border from Zambia. He named Russia, Communist China, Ghana and Algeria as countries that were training terrorists for use in Rhodesia and estimated that between 700 and 800 terrorists were waiting outside Rhodesia for orders to invade the country.

Mr. Lardner-Burke also gave these statistics on terrorism: since the beginning of 1965, there had

been 478 offences against property committed by subversive elements; in Bulawayo alone, there had been 391 cases of intimidation, assault, public violence, petrol bombings, stonings and explosive attacks; in the Native townships 970 water meters had been destroyed. Terrorists, he added, had attacked business premises, White residences and motor vehicles. Russian-type hand-grenades had been used.

And Mr. Lardner-Burke added that there had been an upsurge of political violence of all kinds since July 1, when 380 restrictees had been released. This, experience has shown on more than one occasion in Rhodesia, is no co-incidence. The Liberal apologists in the West would seek to attach the label "freedom fighter" or "fighter for justice" or "fighter against oppression" on Nkomo and Sithole but (apart from fighting each other, sometimes physically) the only objectives Nkomo and Sithole have ever fought for are terrorist intimidation, anarchy and bloodshed. When they and their henchmen have been kept in check, peace has reigned among the Black Rhodesian population; when the restrictions have been eased, terror has stalked among law-abiding Black Rhodesians.

Naturally, it is difficult to convince anyone overseas who has been saturated with Liberal news agencies' reports that there is such a thing as a Black Rhodesian who is content with the current political structure in Rhodesia. At the height of the Anglo/Rhodesian dispute, for instance, British newsmen went to any lengths to fabricate anti-Rhodesian stories. I was not present personally but have been told by a highly reliable source that certain British newsmen became so frustrated when they toured a Salisbury township at the absence of any semblance of unrest or dissatisfaction that they gathered a group of young Black children together, tossed coins in a rubbish bin and, as the children dived into the bin to fish out the coins, took photographs to relay to their bosses in Fleet Street for publication under "Starved and oppressed African youngsters raid refuse bins as tyrannic Smith regime denies them food" type of caption which some fertile Communist, or Liberal if you wish, representative in a news office would think up.

In 1966, the terrorist campaign in Rhodesia was intensified, with about 500 acts of subversion being reported. April 29 saw the Battle of Sinoia. On that date, Rhodesian security forces clashed with terrorists who were well armed with Communist Chinese weapons and Russian hand-grenades (the terrorists also had Communist literature including notes they had made on guerilla warfare while "studying" at the Nanking military college in Peking). Seven terrorists were killed at Sinoia. The Sinoia gang, which admitted that it had infiltrated into Rhodesia from Zambia after training in Communist China, was one of three groups (totalling 70 men) which had been sent into Rhodesia to carry out terrorist raids.

The battle of Sinoia received wide publicity, but was only one instance of Communist-directed terrorism in Rhodesia. Another example, for instance, was the infiltration into Rhodesia in April of seven Natives armed with Russian and Communist Chinese weapons and dynamite with an assignment to blow up the Beira-Umtali oil pipeline. (They were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on June 23.)

After Sinoia it was reported that about 500 Communist-trained saboteurs were mustered in Zambia and hundreds more in Tanzania waiting to cross into Rhodesia for terrorist activity.

The examples quoted above are but a few of the many that show active Communist involvement in the terrorist campaign against Rhodesia. But terrorism was not the only weapon used by the Communists in an effort to bring about a dictatorship in Rhodesia. The intellectuals, Communist and Liberal, were inspanned for the battle.

The University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was a major centre for intellectual subversion against the Rhodesian Government. According to court evidence, it was also used as a centre for distributing arms and ammunition to terrorists. In mid-1966 the showdown came. On July 16, some students demonstrated at the annual graduation ceremony against the visit of Professor J. P. Duminy, vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and prevented two Rhodesian Cabinet Ministers from attending the ceremony. On July 27, the Rhodesian Police detained 19 University lecturers and students. On the same day Mr. Lardner-Burke told Parliament that the Government had acted after a "few years" of clandestine activities by certain persons connected with the University. "These persons have been associated with banned organizations and some of them have strong Communist leanings. Certain lecturers among those persons have used their unique position to influence students into joining them in furthering their aims", declared Mr. Lardner-Burke.

The Police action at the University followed months of simmering unrest, fomented by "Liberal" students. The campaign, following Communist-perfected techniques, was on the lines of "Government interference with academic freedom". Academic freedom, it appeared, included the right to organize terrorist and murder raids! After the Police intervention, the University was temporarily closed.

One of the worst terrorist and murder raids instigated by the Communist-directed "African nationalists" came on May 17 when Mr. and Mrs. Johannes Viljoen were murdered on their farm near Hartley. These murders were described as "brutal, cowardly and cold-blooded" by Mr. Justice Lewis when he sentenced to death two terrorists, Everisto Africa and Edmund Nyandoro in the Salisbury High Court on February 8, 1967, for their part in the murder raid. Nyandoro told the court that he had been trained to commit political murder in Egypt, Tanzania and Communist China and had returned to Rhodesia specifically to kill. Africa said he had been recruited into the terrorist gang in Rhodesia at gun-point.

The ZANU office in Lusaka, Zambia, openly claimed responsibility for the Hartley murders, and threatened further violence in Rhodesia. In other words, murder was being planned under the aegis of President Kaunda's Zambia, which was being given full support by Mr. Wilson's Britain. The subsequent statement by Mr. Arthur Bottomley, then Commonwealth Secretary, in the House of Commons that his Government condemned violence from whatever quarter it came, was poor comfort for the victims of the ZAPU and ZANU terrorist raids - or, one imagines, for the unwitting tools of Communism who had been sent into Rhodesia by "party officials" lounging in the safety of hotel bars in other countries.

Indeed, the conscience of the British Government cannot be eased so easily. It cannot dismiss its role in terrorism and murder with an apologetic condemnation of "violence from whatever quarter it came". ZAPU and ZANU aim at a terrorist takeover of Rhodesia. Britain is supporting that take-

over bid. ZAPU and ZANU aim at establishing a ruthless dictatorship in Rhodesia. Britain is supporting that aim, too.

ZAMBIA

Zambia is one of the wealthiest states in Black Africa, and, for this reason, if none other, must have always looked like a bright plum for the Communists. But there were other reasons for Communist interest in Zambia.

Tribal differences, such as those centering on the undercurrents of discontent in Barotseland with the central authority, can easily be flamed into civil war. So can religious animosities, as was graphically illustrated just before Zambia became independent in 1964 when the Lumpa sect, led by Alice Lenshina, was forcibly broken up by Government troops in bitter clashes in which several hundred people were killed. Government efforts to brand the Lumpas a "fanatical" sect and the exact cause of the unrest have never been explained satisfactorily. Another point of friction which has been exploited in Zambia is the presence of a substantial White community, mainly from South Africa and Rhodesia. The potential for White/Black relations in Zambia to be upset was amply illustrated in 1965 with the absurd campaign by Zambian railway workers, well supported by the British Press, to slander and villify White railwaymen, some of them only on temporary work in Zambia.

These racial, tribal and religious animosities could be fanned to good effect by the Communists, but they have played a waiting game in Zambia, content to indoctrinate, infiltrate and bribe. They have done this with considerable dedication and not a little success. For instance, they managed even before independence in October 1964 to gain a considerable grip on key trade unions and it is almost certain that some Communist influence was at work in the wild-cat strikes that erupted in Zambia in 1965 and culminated in the serious railway strike. The Communists also appeared to succeed in obtaining appreciable influence among a group of politicians who found themselves in the first independence Cabinet. This militant left-wing is led by Simon Kapwepwe, who was Home Minister before becoming Foreign Minister. Kapwepwe so admires Communist China that he wears the typical Red Chinese tunic, popularized in Africa by Nkrumah and Nyerere. Periodically, there have been strains and stresses between President Kaunda and Kapwepwe but up to now they have not fought publicly.

The main flank of Communist activity in Zambia has been mounted by Communist Chinese diplomats, operating from a luxury R50,000 mansion in Lusaka. The Chinese and other Communists were well established in Lusaka by independence, and on independence day correspondents reported that the Zambian capital was "teeming" with Communists.

President Kaunda's problem is not personal ideological commitment to Communism, but his burning ambition to become a leader of Africa, a Nkrumah or Ben Bella of Central Africa (and, who knows, maybe one day of all the continent). To cast oneself in such a role is a difficult assignment, because it means giving priority to the "cause of Africa" above one's own country, and the security of one's own country.

To be an Nkrumah or a Ben Bella, for instance, it is essential to play an active role in the "liberation movement", i.e. in the fight against all anti-Communist governments in Africa. At the time of independence, Zambia housed no less than 15 of these "liberation movements", most of them saturated with Communists. This was impressive for a radical, militant leader of the "true Africa", but it had its snags. It meant that one had to play host to a horde of Communists and Communist-sympathisers who were trying to undermine other countries and at the same time constituted a security risk to one's own country.

The ZAPU officials in Zambia have been in the forefront of the "freedom fighters" to whom Kaunda has played host, but they have proved a danger to Zambian security. In April 1965, for instance, Kaunda's police found it necessary to raid a house in which nine ZAPU officials were staying. The officials were arrested after Communist equipment and books were found but the charges against the men were dropped as Kaunda felt it would further his image in Africa if it were known that he was actively assisting the anti-Rhodesian campaign. It was accordingly official Zambian Government policy to turn a blind eye to arms smuggling, although in September 1965, when Police found a big consignment of arms, including machine guns, being sent to terrorists in Mozambique, Kaunda began feeling uneasy about this free movement of arms through Zambia and the effect it would have on internal security and was constrained to warn agitators to watch their step. Nevertheless, arms smuggling is still prevalent in Zambia to-day, and Kaunda may yet regret the blind eye he has turned to the terrorist organizations in his midst.

Another qualification for an Nkrumah or Ben Bella type of African leader is the need to be open-hearted and extend open arms to Communist diplomats. This also has the danger of undermining internal security as Kaunda has realized on more than one occasion. In April 1965, for instance, he was forced to curb the activities of Communist diplomats by restricting all embassies to 12 members (15 for Commonwealth countries). On other occasions, he has been forced to warn foreign diplomats that he would expel any diplomat convicted of subversion and to warn officials not to take bribes from foreigners. On one occasion, in April 1965, Kaunda called in the Communist Chinese Ambassador to ask him why a pamphlet "Revolution in Africa" was being distributed in Zambia and why, in particular, he, Kaunda, was bitterly attacked in the pamphlet.

It is also necessary, if one wishes to be an Nkrumah or Ben Bella type of leader to be anti-White and anti-West. It is in respect of this qualification that Kaunda's ambitions have run away with him to a disturbing extent. The left-wing in his Cabinet forced him to adopt such an anti-White policy that he has jeopardized the effective functioning of his railway system. If White labour leaves the railways in force, Zambia's economy will be crippled as the country does not have sufficient skilled Black workers to replace the White workers. Kaunda was playing with fire when he placed his railway system in jeopardy just for the sake of being able to blow a "Pan-Africanist" trumpet.

Kaunda's rantings and ravings against Britain over the Rhodesian issue have also placed him in a precarious position. It is all very well being a "Pan-Africanist" in the Nkrumah or Ben Bella mould, but then it does one's "cause" little good to make threats against a Western country (Britain) but not fulfill the threats. Despite his failure to carry out his threats against Britain, Kaunda does not appear to have seen the light. He still is anti-British and anti-Rhodesian, and in pursuing this course can only imperil his own economic future. There is little doubt that the Kapwepwe wing put pressure on Kaunda to adopt his aggressive attitude towards Britain. Naturally it would suit this "Liberal" wing

and the Communists down to the ground if Zambia's economy were crippled. It would then be a case of exit Kaunda and enter the Communists. The Communists, naturally, would also love to see the Commonwealth disintegrating and find Kaunda a good lever to use towards this end.

Under the pressures of all these artificial factors, Zambia has moved to the Left in the last few years. There has been an increase in the number of Zambian students going to Russia and the number of Zambian politicians visiting Peking and Moscow. It is known that both Russia and Communist China have made generous aid offers to Zambia.

A strong Russian delegation spent December 1966 in Zambia to make a study of Russian aid to Zambia and Zambian leaders have already discussed an aid agreement with Communist China. The latter, of course, is banking desperately on the Tanzam railway line becoming a reality.

The Tanzam project envisages a line running from Ndola, in the heart of the Zambian Copperbelt, through under-developed North-Eastern Zambia to Kidatu in Tanzania where it would link up with an existing railway track to Dar es Salaam. The total length would be 1,320 miles, necessitating the construction of 580 miles of new lines in Zambia and 430 miles in Tanzania. Several surveys and several estimates have been made, and it is generally accepted that the Tanzam line would cost at least R 100,000,000 and could involve many millions more. Communist China has agreed to spend this money on the line - and for good reason.

Construction of the line by the Communist Chinese (who have a poor record in the construction, including railway construction, field both at home and abroad) would be the pretext for flooding Tanzania and Zambia with thousands of Chinese "experts" who would have the responsibility of building the line but the prime obligation of spreading Communist propaganda and subversion through East and Central Africa. It is a tempting prospect for Communist China, despite the huge amount of money involved. For it would give Peking an opportunity of striking a tremendous blow for Communism in the heart of Africa. Nyerere in Tanzania is at this stage not in a position to say no to the Chinese, but Kaunda is not yet at the subservient level of a Communist stooge state and would be well advised to reject the overtures emanating from Peking.

Zambia to-day has two choices: either Kaunda becomes a realist and abandons his image-building campaign or the country faces the prospect of economic collapse with the Communists ready to bail Zambia out of trouble. Kaunda, unfortunately, does not appear to be a realist. He appears far more interested in "Pan-Africanism". One cannot escape the conclusion that unless Kaunda faces the economic and political realities of Southern Africa, he will march, or be pushed, along the road that eventually leads to the door labelled "Communist stooge states".

MALAWI

One of the biggest set-backs the Communists received from the Black states on the continent came from Malawi. As with so many of the states in Africa, Malawi, when she was granted independence after 73 years of British rule on July 6, 1964, was custom-made for Communism. Malawi was among the poorest of Britain's former possessions, unemployment was high, and financial temptations were obvious because of the R9,000,000 budget deficit. Furthermore, Communism

could align itself particularly nicely with "Pan-Africanism" and fan flames of hatred because Malawi was dependent for survival on two of the declared enemies of radical Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese Mozambique.

Malawi was a good springboard for any power with designs on Africa, as it provided direct access to mineral-rich Zambia and to the southern part of the continent controlled by Rhodesia, Portugal and South Africa.

All these factors must have been in the minds of the Communist strategists. But if they regarded Malawi as a push-over, they were to be proved wrong. Dr. Hastings Banda, the Prime Minister, may have been an admirer of Dr. Nkrumah, but he would have no truck with either Communists ("their vodka and their wiles") or with the leaders of militant Africa (he once called them ignorant people who only knew how to shout but knew nothing about history or economics). Dr. Banda has been something of a dictator in his country but it would appear that his professed distaste of Communism and militant Pan-Africanism is genuine and that if his dictatorial measures do not get out of hand he will be a bulwark in Africa for the Western fight against Communist inroads on the continent.

The Communists' first flirtation with Malawi came immediately after independence when Kanyama Chiume, Minister of External Affairs, visited Dar es Salaam with a group of ministers and was promised R36,000,000 by the Communist Chinese Ambassador, Ho Ying, formerly the top man in the African section of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Peking, if Malawi recognized Communist China. (On independence, Dr. Banda had invited both Communist China and Nationalist China to attend the celebrations; the Communists got in a huff about this and stayed away from the celebrations, accusing Banda of an "unfraternal attitude" influenced by the "imperialists".) Chiume and his Cabinet colleagues were in favour of accepting the offer, but Banda, to whom the offer was subsequently repeated with a reduced "bait", angrily rejected it as a blatant bribe.

This was one of several causes which led to the Cabinet revolt that rocked Malawi two months after independence. Three ministers, including Chiume, were dismissed by Banda and two others resigned the following day with a sixth minister, Henry Chipembere, siding with the rebels on his return from a visit to Canada.

Chipembere took to the hills to launch an armed revolt against Banda before eventually joining the other five ministers in exile. Chipembere and Chiume were both radicals, known to have left-wing views. Chipembere, a Fort Hare graduate, confessed that while in exile during the independence struggle, he was an "outright racist" and Chiume also admitted to "bitterness" but both claimed that after independence they had "forgotten and forgiven".

After the revolt, Chiume made his way to Tanzania via Zambia and was on intimate terms with Oscar Kambona, Foreign Minister of Tanzania. There seems little doubt that Tanzania actively supported the rebel ministers and that Chipembere was on good terms with Dr. Mondlane, the anti-Portuguese guerilla leader in Mozambique. Chipembere, who was a diabetes sufferer and needed daily doses of insulin, said he had gone to the United States after his unsuccessful fight against Banda for medical reasons, but Banda claimed that he had gone there to obtain assistance from the dictator of Communist Cuba, Fidel Castro, for a guerilla war against Malawi.

Chipembere, and Chiume in particular, were left-wing in their outlook and by subsequent association their outlook must have been tinged at least a mild pink but there is no concrete evidence to suggest that they were dedicated Communists. It is even possible that they wanted to accept the R36,000,000 gift from Communist China in good faith. However, it is also necessary to accept that either in spite of or because of the turn of events in Malawi both men would not have hesitated to use Communist aid if they could have overthrown Banda. They would then have been committed to Communist ideology. The genuine disciple of democracy cannot easily accept the dictatorial rule now operating in Malawi but at this stage it can be said that Communism has suffered a severe rebuff in Malawi and that Dr. Banda has, in many ways, achieved more than many other African states.

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COMMUNISM CRUSHED

(South Africa)

Communist tactics in South Africa have been concentrated almost exclusively on racism. Strenuous efforts have been made to cause friction and hostility between the various races and to press for a Black Government. It says much for the soundness of current policies in South Africa and the harmonious co-operation between the various races that in spite of Communist efforts, negligible support for the Communist Party has emerged from the Bantu down the years. The Communist Party, in fact, has always consisted of a few hard-core White Communists, mostly people whose roots are in overseas countries and who have had an enormous uphill battle trying to convince the Bantu that Communism is for them, and a layer of Bantu who were mostly ignorant of the real meaning of Communism. Time and again the Bantu of South Africa have rejected Communism.

S.P. Bunting, a Briton who in his political career displayed a shocking lack of understanding of the Bantu and of the country on which he tried to foist his Communist ideas, was one of the earliest agitators among the Bantu. In 1917 he founded a group that delighted in the name of the "Industrial Workers of Africa" and unleashed a series of minor wild cat strikes on the Witwatersrand during which he incited Bantu to demand better wages and living conditions. After one of these Bunting ventures, a strike by Bantu sanitary workers in Johannesburg in 1918, he was arrested and charged with incitement but the charge was subsequently withdrawn. These early efforts by Bunting through the "Industrial Workers of Africa" fizzled out as soon as the Bantu realized that this strange White man was by no means the unselfish advocate of their interests that he made himself out to be.

The Communists next tried to whip up discontent among the Bantu through the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa (I.C.U.) founded in 1919 by Clements Kadalie, a Nyasa working in Cape Town, and some of his friends. Kadalie was to dominate the organization for some time, but from the outset the Communists started infiltrating the body (the constitution of the I.C.U. was even drafted by a Communist). They did this by enrolling Bantu as members of the Communist Party and then sending them into the I.C.U., which was a more or less exclusively Bantu trade union, to disseminate Communist ideas. But these "Communists", who played a vital role in the I.C.U. at one stage to the extent that they were on the verge of taking over the body, were not really dedicated Communists. Rather were they a bunch of racials whose racist emotions were exploited by White Communists. They had been indoctrinated with Marxist ideas without really understanding them and were led to believe that Communist principles dove-tailed with their own racist ideas. When they realized the true significance of Communist intentions, they saw the light and deserted the cause. This was shown in 1926 when Kadalie forced a showdown with the Communists and the support of the latter evaporated. Kadalie himself became increasingly leftist in later years and the I.C.U. increasingly ineffectual before dying a natural death. But in its vigorous years, the I.C.U. had done considerable harm to race relations in South Africa and the Communists had not been without their successes in whipping up unrest.

The Communists had an equally difficult time in the early years among the "White proletariat" they sought to recruit to Communism. Although there were a number of Communists in trade unionism

and a Communist element was one of the forces agitating at the time of the 1922 Rand Strike, there was little sympathy among White workers for Communist ideals. Even the Labour Party, founded in 1909, was concerned more with the interests of the White workers than with Socialistic ideas of equality among all races. It had many members who were Liberals on race issues, but its leadership up to World War II was mainly conservative on race matters. This leadership, in sharp contrast to the leadership in the last years of the Labour Party's existence in South Africa in the 1950's, was more interested in protecting the White labour force against the Black labour force than in "one man, one vote" ideologies. The Liberal Labour Party had its heyday in the late 1940's and early 1950's when it obtained Parliamentary representation as a result of election pacts with the United Party (1948 and 1953) but when the United Party broke the pact in the 1958 General Election the Labour Party expired.

In 1915, a number of Liberals on the left-wing of the Labour Party broke away and formed the International Socialist League. Here again, the split was not so much on race lines as on the war issue, the rebels having sought to commit the Labour Party to an anti-war platform. But inevitably the League, led by Bunting and D.I. Jones, ex-secretary of the Labour Party, became a Red Liberal group pledged to multi-racialism. After his excursion into Bantu trade unionism as an agitator, Bunting turned the International Socialist League into what it really was - the Communist Party of South Africa. The Communist Party was officially formed on July 29, 1921 with C.B. Tyler as Chairman, W. A. Andrews as Secretary and S.P. Bunting as Treasurer.

Even at this stage, Bunting and his fellow Communists were not slavishly pro-Black, adopting multi-racialism as their main plank and making "equal rights for equal work, irrespective of colour" type of propaganda. The Communist Party was much under the influence of Moscow, from which it took directives, and Moscow had not yet clarified its own views on race matters and did not insist on Black domination in South Africa. But then came the directive from Moscow: South Africa must become a Black republic and the Communist Party must work towards that objective. Some of the leading lights in the Communist Party were expelled for opposing this directive, which they felt was unrealistic but Moscow was planning far ahead and was adamant: a Black republic was the clarion call. (Moscow soon became obsessed with its new found interest in far-away South Africa and the late Professor Ivan Ivanovich Potekhin, the foremost Russian expert on Africa, even wrote his thesis for a doctorate in historical sciences on the "problems of the South African Bantu.")

The idea of a Black republic in South Africa soon found favour among White Communists who began an intensive programme of indoctrination. Bantu were subjected to an onslaught of Communist dogma at night schools and suchlike. The Communists again had a certain amount of success in this plan of action, but again it was due mainly to the fact that Bantu were indoctrinated with high-sounding ideals and made to understand that Communism would give them an idyllic existence. The Communists soon found that once the Bantu had an opportunity to see Communism in practice they rejected the theories of Marx and so they concentrated on illiterate Bantu who could be brainwashed to the maximum.

In this connexion, the late Professor Edward Roux, a veteran South African Communist, in his book "Time Longer Than Rope" (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1964) makes the following very significant revelation:

"In the ranks of the (Communist) party the best Bantu communists were always those who had not been spoilt by serving an apprenticeship in the (African National) Congress or with the I.C.U. The best of all were rank and file Bantu members, often semi-literate, who received their education through the party and had never been in any other organization."

In other words, Bantu who could be fed with pure Communist dogma (education in Roux's phraseology) and not be able to employ logic and reasoning to reject what they were being told by their shrewd and fiendish tutors.

During World War II, International Communism was forced to switch tactics on more than one occasion and the South African Communists dutifully followed suit. But with the prevailing instability in the Communist movement, it was not an appropriate time to launch full-scale onslaughts on the "proletariat", White or Black, and Communist political activity was largely confined to consolidation rather than new ventures.

But it is to the credit of International Communism that while the war was in progress it had worked out its blueprint for the future and, immediately after the war, was able to stretch its tentacles over a wide area of Europe with such remarkable success (and with such tragic results for millions of enslaved people). In South Africa, the planning and scheming had also been in full swing during the war years and immediately on the cessation of hostilities the Communists went on the march.

The Communists hoped to capitalize on the sentiments of soldiers returning from the war and took over the ex-servicemen's organization, the Springbok Legion, with Jack Hodgson, a hardline Communist, becoming National Secretary of the Legion and Lionel Bernstein, a Communist since his youth, becoming editor of the Legion's magazine, "Fighting Talk". Other prominent Communists who played leading roles in the Legion were Petrus Beyleveld and Fred Carneson. The Labour Party was turned into a more leftist party although there is no evidence that Communists gained effective leadership of the party. However, it should be remembered that Liberal ideas in those years were so closely aligned to Communist plans for South Africa, as indeed they still are, that the Communists were doubtless delighted with the progress made by the Labour Party under the protective wing of the United Party. In 1947, Sam Kahn, one of the staunchest of all Communists in South Africa, entered the House of Assembly as a Natives' Representative for Cape Western. On the labour field, E. S. Sachs had taken over control of the Transvaal Garment Workers' Union and was instructed by his Communist masters to extend his activities to the Cape.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Communists had gained spectacularly in strength. But even at this early stage it was obvious that despite the gains made through White-organized channels, the Communist Party had nailed its flag firmly to the mast of non-White politics and was preparing to concentrate its future efforts in the Black arena. Ideas, plans and schemes worked out during the war years had now crystallized finally and irrevocably: the Communists would work for domination of South Africa primarily through non-White organizations. The astuteness of the Communists' thinking ahead was soon to be shown when International Communism's plans for swamping the world with Liberal/Communist ideas and propaganda were to propel the Black races of the world into a dominant position on the world stage.

The Communists made their play for domination of South Africa in the decade after World War II through two avenues: the so-called "African nationalist movements" and trade unionism. The infiltration of Bantu workers' ranks had started while the war was still in progress, and the Communists succeeded in gaining control of a number of them (J. B. Marks of the (Black) African Mineworkers' Union, Gana Makabeni of the Native Clothing Workers' Union, etc.).

The Communists intensified their onslaught on South African trade unionism in 1955 with the formation of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), a federation of 20 non-white trade unions with a membership of 60,000 which sought affiliation with the Communist W.F.T.U. (see Chapter 4). Leslie Massisia, a Bantu trained in Czechoslovakia, became Secretary of SACTU, which was to play a prominent part in the so-called Congress Alliance, a catch-all of Communist-orientated organizations discussed later.

Communist infiltration and in many cases domination of the South African trade union movement is a story of its own, but suffice it so say that the Communists placed great store on trade unionism, using it as a lever to promote unrest and friction between the races. Always, the pretext was "workers' dissatisfaction" with wage conditions and so on, but many a "workers' strike" in South Africa, White and Black, has had a Red hand in its embryonic development.

An excellent example is given in a report prepared by a senior police officer after a serious mineworkers' strike in August 1946 involving 50,000 mineworkers. (At that time, the United Party, now in opposition, governed South Africa and the report cannot, therefore, be dismissed as "National Party propaganda".)

The report states, inter alia:

"....on the 28th May, 1946, the Johannesburg District Party Committee of the Communist Party of South Africa conspired to incite a direct strike.

"A comprehensive report was compiled by the Johannesburg Committee of the Communist Party and this was forwarded to the Central Committee of the Communist Party at Cape Town by secret courier.

"On 5.6.46 the Central Committee of the Communist Party endorsed and confirmed the conspiracy of their Johannesburg Local Committee.

"The result was that on the 4th August, 1946, a meeting of some African mineworkers assembled at Johannesburg where they were told by J. B. Marks (Coloured), a member of the Johannesburg District Party Committee of the Communist Party and also President of the African Mine Workers' Union, that there was to be a strike on the 12th August, 1946.

"This information of a strike was given to the meeting by Marks after some inflammatory speeches and on a proposal to strike by a Native (Bantu) who did not appear to be a mineworker. The proceedings followed the lines suggested by the Johannesburg District Committee to their Central Committee."

The strike was duly held as demanded by the Communist Party which was active during the strike in distributing pamphlets, etc. Police arrested members of the District Committee of the Communist

Party in Johannesburg and in all 46 people were subsequently convicted and given sentences ranging from R30 (or three months) to R100 (or six months).

In addition to Marks, several of those convicted of inciting the strike would all have appeared at the top of a list of proven Communists 20 years later: Fischer, Harmel, Hodgson, Kotane, Carneson to mention but a few. But the time of reckoning had not yet come for Fischer and his comrades. The South African authorities of that time were not alert to the wiles of the Communists. How many tragedies, one wonders, might not have been averted in South Africa if decisive action had been taken as far back as 1946. For, as the report quoted above states:

"At this stage it might be mentioned that during the course of the (Police) investigations it became clear that certain members of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party were perhaps guilty of more serious offences than those with which the Johannesburg District Committee members were charged."

Later the report states: "Local and present-day strikes are primarily engineered by them (Communists) in order to practise and perfect the necessary machinery for their ultimate object. In order to accomplish this, demands are invariably made on the employers for increased wages to an extent which can never be met in order that no alternative but a strike may be the issue... I would therefore suggest on broad principles that the Communist Party of South Africa, and indeed, that of other countries, is engaged in nothing else but High Treason in the real sense of the meaning and definition of that crime as it is known to us."

In the early years of its existence, the Communist Party had been led by foreigners who did not understand the Bantu and cared little for his welfare. As a result, Communists were unable to impress permanently any Bantu leaders to any marked degree. During and after World War II, however, the situation changed somewhat. Communists began obtaining a better grasp of the Bantu mind and became more skilled in using propaganda among the Bantu. An important weapon in their hands was the decision to work for a Black-dominated, rather than a multi-racial "workers' republic". The upshot was that the Communists had greater success than ever before in recruiting hard-line Communists among the Bantu, although the mass of the population remained antagonistic towards Communist theories. (In the 1960's, the Communist Party, never averse to telling blatant lies, grew so desperate in its unsuccessful efforts to influence the Bantu masses that it resorted to such outrageously dishonest statements as the following one contained in a Communist Party pamphlet: "For higher wages, Land Freedom and Equality - 44 years of the great October Socialist Revolution. Free bread, free public transport, free education, free medical services, free holidays, free meals at work, no rents. Sounds like a dream doesn't it? That is what Communism is bringing to the 200,000,000 people of the Soviet Union.") The few Bantu who now emerged in key positions in Bantu organizations were sufficient to change the entire picture of Communist aspirations in South Africa.

The Communists concentrated on the African National Congress (A.N.C.)- This was formed as the Native National Congress in Bloemfontein in January 1912, and for many years was an ineffective (as far as the Communists were concerned) organization. But slowly the picture began to alter as the Communists became more skilful in their propaganda among Bantu leaders. As early as 1936 a

Communist, J. B. Marks, was Secretary-General of the A.N.C. and in 1943 Abraham Fischer, later the top Communist in South Africa, drafted a new Communist-inspired constitution for the A.N.C. In 1949, the Youth League of the A.N.C. (formed in 1944 when its leading lights included Nelson Mandela, Robert Sobukwe, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu) took over the A.N.C. Moses Kotane, General Secretary of the Communist Party, became A.N.C. Secretary-General.

The Communists were now well poised for action. They believed that, through the A.N.C., they had solid Bantu support behind them, and that through White organizations such as the Springbok Legion, they had sufficient White support to form a pressure group. They decided on a trial of strength with the National Party Government that had come into power in 1948.

In 1950, the Communists organized a series of riots for May 1, the traditional Communist "May Day" or "Labour Day". Ostensibly, it was to be a day on which the Black man would "revolt", but the Government was ready for the White Communists behind the move. On May 6, Mr. C. R. Swart, Minister of Justice and later the first State President of the Republic of South Africa, introduced the Suppression of Communism Bill. The seriousness of the Communist menace to South Africa did not yet have general appreciation. The United Party opposed the Bill in both Houses of Parliament. The Bill was eventually passed late in June, 1950.

The Communist Party immediately went underground, its dissolution being announced by I. Horvich, the national Chairman. The Communists regrouped in a Joint Planning Council and later (1953) in the Congress of Democrats (COD). The latter was supposed to be a "Liberal" organization. Suffice it to say that of the 15 executive committee members, nine were Communists and that Fischer was the President. The organization later formed the Congress Alliance with other "Liberal" bodies (A.N.C., South African Indian Council, South African Coloured People's Organization, SACTU). The Communist Party continued to function underground distributing pamphlets printed in Britain and influencing legal political organizations. Its main front organization above the surface was COD and, through COD, other adjuncts of the Congress Alliance.

On June 26, 1955, the Congress Alliance held a "Congress of the People" at Kliptown, near Johannesburg, at which a "Freedom Charter" was adopted. COD and the other members of the Congress Alliance revealed their true colours. The "Freedom Charter" was saturated with Communist dogma such as "the people shall govern", "the people shall share in the country's wealth", and "the land shall be shared among those who work it".

All the while, the Communist Party worked below the surface with all the familiar Communist trappings of cells and strict party discipline (it changed its name from the Communist Party of South Africa to the South African Communist Party, a very technical change).

The Communists spent the 1950's mainly re-building the fences that had been broken down by the Government's tough legislation and firm anti-Communist actions and in soliciting support among Black and White politicians. Opposition to the National Party was at its strongest in the 1950's among a varied selection of people of different shades of political belief and Liberals succeeded in capitalizing on this opposition to force themselves into the limelight. The Labour Party was revelling in its Parliamentary representation. The Torch Commando sprung into life over

Government plans to remove the Coloured people from the common roll. The Liberals were exhilarated enough to form the Liberal Party (1953). Under these circumstances of strenuous Government opposition to Communism and a fairly favourable climate for Liberalism, the Communists were content to leave much of the dirty work to the Liberals. Furthermore, it would seem that they were hoping for a White Liberal civilian coup of sorts and wanted to see which way the wind would blow in Liberal opposition to the Government. These hopes came to naught. In 1956, the Communists received a further set-back when 156 people, many of them Communists, were arrested and charged at what was to become the famous Treason Trial. Communist plans with the Bantu population also received a severe jolt when, in 1958, the A.N.C. split over policy and Sobukwe headed a splinter group into the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) a group more militant and racist than the A.N.C.

Because of all these factors, the Communists were fairly quiet in the 1950's. They had, however, contributed their dirty handiwork to the South African scene. In addition to the rioting in 1950, there was serious rioting in 1952 when the A.N.C., prompted by the underground Communist Party, unleashed a wave of racial killings and unrest. In East London, Bantu went on a racial rampage, killing three Whites including a doctor and a Catholic nun, Sister Quinn, whose reward for a lifetime of work among the Bantu was to be hacked to death and her flesh eaten. In Port Elizabeth, a White man was killed and several others injured while many shops were set alight.

The Communists also concentrated on harassing the Government. A series of Communist newspapers were published, each being banned in turn. This tactic of harassment was repeated in Parliament from which Kahn had been expelled in 1952. Brian Bunting, son of S. P. Bunting, found a loophole in the Act debarring Communists from entering Parliament and was returned in Kahn's place as Natives' Representative for Cape Western before being expelled. Later Ray Alexander, a dedicated Communist, repeated the trick but was barred from entering Parliament. Finally, the Cape Western seat was taken by Lee Warden in 1955. (He was arrested the following year in the Treason Trial arrests but continued to sit in Parliament.)

As a new decade dawned in 1960, the Communists knew that they had been well and truly battered to defeat in their first encounter with the National Party Government. But by now they had regrouped and were more convinced than ever before that White politics held no promise for them but that they should rather seek their prize through Black politics. They had also decided that force was to be substituted for passive resistance.

The underground Communist Party made no bones about its use of the A.N.C. as the spearhead of its onslaught on law and order in South Africa. In one Communist document, entitled "Statement by the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party", it stated unequivocally that Communist Party policy is that the "Liberation Movement" is to be "headed by the African National Congress and its fighting wing, Umkhonto We Sizwe". Bartholomeu Hlapane, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, stated at one of the anti-Communist trials: "All policy making in the A.N.C. was first discussed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party."

Early in 1960 the call went out to the Black politicians to stage another trial of strength with the Government. This time violence was to be used.

In March Sobukwe called for mass disobedience of legislation passed by Parliament. The result was Sharpeville and Langa. Sharpeville was deliberately selected by the underground Communist Party of South Africa as a battle ground to further Communist aims. The Communists ensured that journalists who would flash word, picture and film to the world were on hand. Communists ensured that Bantu were massed around the local police station. Then, with the scene set, the Communists incited the Bantu crowd to provoke shooting.

Sixty-seven Bantu laid down their lives in the interests of Communism at Sharpeville, and another 186 left the scene with wounds to remind them of Communist intrigues. The people of Langa were luckier: only two were killed and 49 injured.

Once again, the Government acted sternly against the Communist menace. On March 30, a state of emergency was declared and on April 8, both the A.N.C. and PAC were banned. The position was gradually brought under control but not before two further ugly incidents occurred.

On March 31, thousands of Bantu led by Philip Kgosana, a Bantu youth who like so many others on the African stage was to be thrust momentarily into the limelight before returning for ever to obscurity, marched into the centre of Cape Town before being dispersed.

On April 9, an attempt was made on the life of Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister of South Africa. It can be accepted that the would-be assassin, David Pratt, was mentally deranged and had no political connexions, but had Dr. Verwoerd died then - at a crucial time in South African history - the Communists (and Liberals, for that matter) could have claimed full credit for the evil deed, for it was their actions that created the climate and atmosphere for Pratt's act.

In the wake of PAC's failure in 1960, the A.N.C. sprang back into action in 1961 with Mandela, then an executive member, organizing a nation-wide strike for May 29, 30, and 31. The strike was organized at the "All-in African Action Conference" at Pietermaritzburg. It failed dismally and Mandela, who meanwhile had gone underground, became a fugitive from justice before eventually being caught in the presence of a White Communist, Cecil Williams.

Mandela was one of the few Bantu hard-line Communists who emerged during and after World War II and caused so much unhappiness among his own people. The outside world knew him only as an "African nationalist", never a Communist. But in a 62-page document "How to be a Good Communist", Mandela made no bones about being a Communist and exhorted his comrades to "take part in mass struggles initiated by the South African Communist Party, the Congress Movement or by other political bodies within the liberation movement."

Mandela's role in the Communist-inspired violence that struck South Africa in 1960 was a major one. There were other Bantu behind the scenes, some who were later caught out and others who joined the plot but saved their necks while their comrades paid the penalty for carrying out Communist plans; there were Whites, too, who masterminded the Communist violence, again some who were caught in the web and others who slyly slinked away while their comrades faced the music. But to Mandela fell the fate of doing much of the front-line organizing.

One of Mandela's most important assignments was to canvass the support of Black African states. The Communists tried their best to keep the Communist nature of their plans hidden as they were basing their entire operation on the erroneous image (particularly for overseas consumption) of the violence they were planning being an explosion of frustration and pent-up grievances on the part of the "poor, oppressed Africans". To this end, it was essential to obliterate any public knowledge of Russian or Communist Chinese involvement. The answer was to work through the Communist stooge states of Africa. For this purpose, it was necessary to use a Black Communist, not a White Communist. The man chosen was Mandela, who fitted the picture perfectly - a dedicated "freedom fighter" who had no proven Communist record but a very solid "African nationalist" record.

In 1962, Mandela made an extensive tour of Africa, concentrating on the Communist stooge states, recruiting aid for armed revolution in South Africa. He met with considerable success both in respect of moral, and financial backing. He also underwent intensive guerilla training in Algeria.

On his return to South Africa Mandela played a leading part in the fomenting of plans for the violent overthrow of the Government.

His political views are, therefore, of more than passing interest.

In his "How to be a Good Communist", he wrote, inter alia:

"The people of South Africa, led by the South African Communist Party, will destroy capitalist society and build in its place socialism...

"The transition... cannot be effected by slow changes or by reforms, as reactionaries and liberals often advise, but by revolution. One, therefore, must be a revolutionary and not a reformist...

"Under Communist rule South Africa will become a land of milk and honey...

"In our country, the struggle of the oppressed masses is led by the South African Communist Party and inspired by its policy ..."

These were the plans for South Africa that germinated in the mind of Mandela. His general observations on Communism included these stereotyped Communist lines:

"The Communist movement still faces powerful enemies which must be completely crushed and wiped out from the face of the earth before a Communist world can be realized. Without a hard, bitter and long struggle against capitalism and exploitation, there can be no Communist world. Every Communist Party member must possess the greatest courage and revolutionary determination and must be prepared to play his part and carry out all political tasks without fear or hesitation. To sacrifice one's personal interests and even one's life without the slightest hesitation for the cause of the Party is the highest manifestation of Communist ethics."

This document, produced at the so-called Rivonia Trial in 1963-64, irrefutably contradicted the impression the Communists and Liberals had tried to create that "African nationalism" was a potent force struggling against oppression and suppression. It illustrated graphically that the only Bantu

force struggling against the lawful Government of South Africa was the underground Communist Party, which was led by White Communists using Bantu Communists as a gigantic smokescreen.

With the failure of Mandela's strike in May 1961, the next salvo was fired in December 1961. Mandela helped organize a "military wing" of the A.N.C., which was called "Umkhonto We Sizwe" ("The Spear of the Nation"). This body launched a wave of sabotage in Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban.

The Communists tried their best, once again, to present Umkhonto as an "African nationalist" movement forced into violent action by unjust laws. In fact Umkhonto was an out and out Communist organization. Witness Hlapane: "Umkhonto We Sizwe's policy was formulated by the Communist Party, and the organization received its instructions from this Party."

Not to be outdone, PAC also organized a "military wing". Its version of a thug gang was called Poqo. Poqo, though in a different way, was equally as sinister as Umkhonto, and in some of its deeds even more devilish. Its structure followed the traditional Communist cell pattern. Cell members were unaware of the identity of other members and were sentenced to death if they betrayed Poqo secrets (about ten Poqo members were killed for betrayal of secrets).

The Poqo terror gangs were particularly active in the Transkei and in other parts of the Cape. The two most infamous acts associated with Poqo occurred at Paarl and at Bashee River Bridge.

In the early hours of November 22, 1962, Poqo struck in Paarl and after their attack on the local police station was repulsed gang members went on a racial rampage during which they killed Rencia Vermeulen, an 18-year-old White girl, and Frans Richard, a 22-year-old White man, in cold blood.

On the night of February 4, 1963, a Poqo gang attacked two caravans at the Bashee River Bridge in the Transkei and hacked the occupants to death. Those who died were Norman and Elizabeth Grobbelaar, their teenage daughters Edna and Dawn, and Mr. Derek Thompson.

Both Poqo and Umkhonto were fiendish organizations that threatened the security of the State. Although Umkhonto constituted the main flank of the Communist onslaught and had the concentration of Communist plotters in it, Poqo might well have proved a more dangerous weapon of the two. Poqo leaders were less well known to the authorities and were more in the shadows; the cell system and terror and intimidation to which members were subjected made Poqo a more sinister and potentially more dangerous organization as a mass terrorist movement. Umkhonto was led by men on whom the authorities kept tags as a matter of routine and the movement consisted mostly of leaders and few soldiers.

On the other hand, the very nature of the Poqo machinery eventually contributed to its demise. For Poqo depended on mass support, and when the mass of the Bantu population rejected Communist terrorism, Poqo was finished and the mopping up operation became a matter of routine. Umkhonto, better organized and with liberal funds and brain-power at its disposal, could have caused great harm if it had not been nipped in the bud.

The bud-nipping occurred on July 11, 1963, when Police raided Lilliesleaf Farm, a secluded 28-acre estate at Rivonia, in an exclusive belt north of Johannesburg. Not quite knowing how many or what size fish they were about to net, for they were acting on a tip-off, the Police were pleasantly surprised to make a heavy catch of top Communists: Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Lionel Bernstein, Bob Hepple, Raymond Mhlaba. They were particularly pleased to catch Sisulu, who had been on the run, but soon it became clear that bigger fish than even Sisulu were involved. In fact, the Police had hit the jackpot. They had unearthed the "National High Command" of Umkhonto We Sizwe and had smashed a Communist plot to overthrow the Government by armed force. This plan was contained in "Operation Mayibuye", a document that was actually being studied by the six men when they were surprised by the Police raiding party.

Mayibuye is Zulu for "Come Back" and refers to an early political slogan that preceded the more famous "Africa for the Africans" slogan, namely "Mayibuye Afrika", or "Come Back Africa", i.e. "White man, give Africa back to the Black man", erroneously based on the assumption that the Black man inhabited all of Southern Africa before the White man.

Operation Mayibuye was a detailed plan for a general uprising in South Africa, sparked by guerilla operations. The pattern that it was sought to follow was that worked out by Castro during the Communist revolution in Cuba. Operation Mayibuye, in the words of Dr. Percy Yutar, prosecuting in the Rivonia Trial that followed the arrests at Lilliesleaf, was planned "to bring about in the Republic of South Africa chaos, disorder and turmoil, which would be aggravated, according to their (the accused) plan, by the operation of thousands of trained guerilla warfare units deployed throughout the country at various vantage points. These would be joined in the various areas by local inhabitants as well as specially selected men posted to such areas. Their combined operations were planned to lead to confusion, violent insurrection and rebellion, followed, at the appropriate juncture, by an armed invasion of the country by military units of foreign powers".

The raid and subsequent Police investigations netted several other conspirators and suspects in addition to the six already mentioned. These included Dennis Goldberg, James Kantor, Elias Motsoaledi, Andrew Mlangeni, Harold Wolpe - and, re-entering the scene, Nelson Mandela. Ten men were brought to trial: Mandela, Sisulu, Goldberg, Mbeki, Kathrada, Bernstein, Mhlaba, Kantor, Motsoaledi and Mlangeni. Kantor was discharged and Bernstein acquitted. After the trial, which lasted from October 9, 1963 to June 12, 1964, the remaining eight conspirators were sentenced to life imprisonment.

But the "boss" of Lilliesleaf, Arthur Goldreich, escaped punishment. He had returned unsuspecting to his home some hours after the Police raid and walked right into the arms of the Police. Not one of the best known Communists at the time, it transpired that he had been largely responsible for the blueprint of Operation Mayibuye, on which he had put in much painstaking work.

Goldreich had travelled extensively behind the Iron Curtain and although he had visited Russia and Yugoslavia, it appeared that he had a particular admiration for Communist China and was especially interested in Mao Tse-tung's guerilla tactics. Several documents in his handwriting were found, and from these his dedication to Communism is obvious. Like other Communists, he went to great pains to windowdress his Communist plans in the finery of "African nationalism" and stipulated that all

Communist aid should be channeled through Black African states - Tanzania was a favourite state as far as Goldreich was concerned - because, in his words, it "becomes public knowledge when an African state supports democratic movement in South Africa. But if Moscow is involved - international ramifications".

Goldreich, after bribing a young policeman, escaped with Wolpe and two others and fled the country. After a terrifying time in Botswana (then Bechuanaland) when he went in fear of his life because of the hostility of the local population (an aircraft sent from Dar es Salaam to whisk him away was gutted by fire) Goldreich managed to reach safer pastures.

When Goldreich fled from South Africa, his wife was left behind in a prison cell. He soon made amends by picking up a mistress on the way north.

But Goldreich could not make amends for his fellow conspirators he had left behind. He had plotted to impose a Communist dictatorship on South Africa that would assuredly have brought misery to the Black people of the country. When his scheming went awry, he saved his White skin by fleeing the country. Those with Black skins - Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, etc - were left to pay for Goldreich's deeds. Once again, a Communist had shown how little he regards those he seeks to exploit.

After the activities of Umkhonto We Sizwe and Poqo, sporadic cases of sabotage occurred at irregular intervals for the next few years. In all the number of sabotage cases exceeded 400. Saboteurs committed 15 murders. The last and in many ways the most dastardly act of sabotage was committed at the Johannesburg railway station on July 24, 1964 when Frederick John Harris planted a bomb that mutilated men, old women and young children. One of Harris' victims, 77-year-old Mrs. Ethyl Rhys, died of her injuries. Harris was sentenced to death on November 6.

Once again the Communists had scored a victory: terrorism, subversion, murder were all designed to further Communist plans. Sometimes these acts were committed by Communists, sometimes by non-Communists incited by Communist propaganda spread through Communist and Liberal channels.

Doubtless, Harris would be disowned by both the Communist Party and the Liberal Party. But Harris was on the far left of South African politics and when it comes to the fiendish type of murder his warped mind planned, all those on the left - the Communist and Liberal parties not least of all - must bear joint responsibility for creating the atmosphere and climate in which Harris and his type could with cold-blooded cunning seek to blow up the innocent, both elderly and young.

It is because of cases such as these that the Liberal Party of South Africa is in need of deep soul-searching, as are those churchmen who support the Liberal Party - or even the Communist Party. Protestations of strict official adherence to non-violence are not sufficient. Liberal churchmen and the Liberal Party must ask themselves why so many Liberals, despite the Liberal Party's policy of non-violence, become criminals. Is it because members of the Liberal Party are not sufficiently influenced, while they are members, with the tenets of Christianity? Or are membership qualifications too lenient? Whatever the answer, and despite the official protestations of the Liberal Party that it will have no part of violence, it remains a fact that Liberals like Harris are among South Africa's most dastardly murderers.

It was of a leading member of the Liberal Party that Chief Kaiser Matanzima, Chief Minister of the Transkei, spoke when he said of the five murders at Bashee Bridge: "If it had not been for people like Patrick Duncan, there would have been no killings at the Bashee Bridge." And it was a Vice-President of the Liberal Party, Randolph Vigne, who caused so much trouble by poking his nose, uninvited, into the internal affairs of the Transkei.

To the Liberal Party falls the unenviable, but inescapable, responsibility for having fostered Harris, Duncan, Vigne and many others. A particular responsibility of the Liberal Party is, also, the influence it has sought to exert on youth. Young people are idealistic, sometimes politically ambitious, and almost always susceptible to influencing by older people. The young people at South African universities are no exception and the extent to which Liberals have concentrated on the young people at English-language universities has been a tremendous boon to Communism in South Africa. In the climate of racial hatred cultivated by the Liberal Party, University students have been thrown into the clutches of the Far Left, and many a student has in his immaturity misguidedly been influenced into undertaking political actions that have either directly or indirectly, been to the benefit of the Communist Party.

Topping the list of "student Liberals" in South Africa in recent years have been certain members of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). This body has been a primary objective for infiltration by Communists. Goldreich and Wolpe played prominent roles in NUSAS activities. So did Joe Slovo, Ruth First and Bob Hepple, all acknowledged Communists. Fischer himself was a NUSAS man and knew the value of infiltrating that organization having spoken of the "golden age" at the ultra-Liberal University of the Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg, when dedicated Communists were active on the campus.

Some of South Africa's young "Liberals" like Adrian Leftwich, Harris and Randolph Vigne were involved in a strange organization called the "African Resistance Movement" that followed the technique of White Communists of using a Black image in their nefarious campaigns. Leftwich, a former President of NUSAS, is generally credited with being the brains behind this movement. He became a traitor to his own cause, so much so that a Supreme Court judge once said it would be an insult to liken him to the "rat species" - an insult to rats, that is.

Another President of NUSAS was one Jonty Driver, who made his bid for fame on April 28, 1964 when, in his capacity as NUSAS President, he addressed a seminar of the Methodist Youth Camp at Botha's Hill in Natal. In a 21-page (foolscap) policy statement, Driver made no bones about the fact that as far as he was concerned, NUSAS was controlled by Black students at Black universities - adding that this basis "of an (Black) African majority membership of (Black) African decision-making" was important because the Black African was the person "who can be more trusted to view the realities and not to judge in terms of alien ideologies or irrelevant principles".

Driver said it was essential for NUSAS to be the student wing of the "liberation movement" (i.e. the Communist-controlled Congress Alliance). If necessary, NUSAS should go into exile for its beliefs; or, alternatively, it should go underground, splitting into two: a private and a public organization (following the Communist technique).

Explained Driver: "There is no doubt that there is a chasm between NUSAS' public activities (i.e. propaganda, welfare, student education, protest activity) and NUSAS' private activities (i.e. leadership training, moves towards unity in the liberation movement and practical projects).

"Put brutally, NUSAS is, on the one hand, the NUSAS that is publicly known; on the other, it is a front organization through which people like you work."

What Driver was, in effect, saying was that NUSAS, under his Presidency, would work for a Communist overthrow of law and order in South Africa. Or perhaps, confused by the similarity in dogma, he thought, in his immaturity, that he was working for a Liberal regime in South Africa.

Not only students, but toddlers were used mercilessly by the Communists to try to sway the people of South Africa into accepting a Liberal atmosphere for a Red take-over of the country. The best example of this came on May 27, 1963, when young children were paraded before the Marshall Square police station in Johannesburg carrying placards such as "I want my Daddy" (who happened to be a Communist caught in the Police dragnet). The parade was featured with a front-page photograph in the Rand Daily Mail the following morning.

On August 8, 1963, the pattern was repeated when young children (some five years of age, others in push-carts) were paraded on the steps of the Johannesburg City Hall with placards reading "I want my Mummy back" and "Let my Daddy go". The "demonstration" was well-timed for the lunch-hour. Dutifully, the Star published a photograph over four columns, and the Rand Daily Mail gave the "demonstration" front page treatment the following day.

Later it was shown that this demonstration tactic had been chosen deliberately by the Communist Party to whip up public emotions and to gain as much publicity as possible both in South Africa and overseas. In his book, "Braam Fischer - The man with two faces" (APB-Publishers, Johannesburg, 1966), Chris Vermaak writes about a Communist Party cell meeting held in a Hillbrow, Johannesburg, flat on July 5, 1963, and states "After discussing (Abraham) Fischer's statement thoroughly, the group resolved that attempts would be made to organize demonstrations by relatives of detained people, especially children, who would besiege courts and other public places with placards on the lines of 'I want my Daddy', 'Where is my Daddy ?' Members also decided that as many anti-90-day letters as possible would be written to the Press."

The letters criticizing the 90-day detention law, designed to help the Police in the anti-subversion fight, poured into editorial offices and were dutifully published in the Press. If a woman detainee was released, there would sure to be newspaper photographs showing a tearful re-union with her children or some other emotional angle.

Vermaak quotes Fischer as having told Gerard Ludi, the secret agent who infiltrated the Communist Party as a newspaperman: "Newspapermen should try and give 90-day detainees as much publicity as possible. How can this be done? You, Paul Trehwela, Margaret Smith of the 'Sunday Times', and Hazel Fine should do your collective best to get one story a day into the newspapers advertising the plight of 90-day detainees." Paul Trehwela, of whom a fellow Communist, Anne Nicholson, once said: "If Trehwela ever gets into a position of authority in the Family (Communist Party) I will

resign because I'm sure he will be a second Stalin", underlined the importance the Communist Party places on news media as a propaganda medium when he reported: "I am working on two people who are about ready for absorption into the Movement (Communist Party)... News/Check (a South African news magazine) has become well infiltrated. There are now three Left-minded reporters." (Quoted by Vermaak).

Liberal South African newspapers are very sensitive to any suggestion that they are not serving the best interests of South Africa. But whether they like it or not, and whether they were willing or not, there is no doubt that some South African newspapers have been well and truly used by the Communists in their battle down the years for the souls of South Africans. Like the Liberal Party, such newspapers could well examine their policies and the effect of their policies on immature individuals.

Driver was an example of the young man working through a "Liberal" organization to bring about a change of government in South Africa and, either wittingly or unwittingly, being used by the Communists. Goldreich was an example of the dedicated Communist, ostensibly a man with no political affiliations, working out of the public eye to foment subversion and rebellion - and Communist domination of South Africa. Mandela was an example of the Black African who was a dedicated Communist, ostensibly a man working for "peace" and the redress of injustices on behalf of the "suffering and oppressed millions" of the Black race who had been faced with "no alternative but to resort to violence", but who in fact was used as a willing tool by White Communists in a bid to establish Communist domination in South Africa. There were other Mandelas in South Africa.

Then there was the respected member of the community who was ostensibly a dedicated "Liberal" of tremendous personal integrity who would never condone violence, but in fact was a leading member of the Communist Party, actively directing that organization's fiendish schemes.

Falling into this category was Abraham Fischer, the best known of all South African Communists and, it seems, the leader of the South African Communist Party although he himself would admit only to having been "acting chairman" of the Central Committee.

Fischer's father and mother came from two of the best known families in the Free State. His paternal grandfather had been Prime Minister of the Free State and his father Judge-President of the province. Fischer himself, a Rhodes scholar and brilliant barrister, was destined for high office. If he had lived and worked in Russia, he would probably have gone far; but he lived and worked in a Christian, Democratic country and for him the road ended ignominiously in jail. For it was the road of atheistic Communism that he had chosen.

Fischer, one of the first of the Communists who could claim to have his roots deep in South African soil, was an exceptionally valuable person to the Communist movement. Not only was he intellectually brilliant and a man who wrung respect and admiration from those who came into contact with him, but, more important, his family background was impeccable. For these reasons, he never became a "public" Communist but his image was always that of a dedicated "Liberal" - and a "true" South African fighting for justice. So it was that he was seen in such roles as President of COD. Fischer excelled in the part given him to play. Although he was for many years one of the

most active Communists in the upper hierarchy, he was generally regarded by many people as a "Liberal" right until the end.

When the law caught up with Fischer and the evidence was weighed, it was damning. Fischer was arrested on September 23, 1964 and, after being allowed, while on bail, to appear before the Privy Council in London on behalf of a client and returning to South Africa to face trial, estreated bail in January 1965 to "continue my political work", which, he said, he regarded as essential.

After a brilliant Police investigation, Fischer, heavily disguised, was re-arrested in the metropolis of Johannesburg, where he had been living under a false name for some time, on November 11, 1965.

On March 28, 1966, another "Liberal" myth was finally exploded when in a 3 1/2-hour statement from the dock at his trial in Pretoria Fischer admitted openly to being a Communist and advocated Communism as the only choice for South Africa.

In South Africa, the Police have worked brilliantly in their fight against Communism. When one sees members of the Security Branch at work one cannot but have the highest admiration for these men - and feel secure in the future of South Africa. There is no doubt that Communism has been well and truly rooted out of the South African soil. But it would be folly to think that the last has been heard of Communist activity in South Africa. The guerilla attacks in 1966 by infiltrators from beyond South Africa's borders are sufficient to keep the Republic on her guard. South Africa is not yet done with Communism - or, if you wish, International Communism has not yet given up its battle for South Africa, although the battle is likely to move to new planes.

For South Africa, there are two planes that Communism is likely to move on. The first is guerilla warfare, with the Communist stooge states in Africa used as the launching pad for an intensification of guerilla attacks. There is no doubt in my mind whatsoever that the South African security organizations will defeat the onslaught on this plane.

The other is the intellectual plane. Here, too, an intensification of the onslaught on South Africa can be expected. And the biggest danger is Liberalism. The Communists have had success in South Africa through the use of Liberals and Liberal organizations. They will not hesitate to use this strategy again. South Africans can expect an intensification of the Liberal saturation process.

Communism is a force of tremendous power. But I believe that South Africa will remain a Christian nation, committed to the principles of true Western democracy. And I believe that the South African people, of all races, will retain their national pride and self-respect.

These are the forces that will defeat Communism whenever it rears its ugly head on South African soil.

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RED PINCER MOVEMENTS

(The sub-continent)

The Republic of South Africa has always been, and remains, a prime target in the Communist take-over bid for Africa. In recent years it must have been obvious to the Communists in Moscow and Peking and elsewhere that the cherry would be the hardest of all to conquer; probably while the Communist struggle within South Africa was going on it was appreciated that the battle within the Republic would be lost. There were good reasons, therefore, for a substantial blueprint of the campaign against South Africa to be demarcated in bordering countries, notably the three British High Commission territories of Swaziland, Bechuanaland and Basutoland which were late arrivals at the door of independence from Britain.

LESOTHO

Lesotho represented the main flank of the extra-territorial attack on South Africa; and there were, again, good reasons why the Communists chose this terrain as the battlefield. Of all the countries in Africa, Lesotho is not only amongst the poorest but probably has a lesser measure of self-sufficiency than any other country on the continent. Four-fifths of Lesotho is mountainous; the remaining one-fifth is ravaged by soil erosion and is over-populated. There is hardly any manufacturing industry and the main means of subsistence, agriculture, is severely handicapped by poor farming methods and climatic conditions resulting in abnormally low yields. The grounds for dissatisfaction among the peoples of Lesotho are tailor-made for the Communist brand of fomenting unrest. But there was another important consideration in the Communist selection of Lesotho as the main extra-territorial flank for the attack on the Republic. Lesotho is landlocked, completely surrounded by the territory of South Africa, which has long been the carrot held up to annoy, frustrate and tantalize the other Black African states. It was obvious that Lesotho could be used advantageously by the Communist powers to provoke incidents with South Africa and fan the flame of hatred across the continent, and, at the same time, embarrass major powers like Britain.

An example of the latter technique came in 1965 when ten members of the Basutoland Congress Party were refused transit rights to Lesotho through Jan Smuts Airport in South Africa. The South African Government had evidence that far from being students on a study tour of African countries, the ten men had been to Communist countries where they had dedicated themselves to and been trained in the Communist methods of sabotage. The South African Government, knowing that Lesotho was being used as a base by Communist elements for training saboteurs against South Africa, steadfastly refused to permit the men passage through South Africa. In the light of the known facts, it would not be unreasonable to assume that there was a very real danger of these men conducting anti-South African activities from Lesotho (then still British-controlled Basutoland), but, although the Communists lost their services in Lesotho, the incident created international repercussions involving South Africa, Britain and Lesotho to a degree where they probably felt the money spent on the ten men had been invested wisely.

The view held by the South African Government that activities against the security of the Republic

were being fomented in Lesotho was not idle suspicion-mongering but based on hard realities. For instance, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), banned in South Africa, had operated openly in Lesotho under British rule. Other South African political fugitives also operated openly in that territory and the situation was so bad that on becoming Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan was forced to issue severe warnings to the fugitives to stop their activities or face deportation. Some, notably Joe Matthews, were deported; others were jailed for plotting revolution. For instance, in April 1963, Police were forced to clamp down on the activities of the PAC headquarters in Maseru, headed by P.K. Leballo, who had claimed PAC responsibility for the Poqo terrorist raids in South Africa. The PAC offices were searched and several arrests made.

In July 1965, six political fugitives were sentenced in a Maseru court to a total of 11 1/2 years imprisonment for plotting subversion against South Africa. The magistrate said he was amazed that a private army, such as PAC, had been allowed to operate in Lesotho; adding that the convicted men had been guests in Lesotho and had embarrassed the Government. Among those sentenced was Tsepo Letlaka, a former Transkei lawyer who was a member of PAC'S Presidential Council. In October, another political fugitive, Pearce Qgobose, was jailed for three years under the Prevention of Violence Abroad Proclamation for conspiring to commit violence against South Africa. Earlier that year, the "Ndlovu Report" had been presented to a Maseru court describing details of the training of PAC members in the use of explosives and of the landing of arms in the Transkei from a ship. The "Ndlovu Report" gave details of how at a national executive committee meeting of PAC, held in Maseru in 1961, it had been decided that all the members of the Congress in Lesotho should be sent abroad for military training. The report told of an escape route through Bloemfontein and how men would be sent to training camps in Egypt and Yugoslavia. (Some of the trainees who passed out at these camps were subsequently sent to Ghana to train guerilla fighters for Rhodesia and Angola.)

But these actions against Communist and Communist-inspired agitators in Lesotho under British administration merely scraped the surface. Communist intrigue in that country was intense and British-controlled Lesotho was a nest of Communist plotting and scheming. By the time the country became independent, Communism was a grave danger to Lesotho.

Communist influence in Lesotho was not confined to South African political fugitives. Communists had succeeded in infiltrating legal political parties to an alarming extent. There was even a Communist Party, led by John Motloheloa, a former executive member of the banned African National Congress in South Africa. The Communist Party concentrated on disseminating Communist literature and spreading subversive ideas among the population. Early in 1964, for instance, the Communist Party smuggled 40,000 brochures, printed in Communist East Germany, to Lesotho (South African authorities were powerless to confiscate the consignment because of international agreements). Considerable amounts of money were poured into Lesotho under the eyes of the British rulers, with Communist China taking the lead. Booklets and pamphlets openly advocating Communist-style revolution swamped the country and were sold at rock-bottom prices. Radio Peking and Radio Cairo had powerful transmitters beamed at Lesotho and broadcasts from these countries were heard loudly and clearly in a country that until very recently was starved of good radio programmes.

The Basutoland Congress Party (B.C.P.), the oldest political party in Lesotho, having been

established in 1952, was infiltrated and eventually taken over by the Communists. This resulted in the formation of two new parties, the Basutoland National Party (B.N.P.) and the Marematlou Freedom Party (M.F.P.). The M.F.P. was promptly infiltrated, in turn, by the Communists.

The B.C.P. was led by Ntsu Mokhehle, a fiery deposed schoolmaster who had graduated from Fort Hare with an M.Sc. and had travelled frequently to Peking and to "African Unity" conferences. He was on particularly friendly terms with the Ghanaian dictator, Nkrumah. A letter said to have been written by the (Communist) All China Federation of Trades Union in March 1965 and circulated in Lesotho praised Mokhehle as a "great leader" and expressed gratitude to him "for extending his most generous offers to China". The letter added: "Our Government had the pleasure to present to your leader the small sum of £150,000 (R300.000) as a sign of Chinese appreciation." The letter asks the Congress Party to "give us an indication as to how many immigrants could be absorbed in your industries" and adds: "Thousands of applications are coming in daily from people of all walks of life who are eager to settle there and assist you to develop your spacious country." The Communists were obviously extremely confident of the chances of the Congress Party in winning the General Election in April 1965 even if they displayed a quaint ignorance of the facts of Lesotho's "industries" and "spacious country".

The M.F.P. was led by Dr. Seth Makotoko, a medical doctor educated at the University of the Witwatersrand, who was to become President of the Lesotho Senate. According to a report in the Johannesburg Sunday Times on October 11, 1964, two of the three political parties in Lesotho (B.C.P. and M.F.P.) were at that stage "completely Communist-controlled". The report reveals how Mokhehle had met Joe Matthews, who had acted as an agent between Mokhehle and Moscow. In 1962, however, the two men had had a row and Mokhehle had turned to Peking.

After his row with Mokhehle, Matthews turned his attention to the M.F.P. and became close friends with Dr. Makotoko, the two men making several visits behind the Iron Curtain.

The amount of money distributed in Lesotho by the Communists in a bid to gain control of the country before independence was staggering when the size of the country is taken into account. In December 1963, K. Kolisang, General Secretary of the B.C.P., was given R60,000 for his election campaign while on a visit to Peking. At other times, the B.C.P. received up to R20.000 in separate donations for election purposes. In 1964, the B.C.P. had full-time organizers throughout the country and 16 vehicles with full-time drivers. In 1964, the M.F.P. received R720.000 from Russia for election purposes and used the money to appoint 200 full-time organizers and buy 27 vehicles driven by full-time drivers. If the size and population of Lesotho (11,716 square miles; 800,000 people) is taken into consideration, these figures are almost unbelievable - but then one should remember that Lesotho was but a step in Communist plans for a bigger fish: South Africa.

Another event in 1964 was a constitutional conference in London at which it was decided that Lesotho would become self-governing the day after a General Election on April 29, 1965. At this conference, the Paramount Chief, Moshoeshoe II, the B.N.P., the B.C.P. and the M.F.P. all agreed that on attaining full independence (in 1966) the Paramount Chief would become King with purely constitutional functions.

The B.C.P. and M.F.P. agreed to this because they were confident of winning the 1965 General Election. But they were in for a shock. The Election was won by the B.N.P., led by Chief Leabua Jonathan, with 31 seats. The Congress Party (which had campaigned on an anti-White, anti-Colonialism, anti-Church, anti-Chief, anti-South African platform) won 25 seats and the M.F.P. (which had among its candidates five who were also members of the Communist Party) won four seats. In the Election campaign, leaders of the B.C.P. and M.F.P. did not commit themselves openly to Communism but it is significant that, as Chief Jonathan said, "although we repeatedly challenged their leaders to deny publicly any Communist help, they have so far refused to do so". Significantly, too, Chief Jonathan was offered substantial financial aid by a top Communist just before the Election - provided he merged his party with the M.F.P. The offer was rejected.

Both the B.C.P. and the M.F.P. were all set for independence within a year of self-government (as agreed with Britain) but on losing the 1965 Election, they changed their tune completely. Mokhehle and Makotoko demanded that another General Election be held before independence as they claimed that if the number of votes cast in the 1965 Election was taken into account rather than constituency results, the B.N.P. was a minority Government. The Paramount Chief, Moshoeshoe II, was urged to demand greater control over the Army, Police and internal security and this demand became the centre of the Communist-inspired attempt to overthrow the Jonathan Government.

The B.C.P. and the M.F.P. strenuously opposed Parliamentary ratification of the request to Britain for full independence and later boycotted the celebrations when Basutoland became the sovereign state of Lesotho on October 4, 1966. Moshoeshoe became increasingly antagonistic towards the Government which he was supposed to serve as a constitutional monarch and became involved in political affairs to an increasing extent. It became more and more obvious that Communist influences were at work behind the throne. An open clash between King and Prime Minister became inevitable.

In December, Moshoeshoe decided to hold a political meeting on the top of Thaba Bosiu, where the burial place of Moshoeshoe I, the founder of the Basotho nation, is a national shrine. The Government asked the King to desist from his plans and to keep out of the political arena, but the young monarch persisted. Although he never addressed the meeting, called for December 27, violence erupted on that day when Police clashed with armed tribesmen at Thaba Bosiu and at Teyateyaneng. Eleven people were killed, including Police Inspector Paul Rathoma. Unrest continued with an attack on two police stations, at Butha Buthe and Leribe.

The fight was now in the open and in full swing. Chief Jonathan immediately placed King Moshoeshoe under Palace arrest and three days later, at the funeral of Inspector Rathoma, accused Moshoeshoe of being involved directly in the death of Rathoma. "The death is directly linked with the King's intention to hold a political meeting at Thaba Bosiu. In so doing, the King was acting in defiance of his own Government in disregard of the Constitution," said Jonathan.

However, the King was merely a pawn, but a dangerous pawn, in a plot to turn Lesotho into a Communist dictatorship. On January 5, both Mokhehle and Makotoko were arrested and a week later, Moshoeshoe's uncle, Reentseng Lerotholi, described by the College of Chiefs as "the person responsible for the spread of the confusion in the country", was arrested. Meanwhile, Moshoeshoe,

with the tide running strongly against him, had capitulated. On January 5, he signed a document stipulating that he accepted the role of a constitutional monarch and would act only on the advice of the Government in such matters as the contents of any speeches he might make and visitors he might receive at the Palace; and, furthermore, he stated that if the Government deemed him to have violated the agreement to remain a constitutional monarch he would automatically be dethroned. Chief Jonathan had won the day, for the time being at any rate.

The extent of Communist influence in the anti-Jonathan movement was outlined by J. H. P. Serfontein, Political Reporter of the Johannesburg Sunday Times in that newspaper's issue of January 8, 1967. He wrote:

"It can now be disclosed that the plot to unite the two main opposition parties . . . behind the King . . . was planned shortly after the elections in April 1965, by the well-known communist Joe Matthews. In a confidential letter to the then secretary of the M.F.P., Mr. J. Mokotso, dated May 12, 1965, Mr. Matthews urged that the M.F.P. which had many communist members and was backed by the Communist Party of Lesotho, should co-operate closely in future with the B.C.P... from Mr. Matthews's letter it was clear that he was largely responsible for financing the M.F.P., which is generally accepted as the King's party, and strongly backed by him. It can also be disclosed that a former member of the Communist Party in Lesotho, Jack Mosiane, a close associate of Mr. Matthews returned to Maseru from London a few weeks before the violent incidents. Mr. Mosiane was jailed in 1960 for his role in attempting to burn down the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Maseru... Security circles believe that Mr. Mosiane had come with instructions from Mr. Matthews to bring the plot to a head and that he had brought money to revive the B.C.P. and M.F.P. organizations."

Serfontein also referred to a "high command" of six advising the King and of "a number of communist advisers surrounding him". He said one of the six members of the "high command", T. G. Mohaleroe, a former Permanent Secretary of Justice who was a member of the Communist Party, was "pushed" by the King to become the leader of a new political front. He also described Chief Lerotholi as "an active communist in his younger days and (who) had a strong influence on the King". Dr. Makotoko is described in the report as "an active communist in his youth".

By the end of January 1967, peace and calm had returned to Lesotho as a result of the strong action taken by Chief Jonathan to rebuff the Communists. But my experience of Lesotho politics makes me feel that all is not yet safe in Lesotho. Lesotho "students" have been trained in Communist countries, notably Communist China, and these "students" are now back in Lesotho in appreciable numbers, ready to join with other Communist-indoctrinated "freedom fighters" and pounce whenever the opportunity presents itself. The Congress Party is still strong in certain areas of Lesotho and is capable of fomenting further unrest. It should be borne in mind that the Congress Party is particularly strong in certain areas bordering on the Republic of South Africa, and for the Communists the prospect of armed conflict within Lesotho that could spread across the frontier into South Africa - as it easily could - is a tempting one. Moshoeshoe, it is obvious, has not yet abandoned all political objectives and as long as he remains in Lesotho the Government will have to tread warily. Mokhehle has lost a major battle to Jonathan, but Mokhehle is not the type of man to sit back and accept his set-back as a permanent fate. The Congress Party will strike again. Jonathan's main task would appear to be to consolidate his Civil Service and his Police Force into a strong,

Westernized bulwark against Communist aspirations while, at the same time, consolidating popular support for his Government (he has already succeeded since becoming Prime Minister in obtaining greater support to some degree). If he can achieve these targets, he will have a chance of winning the next battle against the Communists. But it will be a long, uphill struggle.

In his struggle, Jonathan will undoubtedly be hampered by the presence in Lesotho of large contingents of personnel from the United States and the United Nations. It is an inescapable fact that during British administration of Lesotho the country was neglected right up to independence (the contrast between Britain's independence "gifts" for Botswana - a brand-new capital with magnificent Parliamentary and Government buildings, etc. - for instance, and the state in which Lesotho was handed over to the Basotho is both striking and sickening) and was, in blunt language, left in the lurch by Britain on independence. Now another Western nation, the United States, is trying to fill the role of fairy godfather.

There is, of course, no harm in the United States assisting less-developed countries of Africa. But the problem as far as Lesotho is concerned is that United States personnel have either been so indoctrinated by the Liberal climate in the United States Government or have been so carefully selected for their posts that they have a two-fold purpose in Lesotho: to "help" Lesotho and to undermine South Africa. This is a golden opportunity; the Communists tried it in Lesotho and failed, now the United States is trying to mount an assault on South Africa via Lesotho. And for the United States the latter objective is far more important than helping Lesotho. All that has been written in this paragraph is equally true of the United Nations presence in Lesotho.

The situation, for Lesotho, is a grave one. Chief Jonathan knows where he stands with South African offers of aid. He knows South Africa has no ulterior motives. He can also rest assured that South Africa has successfully fought more devilish campaigns than that now being mounted by the United States and the United Nations in Lesotho. But can Chief Jonathan be sure of where he stands with the United States and the United Nations? The Communists are not finished with Lesotho yet; when they strike again, will the United States and the United Nations be on Jonathan's side or will they, filled with their hatred of and frustration at the success of South Africa's race policy actively co-operate in toppling the Jonathan Government for no other reason than to get rid of a man they regard as too friendly with South Africa?

Chief Leabua Jonathan and his Government would be well advised to remember that in the world today, the red line dividing Communism and Liberalism (as advocated by Americans like Robert Kennedy and Arthur Goldberg) is a very thin one. And if the American Liberals can attain their objectives in South Africa they would willingly sacrifice Lesotho to Communism.

BOTSWANA

Botswana, like Lesotho, has been a haven for political agitators from South Africa. But whereas Lesotho has generally been favoured by subversive organizations as a base for further agitation against the South African Government, Botswana has been used more as a thoroughfare for those wishing to go abroad for training in guerilla warfare or for finding residence elsewhere in the world. Botswana has a narrow, 50 yard boundary with Zambia (there is some doubt as to whether this strip

is really Botswana territory) and this has often been the outlet to the north for those who have to flee from the forces of law and order in South Africa.

Lesotho has served notice that she will deal decisively with any agitators who merely make use of her hospitality for continuing their subversive activities. The extent to which political fugitives from South Africa will continue to be welcome in Botswana is not yet clear although there are indications that the Botswana Government will not keep the door as wide open as did the British authorities.

In Botswana, there is a fair sprinkling of local left-wingers, although in the March 1965 General Election, the conservative Democratic Party led by Seretse Khama polled 80% of the votes cast. The only Parliamentary opposition party is the (Northern) People's Party led by Phillip Matante, who is said to be a great friend of Nkrumah whom he visited while the latter was in control of Ghana. The (Southern) People's Party is virtually non-existent apart from its leader, Dr. K.T. Motsete, a quiet-spoken doctor of philosophy who also has several music degrees (he composed the Botswana national anthem). Dr. Motsete has also been a visitor to Nkrumah's Accra and has links, as well, with Moscow. Motsomai Mpho, a treason trialist in South Africa, where he belonged to the banned African National Congress, is regarded as pro-Communist Chinese.

All three men belonged to the original People's Party, formed in August 1961 with Motsete as President, Matante as Vice-President and Mpho as General Secretary. Mpho was the first to break with his leaders and was later followed by Matante.

The strife in the People's Party is illustrated by a report that appeared in the Johannesburg newspaper, Die Vaderland, on March 2, 1964. It reads in part as follows:

"The Vice-President of the Bechuanaland People's Party was yesterday thrown out of the party by the executive of extremist Nationalists after being accused by the President at a public meeting of theft of trust moneys. The President of the party, K. T. Motsete, alleged that the Vice-President, P. Matante, had received and used for his own use about R50.000 that had been given to the Bechuanaland People's Party by the Afro-Asian states... The ex-Vice-President was a member of the Msomi gang (a gang of thugs and hoods) in Johannesburg and would never be a leader such as one of the first Ministers of the Republic because he did not have the necessary background and training, Motsete continued."

But the most interesting left-winger that has appeared on the Botswana scene is a man called Kenneth Koma. Now in his early 40's, Koma returned to Botswana after, he said, attending Lovedale, Adams College and the University of Cape Town, obtaining a B.A. degree from the University of South Africa in 1952, studying at Nottingham University in 1957 where he obtained an L.L.B. degree, enrolling at Charles University in Prague in Communist Czechoslovakia where he obtained an M.A. degree in 1962, and spending a few more years behind the Iron Curtain including a year doing research at the Africa Institute, Moscow.

Just before the March 1965 Election, Koma returned to his homeland. Initially, he tried to work against Khama through the existing opposition parties, keeping himself studiously in the

background. But it was soon obvious that he was not the innocent he made himself out to be and in September 1965 anonymous leaflets were dropped by aircraft over remote villages of Botswana warning the people against "The Man from Moscow" and calling on the populace to support Khama. In October 1965, a National Front was formed with the support of Mpho and Motsete, but Matante, who now had representation in Parliament, refused to go along with the National Front. Koma still kept out of the limelight, but it was general knowledge that he was the driving force behind the National Front.

The reaction of the Batswana themselves speaks for itself. In January 1966, Consultation, the official publication of the Democratic Party, openly branded the National Front as the "Communist Party" led by Koma. The publication said in an article that the Government had no intention of abolishing the office of chiefs and added that the abolishing of the office of chiefs "would certainly be done by the Communist Party, which is even now courting the chiefs for their support, and the chiefs must be made aware of this, so that they may not knowingly barter away their freedom, nay their very existence, for the support of Dr. Koma against the Bechuanaland Democratic Party". The article also accused some of the chiefs of "writing themselves off by throwing their weight on the side of the Communist Party led by Dr. Koma... one wonders how the chiefs can ever hope to co-exist with the Communist Party".

In July 1966, Consultation returned to the fray, accusing Koma of trying to confuse Botswana "because he does not want it to be known that he in fact is in the Communist camp, or that he serves the cause of Communism". In the same month a document issued by the Democratic Party again labelled Koma as a Communist. "He stands for severing all ties between ourselves, Britain and the Commonwealth to facilitate take-over by his Communist principals for the use of Bechuanaland as a battleground or as a base of operations against neighbouring countries." Koma was also accused of working for a totalitarian state.

President Khama of Botswana is not as easy a man to read as Chief Jonathan of Lesotho or Prince Makhosini Dhlamini of Swaziland. So far, he has not had need to use force in the political arena as Chief Jonathan has been compelled to do. How strong he would be if he were suddenly confronted by the Communists in a direct challenge is difficult to say but one cannot help feeling that he would not act as strongly as would Chief Jonathan or Prince Makhosini. No serious challenge is in the offing, however, and Botswana should be comparatively peaceful for the next few years.

SWAZILAND

Communists have also been active in Swaziland, the other one-time British High Commission Territory in Southern Africa. The Communists apparently tried their hand in Swaziland in 1964 when a not unsuccessful strike of building workers and Swazis employed in businesses was held. More than one observer, including Mr. Willie Meyer, leader of the (White) United Swaziland Association, attributed Communist inspiration to the strike.

Alarm was expressed in February 1965 by Prince Makhosini Dhlamini, first Prime Minister of Swaziland, when he told a dinner in Taipeh, Nationalist China, that he was determined that Swaziland would never become a second Congo. "They (the British) eagerly close their eyes to the

sly infiltration of Communist elements in Swaziland", he said.

In June 1966, Dr. George Msibi, secretary-general of Imbokodvo, the ruling party in Swaziland, spoke of "disturbing reports" that had been received of secret meetings in Swaziland to form a Communist front organization. "The intention is to unite dissident members of the existing opposition parties into a single organization that would clearly be controlled either directly or indirectly by the Communists. We believe a considerable amount of money from Peking has been promised to finance the venture", he said.

The Communist presence in Swaziland has not reared its head above the surface so far, and apart from these odd (but important) expressions of uneasiness about Communism, the country has been quiet. Nor is it likely that Communism will have much chance once Swaziland becomes independent. The country is ruled by two men of considerable determination, King Sobhuza II and Prince Makhosini. Amongst their ranks they have men of above average intellect from whom a particularly strong Cabinet can be formed. Furthermore, Swaziland has two things in her favour that will help rebuff Communism: her people are deeply rooted in tribal life and owe deep loyalty to Sobhuza; secondly, Swaziland is a potentially prosperous country with rich mineral deposits and fertile agricultural land. With the present leaders in Swaziland, the support these leaders have from their own people, and the considerable political co-operation given the leaders by the substantial White population, one can foresee a strong, pro-Western Swaziland effectively countering any Communist onslaught.

PORTUGUESE PROVINCES

One of the biggest bulwarks against Communism in Africa has been the Portuguese presence on the continent, but it is doubtful whether Portugal has yet won her victory finally against the rebel forces in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. The anti-Lisbon rebel movement began viciously in Angola in 1961, gained impetus in Portuguese Guinea during 1963 and spluttered into life in Mozambique in 1964. Portugal, somewhat taken aback at the challenge to her paternal benevolence, reacted convincingly in rebuffing the rebel movements but it has been a hard struggle. The military fist was one reason for Portugal's success so far in repulsing the rebels but there were two other important ones. One was the disarray in the ranks of the rebel movements, particularly in Angola, and the other was the fact that the rebels made the mistake of antagonizing the natives by directing guerilla fighters from one tribe against innocent settlers belonging to another tribe. Indications are that the rebel forces are going through a re-grouping and consolidation phase before launching their next attack on the Portuguese.

The ineffectual leadership and dispute within the Angolan rebel movements was partially resolved in 1965 when Dr. Agostinho Neto, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M. P.L.A.) emerged as the acknowledged leader of the rebels at the expense of Holden Roberto, leader of the Union of Angolan Populations (U.P.A.). Neto suddenly found that he was supported not only by Communist China and Russia but also by the Organization for African Union and by Mario de Andrade, who had originally led the movement before deserting. Although Roberto has not thrown in the sponge, the switching of support by Russia and the O.A.U. from Roberto to Neto was a significant breakthrough for the rebel forces. Neto has been strongly influenced by Communist

China and his accession to power does not augur well for the future. An even less promising prospect, though, would be the assumption of rebel leadership by Andrade, a dedicated Sorbonne-educated Marxist, who has been a member of both the Portuguese and French Communist parties. Andrade has good contacts behind the Iron Curtain and has been a valuable asset in Neto's climb to power. He is a more forceful personality than Neto and may yet take over from Neto.

The Angolan terrorist campaign provides another excellent example of how easy it is for Western apologists to mislead the world into swallowing Communist propaganda. Roberto is generally regarded as a moderate man, a "freedom fighter" seeking to bring democratic rule to his country. The lie to this view is given by Pieter Lessing in his book "Africa's Red Harvest" (The John Day Company, New York, 1962). After describing Roberto's early links with the Belgian and French Communist parties, Lessing quotes the following excerpts from an Order-of-the-Day issued by Roberto to "Dear Compatriots of Angola".

"Here, in a few words, is our plan for the future. Sekou Toure will reign over the northern part of (West) Africa, Comrade Nkrumah will rule the centre and your servant Holden Roberto the south. We hope that our eminent comrade "THE DEVIL" (*A Communist code-name for the Communist movement*) will help us to realize our destiny. The future is being forged. You must not believe those who spread nonsense. Communism is not bad. When we stayed in Moscow we were able to see for ourselves many wonderful things which the West will never have. Our comrade THE DEVIL is standing by with a watchful eye.
LONG LIVE COMMUNISM. Down WITH CONCENTRIC TRIBALISM."

Thus the "pro-Western, anti-Communist, moderate" Roberto!

In Mozambique, the leader of Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO), Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, a South African educated intellectual, is generally regarded as pro-Western but, like Roberto, he is not all that innocent. His terrorists are armed with Russian and Czechoslovakian arms and he openly boasts of following policies formulated by the Communists in Cuba and Vietnam.

Mondlane, despite the support he is receiving from the Communists, is an ineffectual leader, and his strength is being sapped by his two chief aides to an increasing extent. They are Marcelimo dos Santos, pro-Russian, and the Reverend Vria Simango, pro-Chinese.

Also challenging Mondlane's leadership of the Mozambique terrorists is the Mozambique Revolutionary Council (COREMA) led by Hlomulo Gwame, who headed UDENAMO, the first of the anti-Portuguese movements in Mozambique (1961). (UDENAMO later merged with MANU into FRELIMO.) Operating from Lusaka, Gwame, a fanatic racist, is working hard to oust Mondlane, who he regards as being too soft.

If the anti-Portuguese battle blows up, therefore, the Communists are likely to be in a better position than they were previously when the campaigns were led by Roberto and Mondlane. Not that the Communists are newcomers to the anti-Portuguese war. Their presence has always been felt in the background, although they generally chose to work through Black African leaders and states.

Although several of the rebel leaders have been behind the Iron Curtain, notably to Communist China and Czechoslovakia, the incentive for the anti-Portuguese campaigns has come from the Communist stooge states like Egypt, Ghana (under Nkrumah), Algeria, Congo-Kinshasa (when it was under Communist influence) and Tanzania. In Tanzania, in particular, massive training camps (at which Communist propaganda was delivered by Chinese officers attached to the Tanzanian army) were erected for the training of Portuguese rebels in guerilla warfare. Other camps were situated in the Congo-Kinshasa which provided the chief sustenance for the rebels after the hit-and-run attacks on the Portuguese. Later, during Moise Tshombe's reign in Kinshasa, relations between the Congo and the Portuguese rebels deteriorated rapidly, and the rebels eventually packed up and transferred to the Congo-Brazzaville after the latter country went Communist following the ousting of President Youlou. Tangible help also came from Czechoslovakia and Cuba, which, with Russia and Communist China, provided arms and ammunition and "friendly advice". By 1966 Tanzania was taking an increasingly active role in the Mozambique campaign, despite Nyerere's personal disillusionment at the effectiveness of the campaign, and instructions had been issued to the Tanzanian Army to intensify its training of the rebels and to take an active part in the planning of raids across the frontier. (It has been suggested that Tanzanian soldiers have even crossed the frontier themselves on occasions to take part in attacks on Portuguese.)

The Communists, therefore, employed sound tactics in handling the fight against the Portuguese presence in Africa. The organization of the fight was left to the Black Africans although the Communist Chinese and Czechoslovakians, in particular, were continually in the background, exhorting and encouraging and providing arms. Their influence, especially on the rebel leaders, was undoubtedly immense. They were also active among the intellectuals - in August 1965, for instance, the Portuguese security police, PIDE, uncovered a Communist-backed fifth column operating in Mozambique and known as the Fourth Operational Command. It consisted largely of intellectuals, including two prominent journalists, two poets and an artist. The Command, sponsored by Communist China, which had trained the leaders, had planned sabotage and subversion on an extensive scale.

One is inclined to deduce that the Communists, having left the organization of the anti-Portuguese campaigns to local rebel leaders and Black African leaders, and having found this combination lacking in ability and effectiveness, are now going through a period of re-thinking and re-grouping of forces, and, when the new onslaught against Portuguese rule in Africa is launched, it will not be surprising if it is Communist directed to a more active extent. A physical onslaught will probably be preceded by a propaganda offensive amongst the natives of the Portuguese provinces.

This prospect does not appear a bright one for Africa. The Portuguese have had a creditable military record in the fight against the rebels in Africa. By mid-1966 they had 100,000 troops on duty in their African provinces, and nearly 1,000 had been killed. They had also started impressive economic programmes to further the welfare of these provinces, but these programmes have come very late, and, in fact, were only initiated after the first shock of the rebel offensive on Angola in 1961. Politically, the natives of Portugal's African provinces have little to hope for in the future, as the Lisbon Government has made it clear that it has no intention of ever granting independence to the provinces. (In this connexion, a crucial test could come when Dr. Salazar goes after three decades of ruling Portugal - who can say that with a full-scale war in Angola the world will not find another Algeria in Africa, and in Europe another de Gaulle settling the problem of an African dependency ?)

In any event, the prospect of stepped-up Communist-directed military action in Portugal's African provinces, the late advent of economic planning on a realistic scale and the permanent denial of political rights poses a tremendous question-mark. The latter point cannot be over-emphasized. Premature granting of independence to Angola and Mozambique would be wrong but some definite programme of political emancipation is essential. In South Africa, the Black man will eventually enjoy full political rights in his own independent state; in Rhodesia, the Black man will eventually rule or the White man will adopt the South African pattern - either alternative providing for full political rights. That will leave Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea as colonial islands. In such a situation, Communism is likely to find increasing appeal.

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THE BATTLE AHEAD

International Communism has laid down a good framework for the battles that lie ahead in Africa. The chief ingredient for successful Communist revolution in Africa - "popular unrest" - has been well stirred across the length and breadth of Africa in ample proportions through racial and tribal disturbances. Communism has succeeded in establishing nine stooge states which can be expected to bow increasingly to Communist whims and wiles. Several others are outside the door of the stooge states club, wavering on whether or not to apply for membership.

In assessing the future patterns of Communist operations in Africa one must, therefore, accept that there will be an intensification of the old techniques of building up "nationalistic" leaders who can call the Communist tune in their home countries, and importation into Africa of arms and ammunition on a large scale accompanied by the dissemination of propaganda amongst the masses. Accordingly it is likely that Africa will provide further shocks to the West in the form of racial and tribal upheavals. It is also likely that there will be an intensification of guerilla warfare in the Portuguese provinces of Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea and of underground and, especially, intellectual activity in South Africa and Rhodesia.

In connexion with the latter point, it is obvious that the Communists and their fellow travellers have already sharpened their knives for a new onslaught on South Africa. The importation of foreign "Liberals" such as Senator Robert Kennedy of the United States, and the activities of the National Union of South African Students which are aimed at persuading the youth of South Africa to reject traditional and established norms and adopt new, "revolutionary" ones, are two manifestations of the new approach by the Communist forces against South Africa. Nowhere in Africa has Communism suffered such a resounding and humiliating rebuff as in South Africa and the employment of the "image" of foreign "Liberals" and the technique of the appeal to young people are two significant indications of how Communism is planning to use South African leftists. The glee with which the Communists look on the visits to a staunch upholder of the principles of Democracy and Western Civilization by such as Kennedy can be gauged by the visit Khrushchev paid to the United States when Dwight Eisenhower was President. Khrushchev's visit gave the Communists their biggest propaganda boost for years as Khrushchev was given splash treatment on television and in news media. The United States (and the world) was swamped with reports of Khrushchev's every move and his every propagandistic utterance. His visit marked an intensive resurgence of Communist indoctrination not only in the United States but throughout the world. The aim of Kennedy's visit to South Africa had the same objective of sweeping together dejected and defeated leftists and at the same time constituted a desperate bid to recruit the Youth of South Africa to the cause of left-wing organizations. Those who benefited from this man's visit to the Republic of South Africa included the Communists.

The West, nevertheless, need have little fear of the effect that these new Communist moves will have on South Africa. The mood of the overwhelming majority of both White and non-White peoples in South Africa and the strength of the central authority are such that Communism will again be defeated in South Africa. For South Africa, there is but one danger and that is the danger of the abuse of academic, Press and other intellectual freedoms and their use to brainwash the Youth of

the country. Much the same can be said for Rhodesia, where there is an efficient, and in some ways more ruthless than even in South Africa, approach to Communist agitators by the Government authorities.

The future of the Portuguese provinces is not as secure. Portuguese policy in her African provinces does not provide the local inhabitants with the prospects of political advancement and development that the South African internal policy of separate development does, and this does not augur well for a Government that is fighting a guerilla war the year round. But the picture in Portugal's provinces is not as foreboding as it is in the countries to the north.

In general, it can be said that in the southern part of Africa, the West can feel content with the strength of the anti-Communist forces. There is cause for grave concern, however, in the prospects of combating Communism in the emergent states of Africa, where the battle is likely to be a fierce one.

The first wave of post-independence jubilation in Black Africa has now come and gone and has left behind considerable disillusionment. The pre-independence political promises have not been realized and millions have been disappointed. Some of the leaders have fallen by the wayside, others have tarnished reputations for not living up to their promises. Newer, sometimes more energetic politicians are or will soon be emerging to challenge the "fathers" and "redeemers". In many an African country, such as Libya, Ethiopia and Kenya, crucial waters will be entered upon when the time comes for the established rulers to pass from the scene. The Communists will probably time their next moves in Africa to coincide with this period of political uncertainty.

There are, too, those politicians who have been given much money in the past decade or so and will soon be called on to repay some of it - not in hard cash, of course, but in political results. Communist China is particularly interested in this phase of the battle for Africa. Up to now, all the Black Africans who have succumbed to Communist bribes have passionately declared that they have not sold their souls to the Communists and that there is nothing wrong with being friends with the East as well as the West. Some of those who have believed that they can accept large-scale aid from the Communists have even indicated that they believe they can exploit the Communists rather than the other way round. In this, of course, they have merely taken a lead from Nasser of Egypt. But Nasser, and other African leaders, will soon be asked to settle their accounts. This is what Mao Tse-tung has had to say about such people:

"Very soon we can expropriate everything. The more we give them in their pillage, the more encouragement we give them, the wider will they open their doors to us and thus enable us to take over the positions and occupy them. *They will not know it consciously*, but they will be helping us to capture what we want and to extend what we hold... *Any person who receives our support and does not fulfil his part of the bargain must become the target for a frontal attack of pitiless ferocity...* Who then resists must be destroyed with every weapon at hand and be left a wretched tatter at the end." (author's italics.)

Is the West suitably geared to meet the next challenge of Communism in Africa? Judging by past

performances, the West is lamentably lacking in the foresight that will be needed if the African states are to resist and repulse Communist overtures. What can the West do in preparing for the coming onslaught?

The very first thing the West could do would be to have a major reappraisal and reassessment of its thinking on Africa. It should accept that in spite of being independent, Black Africa is not nearly ripe for the role it is trying to play in the world. It must be accepted that Africa is not Europe; that Africans are not Asians. It must be appreciated that there is need for Africa to take a few steps backward, consolidate and build, and then march forward. This would obviously have to be done in co-operation with the African states which would as obviously resist any such movement. Somewhere along the line there would have to be a meeting point.

Perhaps the best starting point would be a review of the position of the Black states and in a larger context the Afro-Asian states in world politics. As a first step, voting power at the United Nations should be reviewed. Economically under-developed, sparsely-populated, largely illiterate countries should be made to realize that they cannot have the same voice at the United Nations that a power such as the United States has. Likewise, Britain should review the composition of the Commonwealth. (The Secretariat of the United Nations, of course, is riddled with Communists and Communist sympathisers and needs a radical cleaning-up if it is to operate effectively as an organization for ensuring peace instead of a Communist war-mongering machine.) At the same time, thought should be given to whether a poor country could not utilize her funds in a better way at home than by spending hundreds of thousands of rands on establishing embassies well stocked with personnel, food and wines in all corners of the globe. In this respect, the attitude of the military government of Ghana in reducing its embassies abroad has been realistic and sensible.

Even if the United Nations and the British Commonwealth were to disappear, this would be to the benefit of the African states and, in the long run, to the world at large. New institutions could take their place at a later stage. In the nuclear age, the United Nations, after all, has value - costly value - only as a political platform for the advocating of ideologies. When the chips are down, it is the "hot line" between the White House and the Kremlin, not the United Nations, that will be the last resort for determining the future of the world. The United Nations can well continue, if necessary, as a forum for debate between the major powers, albeit one that at present serves the Communists best. But as far as Africa is concerned, if the African states are not prepared to accept a role in world affairs subordinate to that of the major powers, it would be better, in the interests of all concerned, for the United Nations to die.

In a nutshell, there must be greater concentration in the years ahead on the economic development of Africa than on political image-building. Having accepted this, the West should review its aid policies to Africa. Aid should not be withheld but should be granted in such a way that the development of human resources is of paramount importance. If necessary, aid to a particular country can be as bounteous as is wished, if this bountiful aid is channeled into projects that will develop the resources of human material that that particular country possesses. In the long run this will not only be the salvation of Black Africa but the most effective weapon against Communist exploitation in the armoury of the West.

The more a "politics-free-zone" can be created in Africa the more the African states will develop. Economic development is the key to political stability and political stability is the arch enemy of Communism. The African states, in their quest for African unity, have seen the necessity for starting to build at a local level, i.e. through regional groupings rather than through Pan-Africanism, which they themselves have rejected. They should go further and start at the parochial level.

All this indicates radical re-thinking on the part of Africa and the West. It must be admitted that there is no indication that the West is prepared for radical re-thinking; it presupposes, too, that the West's interest in Africa is primarily concerned with the interests of Africa itself and there is no indication that this is the case, either; it assumes acceptance of the fact that if Communism wins the battle for Africa, the Red menace will be on the doorstep of Western Europe and the Americas, and there is no indication that this fact is generally accepted in the West, which is far more concerned about a Communist take-over in Vietnam or Cuba than in Egypt or Tanzania.

But even if these tenets were to be accepted by the West, concentration on Africa alone would not be sufficient to deal the death blow to Communism's African and global aspirations. The West would have to put its own house in order, as well as the African house. A prime target for the Communists at present, and all indications point to an intensification of exploitation of this target, is the academic and intellectual life of the Free World, the Press and mass communications of the Free World, and the Youth of the Free World. The continuous chipping away at traditional norms and established moral practices suits Communism ideally. The accent to-day is on exciting sensualities by ripping away the coverings of modesty from dress, dancing, singing, films, and so on. The greater the moral decadence of Western society, and particularly Western youth, the greater will be the satisfaction of the Communists. It should be borne in mind constantly that Communism is atheistic, and actively encourages immorality. But the sanctity of sex is not even the ultimate target; it is not difficult in the climate of the modern world, to condition teenagers to accept illicit sexual acts as normal - the accent now is increasingly on glorifying sexual perversion and condoning such acts of depravity as homosexuality and lesbianism. The breakdown of family life and moral concepts, as is happening in the Free World to-day, are a vital cog in the Communist wheel of revolution. But perhaps the Free World does not appreciate its level of decadence; certainly, when Mr. Harold Wilson refers to the essential need to maintain "Britain's honour" it does not appear that he has the faintest idea of just how little honour there is left in the image that much of the rest of the world has of Britain - tragically enough amongst millions of people who once sought their inspiration and geared their ambitions on English history, culture and principles.

In all this, as on the political scene, the universities and the news media of the world take a leading part. Both are saturated with "Liberals" and infiltrated with dedicated Communists. Where there is a hardening against Communism, both see Democratic, i.e. anti-Communist, governments as a threat to their existence and catch hold desperately of "academic freedom" and "Freedom of the Press" to bolster the rot that has set in amongst their communities. This is a noble thought and academic freedom and Freedom of the Press are two freedoms of the Free World that should be cherished and, indeed, nurtured. But it should also be remembered that the world has changed since those freedoms first germinated; and unless they change, too, the strong trees into which they have grown will shed seeds that will outgrow them and destroy them. The latter seeds are the seeds of Communism, which sends out branches into every potential sphere of influence in the Free World. The spheres of education and the Press are two prime targets of those Communist branches.

Rather than reacting negatively by opposing everything Democratic forces do, academicians and other intellectuals should act positively and responsibly by resisting Communist infiltration. "Liberals" are the first to shout loudly that they are "liberals with a small 'l'" and to decry the efforts of Democratic forces as witch-hunting. They decry, equally loudly, any attempt to associate "liberalism with a small 'l'" with Communism, and their instinctive reaction when any anti-Communist move is made is to condemn for the sake of condemning. It is because of their blanket condemnation of any and all anti-Communist or Democratic forces merely for the sake of opposing, or sometimes through ignorance or the inability to be able to reason logically, that they inevitably become the tools of Communism.

Their refusal, through ignorance or obstinacy or both, to study political questions objectively and give their own individual interpretation thereto is seized upon by Communist forces and turned into hatred which in the end becomes blind hatred of anything for which Democracy stands. They themselves consider themselves democrats, unable to see, because of blind hatred, that they, far from contributing to Democratic principles, are undermining Democracy. Whilst they might therefore be perfectly sincere in refusing to be associated with Communists, they should realize that in the current struggle for the minds of the peoples of the world, the Communist forces have launched an all-out battle in which no holds are barred and, octopus-like, Communism deliberately uses all anti-Democratic forces with or without their realizing it. No quarter is given, but a lot of quarter is asked - and received - in return. There is only one way to meet Communism, and that is to see it for what it is and fight it accordingly. Academicians and other intellectuals should resist the temptation to turn automatically on anti-Communist forces at every bugle call sounded by the Communists. They should, if they are sincere, stop seeing every political move in two shades of colour: "for" and "against". Rather than going to such pains to accuse right-wingers of confusing "liberalism with a small 'l'" with Communism they should take pains to ensure that they do not confuse Communism and Liberalism by actions that play right into the hands of the Communist forces. They should realize that it is for them to decide whether the thin red line between "liberalism with a small 'l'" and Communism will remain there or will become even more blurred.

The cleric, like the academician, has the same responsibility not to be misled by Liberals into accepting that every move by Democratic forces is necessarily evil. The more the Church keeps out of politics and leaves politics to the politicians, the better will be the world - and the more effective will be the campaign against the atheistic Communist movement. Both the Church and the State have vital roles to play in African states. All the priests in the world could probably each work 24 hours a day seven days a week and yet not have sufficient time to try to convert all the sinners in the world. This would be impossible.

But perhaps those who spend so much of their 24 hours a day making political speeches would be better advised to spend more time on their calling.

The chief target in Africa of the political clerics is South Africa. Nowhere in Africa has the problem of multi-racial communities been solved satisfactorily. In some states, Communist take-overs are an ever-present danger; in South Africa attempts at solving the problems of multi-racial communities imply implicitly a rebuttal of Communism and atheistic teachings. At the same time, it should be

remembered that South Africa has not experienced the chaos and violence that has been so common elsewhere in Africa and for this reason alone South Africa is making a striking contribution to the promotion of Christian ideals. One man, one vote has become in Africa one man, no vote and in the process hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, tortured, raped, humiliated. The cleric should ask himself whether Christianity implies the slaughter of millions merely for an earthly ideal, that is soon overthrown anyway; or whether Christianity is not better served by delaying the implementation of the earthly ideal for a short period of time to ensure that in the end true Christian fellowship and brotherhood will prevail over atheism. The cleric should try to seek an answer, in integrity and honesty, to the question as to whether the promise of a smooth, non-violent transition to racial peace and the assurance of lasting rejection of Communism and atheism is not truer to the Word of God than the damage that is being done by the Michael Scotts, John Collins', Trevor Huddlestons and Joost de Blanks, whose efforts, if given free reign, will inevitably lead to Communist domination of the continent of Africa whether they intend this or not.

Newspapers wage an incessant battle against the forces of Democracy, often not because of principle but because they are merely in opposition to the governing party in a particular country and employ any means to whip the government. The Communists are adept at creating atmospheres and climates in which their propaganda is carried forth by anti-government elements in a particular country - elements that would decry any suggestion that they were being used by the Communists. Yet they are playing a highly dangerous game, for in modern days the fight between Democracy and Communism is so highly geared that no one, least of all journalists, can support Democracy and still launch vituperative attacks on Democratic governments along party political lines merely for the sake of attacking. Very often, of course, newspapermen have no conception of the role they are unwittingly playing. They, like their counterparts on radio and television and magazines, are merely toys in the hands of one or two dedicated Communists on their own staff or in the army of Communists who have infiltrated the large news agencies. The Communists invent all sorts of catch phrases that are designed to have glamour appeal and the journalist invariably falls for them and uses them as his own without any realization that they are Communist stock-in-trades. Thus they fall for all the Communist stock tricks such as "supremacist government", "racist regime", "minority government" (applied never ever to the dictatorships of Russia and other Communist countries which are always respectfully referred to as the 'Soviet Government' or the 'Peking Government' or suchlike, but to anti-Communist Democratic nations in the West); "majority rule" (again, not in criticism of 'elite group' rule in Russia, Algeria, Guinea, etc., but only to those countries in Africa which are always termed, in Communist-inspired jargon, the 'White-ruled countries') and "Nazism", "Fascism" (always of countries which have strong anti-Communist Democratic governments in control). The American Communists, of course, extend this Communist jargon to their own country to foster unrest; they not only call all the Bantu townships in "White-ruled countries" "ghettos" but they call their own Negro slums "ghettos". This is good for exciting Negroes' racial hatred and sparking racial riots. The Communist infiltration is particularly widespread in the international news agencies which provide one of the most effective vehicles for Communist propaganda. The above examples of Communist-inspired news agency jargon are a few of the more blatant ones; there are many more, usually far more subtle. On the newspapers, radio and television networks and magazines of the Free World, there rests a heavy responsibility for countering Communist infiltration - at home, in their own respective houses.

One of the most important lessons that the West should learn from African affairs in this decade is

the immense power that individuals possess on the continent. The present decade has shown that heads of government in Africa can easily work themselves into positions of virtually impregnable power. With the advent of military rulers, the tendency towards "permanency of rule" is likely to be intensified. This does not mean to say that Africa has seen the last of its coup d'etats or ousting of leaders in other fashion, but it does mean that African rulers are likely to become increasingly dictatorial both in the Communist stooge states and in countries still regarded as democratic. Because of the present political structure in African states, that does not take cognizance of local conditions, the only leader who can survive is the one who wields autocratic authority. In some cases, economic, tribal or other strains will result (as in the past) in chaos and misery and situations will accordingly arise where the leader will either be overthrown or will strengthen his "permanency of rule"; if he is overthrown he will merely make way for another ruler who will seek to create "permanency of rule".

In the absence of sober re-appraisal of the political structure of Black African states in which account will be taken of local conditions (and there is no indication that such a re-appraisal is forthcoming) Africa must brace itself for further bouts of chaotic upheaval - and an intensification of dictatorial rule. In this situation, it is important that the West seek out its friends and potential enemies with great care; specifically that it keeps a wary eye open for budding Marxist dictators in the Nkrumah mould.

In the atmosphere of Liberal thought that permeates the influential propaganda media in the world, it is difficult to convince those in authority that a particular leader is Communist-inclined. Liberals hate having to admit defeat and even to-day there are many who refuse to accept that Nkrumah was a Marxist or that Nyerere is a Communist tool. Even more difficult is to penetrate the left-wing curtain of protection that is accorded to any Communists who are fighting for power.

In fact, the Communists find considerable assistance in Western circles when a Marxist launches a Communist revolution under the guise of "African socialism" or some other tenet of Liberalism. They are pampered and protected by Western Liberals to such an extent that often the majority of Westerners cannot accept even the most blatant Communist as anything but a freedom-loving democrat.

We have seen this happen in Africa, and no doubt will see it again. But Africa is not as important to the West as Asia and the Western Hemisphere. It would be as well, therefore, to quote an example that even the United States will be able to appreciate: Castro of Cuba.

It was in the newest hours of the year 1959 that Castro became ruler of Cuba. It was only the following year that he announced that he was a Communist and had been a Communist all his life.

The people of the United States were shocked by the emergence of a Communist satellite less than 100 miles from their door. They were bewildered at the revelations that Castro was a Communist.

Their shock was understandable by Democrats in Africa, who were equally alarmed at the Marxist trumpeting on the African scene often far farther away than 100 miles.

Their bewilderment was also understandable. When Castro was fighting President Batista, he was given such a build up that he was regarded as a hero fighting for freedom from a tyrannic dictator. Famous commentators such as Ed Murrow and Ed Sullivan were lyrical in their praise for Castro. They were well supported by other news media, including the influential New York Times! They also received substantial support from American legislators, notably Senator Wayne Morse, whom President Johnson had so much trouble with over his campaign against the Communist terrorists in Vietnam. Typical of the damage done by these people was the statement by Charles Porter of the United States House of Representatives: "No one in the State Department believes Castro is a Communist, or a Communist sympathiser, nor does any other responsible person who wants to get his facts straight." He was correct. Castro's most ardent supporters in the State Department were Roy Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State, and William Wieland, in charge of the Caribbean desk. Two United States Ambassadors in Havana who had reportedly dared to oppose the official Washington policy of opposing Batista were publicly repudiated and the United States Government continued to support anti-Batista forces, chief amongst them Castro's Communist front organization.

The refusal to accept Marxists as Communists was nothing new when Castro was fighting for control of Cuba, and the refusal has been repeated in other parts of the world, including Africa, since. The astounding fact is that Castro's sympathies were not unknown, but even to the conditioned in Washington should have been seen clearly as Communist sympathies.

At the age of 19, Castro went to the University of Havana and plunged into student politics on a left-wing ticket. He unsuccessfully tried to kill the local student leader when his efforts to take over control of the student body were thwarted. Castro fled from Havana and joined a Communist plot to assassinate General Trujillo, the Dominican dictator. Later he returned to the University of Havana and led a terrorist movement and was arrested, but was subsequently discharged, for the machine-gun murder of a student leader. Castro then went to Bogota, Columbia, where he joined forces with the Communists in a plot to overthrow the Government. The Police files in Bogota show that Castro was named as a "first-grade agent of Russia" and one of nine "international Communists" who led an organized and armed attack on Bogota in which 136 major buildings were burnt down, R15,000,000 damage was caused, and more than 1,000 people were killed.

Castro returned to Cuba, was arrested for the machine-gun murder, but was again discharged (it was alleged that witnesses had been intimidated to such an extent that the Police were unable to use damning evidence against Castro) and joined the Orthodox Party from which he could conduct his Communist plotting. In 1952, General Fulgencio Batista took over the government of Cuba on behalf of the armed forces, whereupon Castro came into the open as a left-wing "revolutionary". He staged an abortive attack on the Army barracks in Santiago on July 26, 1953, and was captured along with his brother, Raul, but both were later released from prison after serving 22 months of their respective sentences of 15 years and 13 years and continued their "Movement of July the 26th". Castro continued his Communist plotting and planning, first from Mexico City and then from the mountains known as the Sierra Maestra.

It would have been plain to anyone who had made even a superficial study of Castro's life that he was a Communist, and a dedicated one at that. To anyone except the United States State Department and the Liberal lobby in the United States. And yet this is the most peculiar and strange bedfellow that went to sleep with Washington.

The tragedy of Cuba is not only the tragedy of Castro. It is equally the tragedy of a lesson that has not been learnt.

There have been African Castros. There will be more African Castros. It is imperative that the West be on the alert for the new Castros of Africa.

The ground has been well prepared by the Communists in Africa, but they lack one major asset. They do not have an Army in Africa. Force has always been an integral part of the final stages of Communism's accession to power, and often the only means of keeping Communists in power. Right from the time of the first Communist success, in Russia in 1917, force has been used to attain and maintain power. The only occasion on which a free election along democratic lines was held in a Communist country was in Russia in November 1917, when the Communists were well and truly thrashed and had to abolish the Constituent Assembly in order to remain in power. Force has been the midwife of all Communist revolutions, and often it has been the Russian Army that has either been the prime cause of the success of a Communist revolution (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania) or has crushed any popular uprisings (East Germany, 1953, Poland, 1956, Hungary, 1956). But in Africa, there is no Red Army, and this is the one weapon the Russians and Chinese would dearly like to have. It would not be surprising therefore, if the Communists shortly made a concerted move to get the Red Army into Africa.

The easiest way of achieving this would be by converting a stooge state into a fully-fledged satellite state, which could then call for Russian or Chinese military protection. But the same effect could be achieved by the Communists obtaining a base in an African country along the lines of the British and United States bases in various parts of the world and then using this to take over an African army. This Communist stooge state would then conclude treaties with other African states and a few well-engineered incidents would enable the Communists to send their ostensibly African army to the aid of a fellow-African state. It is likely that the Communists will opt for the latter pattern rather than a fully-fledged satellite state as this might offend Black African susceptibilities.

Viewed from a tactical point of view, there are four outstanding candidates for giving Russia a military base. They are Tanzania in East Africa, Congo-Brazzaville in West-Central Africa, Guinea in West Africa and Somalia in North-East Africa, which have all allowed Communist military establishments of sorts to be set up in their countries. In North Africa proper there is always Egypt.

Britain and France are both key targets of the Communist global offensive. The increasing French rapprochement with Russia and the anxious efforts of the Socialist Government in Britain to placate public opinion into accepting Russia as sincere in her pronouncements on "peaceful co-existence" are both part of the Communist jig-saw of building a Communist world.

As far back as the days of Marx and Engels, Communists were thinking in terms of Africa as a route on the conquest of the West. If the colonies of the European powers could be alienated from their motherlands, so went the reasoning, then a deadly blow would be delivered to the economy of the home country. Any impartial observer will readily appreciate the degree to which Communists have succeeded already in alienating Black Africa from Britain, Belgium, France and the United States,

as the present protector of the mother countries.

A famous Lenin declaration was that the shortest route to Paris and London was through Peking. The first stage of Lenin's prophesy has come true, for Communism is firmly established in Peking. Only one thing can prevent the next stage of Lenin's vision coming true and that is active Western action to repulse Communism from Africa. If the West fails to do so, the march from Moscow through Peking will have reached the Mediterranean and the last mile will have begun. Not quite the last mile, for the mile to Paris and London will be the second last mile.

The last mile will be the march on Washington.

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