RHODESIA - MZILIKAZE TO SMITH
(Africa Institute Bulletin, vol. 15, 1977)
The Rhodesian problem is essentially the outcome of white and black settlement in Southern Africa, and the resultant confrontation between two societies - West European and African, and the central issue today revolves round the continued survival of whites, and the contribution they can, or will be allowed to make to Rhodesia's future development.
Modern Rhodesian history dates back to the Matabele migration from the Transvaal in the late 1830'swhen they arrived in the area now known as Bulawayo. The Matabele, a scion of the Zulu nation, under their Chief Mzilikaze, were driven from the Transvaal after attacks on the Voor-trekkers. Their encroachment on the land north of the Limpopo marks that first repercussion white settlement in Southern Africa was to have on the course of Rhodesian history.
The Matabele were a predatory race, and established themselves in their new environment by subjugating the original inhabitants until they were firmly entrenched as rulers of the territory between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers. Their impis foraged far and wide across the land, looting cattle and capturing women and children. Before the coming of the Matabele, the Bushmen, who left their paintings in remote caves, and the negro-hamitic peoples, who had migrated from the lakes of Central Africa were the occupants of Rhodesia. This migration brought the Mashona to Rhodesia, possibly sometime in the 1500's. There were also the builders of Zimbabwe, and numerous other imposing stone structures, who left no other record of their passing save silent ruins scattered about the land. By the last half of the 19th century, when whites started taking an interest in the land north of the Limpopo, the Matabele and the Mashona were already firmly established in the area.
THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA
The first whites to reach Rhodesia were missionaries,
hunters and trekkers who crossed the Limpopo
in search of grazing. Missionary-explorer
David Livingstone was the first white man to reach
the Victoria Falls, doing so in 1855. Four years
later Robert Moffat established Inyati Mission, the
first permanent white settlement. In subsequent
years whites arrived in ever-increasing numbers,
but were with few exceptions temporary visitors
and not settlers or colonists in the accepted sense.
The first actual white settlers in 1890 took part
in what is termed the scramble for Africa, preceded
and triggered off by the discovery of diamonds and
gold in South Africa. During the 1880's European
imperial powers like Germany, Portugal and
Britain showed a growing interest in land north of
the Limpopo.
The Portuguese already had colonies on the East
and West Coasts of Southern and Central Africa,
and British penetration from the south was to
prevent them from linking their territories across
Africa. Germany found herself in much the same
position as Portugal and her interest in the
Transvaal Republic was growing steadily. Transvaal too
had put out tentative feelers towards the north,
which could ultimately have led to the linking of
German and Transvaal territory, thereby severing
the path of British advancement.
Such was the position in the 1880's when Cecil
John Rhodes, politician and mining magnate, who
gave his name to Rhodesia decided to act. John
Smith Moffat, at the instigation of Rhodes per-
suaded Lobenguela, who had succeeded Mzilikaze
in 1868, to sign the Moffat Treaty in 1888. In
terms of the treaty the Matabele agreed not to
enter into correspondence or treaty with any
foreign power without the sanction of the British
High Commissioner for South Africa.
The Transvaal and Portuguese Governments
both objected to the Moffat Treaty, but the British
Government remained adamant.
Later during the same year British advancement
into Central Africa was finally secured when
Lobenguela signed the Rudd Concession giving
Rhodes 'complete and exclusive charge over all metal and
mineral rights' in Rhodesia in return for a monthly
payment of £100 to himself and his heirs. In
addition to this, Lobenguela received 1 000 rifles
and 100 000 rounds of ammunition.
THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY
Besides mineral rights, the Rudd Concession also
conferred sweeping commercial and legal powers
on Rhodes. Armed with the Concession, Rhodes
used his considerable financial resources, derived
from control of De Beers and Gold Fields of
South Africa, to form the British South Africa
Company (BSAC) that subsequently obtained a
charter from Queen Victoria in 1899. The charter
granted the BSAC the right to operate in all
Southern Africa, north of Bechuanaland (Botswana),
north and west of the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek
(Transvaal), and west of the Portuguese possessions.
No northern limit was stipulated.
The first pioneer column, 180 men and 500
troops in employ of the BSAC left Kimberley for
Rhodesia in May 1890, and established Fort
Victoria in August 1890. A party of pioneers,
including the famous hunter, Courtney Selous,
continued further northwards, and in September
1890 raised the British flag at what is now
Salisbury.
The pioneers dispatched a party to Eastern
Rhodesia to obtain a concession from Chief Mtasa
thereby securing the country's eastern border with
Mozambique. Border disputes however persisted,
finally leading to an armed confrontation between
the BSA Police and the Portuguese in 1891. The
Portuguese were defeated, and the boundary
dispute was settled at the Anglo-Portuguese Convention in June 1891.
The BSAC then turned its attention to the
consolidation of Rhodesia. A railroad had to be
constructed from Kimberley to Bulawayo, growing
unrest and strife among the Africans quelled if law
and order were to be maintained, and the country
was to attract colonists and capital.
In 1892 Dr Leander Starr Jameson, close associate
of Rhodes, was appointed Chief Magistrate
for Mashonaland. Jameson believed the Matabele
could be absorbed peacefully into the country's
labour force, and attempted to secure a modus
vivendi with them, based on segregation by
designating a boundary between them and the Mashona.
He also tried to prevent the Matabele from
entering Mashonaland, except as labourers. The
latter were however not to be deprived of their
traditional raiding grounds. After numerous incidents,
matters finally came to a head in 1893 when
a Matabele impi raided the Fort Victoria area to
punish local blacks for cattle theft.
After a skirmish between whites and a Matabele
impi, Jameson finally decided that the Matabele
had to be put down, and plumped for war on 18
June, 1893. Although the Matabele enjoyed a vast
numerical superiority, the whites defeated them
with their sophisticated weapons (The Maxim gun
among others), and greater mobility. The
Matabele then fled northwards.
During their pursuit of the Matabele, Major
Allan Wilson and 31 men were trapped and killed
to a man on the banks of the flooding Shangani
River following a fierce engagement that put an
end to the uprising. Lobengula died somewhere in
the Wankie area during the flight of the Matabele,
and an era of peace and prosperity followed.
Bulawayo boomed during the next years.
The peace did not last long however. A rinder-
pest epidemic spread through the country in 1896,
decimating cattle herds. White veterinary officers
aggravated matters by shooting cattle belonging to
blacks in an effort to prevent the disease spreading.
Other causes of discontent among the blacks were
BSAC's land and labour policies and a taxation
system. When Jameson was defeated and captured
during his abortive raid into the Transvaal in
December 1895, the blacks decided to put an end
to white settlement in Rhodesia. In the absence of
the troops who had accompanied Jameson, the
second uprising proved far more serious than 1893
rebellion, and the BSAC was forced to summon aid
and reinforcements from the Cape. Sir Fredrick
Carrington set out with a total force of 2 000
whites and 600 black soldiers, and finally drove the
remaining impis into the Matopos where they were
blockaded.
Rhodes arrived in Rhodesia from London at this
time, and decided to take a hand in matters. In
October 1896 he went into the Matopos to meet
the Matabele chiefs personally, persuading them to
relinquish their arms and to surrender.
By that time however the trouble had spread to
Mashonaland. The Mashona rebellion was finally
put down by the BSA Police assisted by a force of
Mounted Infantry under Command of Col Edwin
Alderson (who was to become Inspector-General of
the Canadian Forces in World War 1). Conditions
in Rhodesia improved considerably in the period
immediately after the Boer War (1899-1903).
Although the discovery of a major gold field still
eluded the BSAC, numerous small mines were
being opened up, and steady stream of immigrants,
keen to escape from the depression following
in the wake of the Boer War, were arriving
from South Africa.
While the BSAC did not do much to encourage
agriculture at first, land was plentiful and handed
out freely. After much trial and error, farming
became established and within 20 years of the first
pioneers entering Rhodesia the ground roots of a
sound agricultural industry had been established.
Rhodesia was offered her first opportunity to
join the Union of South Africa in 1910, and
Charles Coghlan, who later became the first Prime
Minister of Southern Rhodesia, attended the
National Convention in Durban in 1908 as unofficial
representative from Rhodesia. Ironically enough,
Coghlan, who was to lead the anti-Unionist
movement in Rhodesia during the 1922 referendum,
felt in 1908 that Rhodesia should join the
Union, but that the time for such a move had not
yet arrived.
After 1910 anti-BSAC sentiment mounted in
Southern Rhodesia, and an increasing number of
settlers felt that the country should be placed
under British rule. Britain however did not see her
way clear to taking over the burden from the
BSAC at this time.
The BSAC attempted to fuse the two Rhodesias
- Northern and Southern - during the years
immediately after the World War I, however,
Southern Rhodesia was wary of the large black
population she would acquire by this move, and
the scheme was finally rejected in 1917.
BRITAIN STEPS IN
During the following year the Privy Council
handed down a long-awaited decision. The case
had been put before it in 1914, and concerned the
land question in Southern Rhodesia. Elected
members of the Legislature contended that the
BSAC did not own unalienated land in its private
capacity, and that revenue from unalienated land
should be used for the administration of the
territory instead of being appropriated by the
BSAC.
Following the Privy Council's decision in favour
of the Legislature the BSAC lost the economic
motivation to govern the territory, and claimed
£7 688 000 from the British Government for reimbursement
of administrative deficits. It then
seemed that a South African solution was the best
answer to the Rhodesian dilemma. A referendum
was held in 1922 to determine whether the territory
should become the fifth province of South Africa,
and the anti-Unionist movement carried the vote
by a majority of 2 785.
The British Government formally annexed
Southern and Northern Rhodesia in 1923, and
paid the BSAC compensation amounting to
£3 750 000. Southern Rhodesia in turn was to
reimburse Britain to the extent of £2 000 000. The
first general election was held in 1924 and Coghlan
became the first Prime Minister of Southern
Rhodesia after the territory had been granted
self-government. The British Government did
however retain the right of assent in matters
pertaining to black rights.
Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern) became
Prime Minister in 1933, a post he held until
Southern Rhodesia became part of the ill-fated
Central African Federation in 1953.
LAND TENURE AND FRANCHISE
A brief look at the franchise and the system of
land tenure during the period 1923-1953 is
warranted. With the granting of self-government in
1923 Rhodesia retained the Cape Colony system
which gave voting rights to blacks and whites who
owned property to the value of £150 or had an
annual income of £100. Both means tests were
accompanied by a simple language test in English.
These voring qualifications for a common voters'
roll were maintained until 1951, when the financial
qualifications were raised.
Blacks had the right under the 1898 Constitution
to acquire and dispose of land in the same way
as whites, but few of them ever exercised this right.
The Morris Carter Commission was convened to
look into the matter in 1925. Its recommendations
were embodied in the Land Aportionment Act of
1930 (amended 1941), which allocated the land
(50 percent to whites, 33 percent to blacks and rest
remaining unallocated).
While the Land Apportionment Act did guarantee
the land rights of blacks, thereby protecting
them from exploitation, it engendered much bitterness,
and remains a most contentious issue in
Rhodesia. Recent legislation by Prime Minister
Smith amending the Land Tenure Act to give
blacks access to agricultural industrial and
commercial land resulted in the most critical test of his
leadership since UDI when 12 members of the RF
party opposed him in Parliament. (The Land
Apportionment Act was redrafted, in 1969 and
renamed the Land Tenure Act. In terms of the new
Act blacks and whites were allocated an equal area
of 45 million acres (18210 000 ha) each, while the
remaining land, about 10 million (4047000 ha)
acres was designated national land for use as parks,
nature reserves etc.)
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
The idea of Federation, increasingly bandied
about in the late l940's, was not new and had been
mooted from time to time. Events after World War
II - the economic boom in Central Africa, and the
rise of the South African Nationalist Party from
1948, regarded as a threat to British interests in
Southern Africa - all helped to crystalise matters.
Despite the misgivings of certain black leaders,
Huggins and Roy Welensky, from Northern
Rhodesia, ardently supported the Federation
concept, and relentlessly pressed the British
Government to go ahead. The Federation was finally
constituted, following five conferences held
between 1951 and 1953 as well as a referendum in
the territories concerned (Southern Rhodesia,
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland). The conferences
were initiated by the Labour Government
(that had agreed to Federation in principle, but
held certain reservations about black rights), and
completed by the Conservatives that came to
power in November 1951.
The first Federal election, held in 1953, was
based on universal suffrage, and the same voting
qualifications applied to all races. The voters
returned the United Rhodesia Party (later the
United Federal Party) with 24 seats out of 36.
Despite overwhelming support for the Federation
in the 1953 referendum, and the sweeping victory
of the UFP, black nationalists were extremely
hostile towards the Federation, and their discontent
finally led to a period of traumatic violence
and lawlessness.
When Huggins became Federal Prime Minister
in 1954, he was succeeded in Southern Rhodesia by
Garfield Todd, the New Zealand-born missionary.
Todd was soon at loggerheads with Federal thinking.
He refused to extend power and franchise to
the blacks, and also sought to enforce the African
Land and Husbandry Act in all black areas. His
predecessor, Huggins had applied the Act to
selected areas only in an effort to convince the
blacks of the advantages of sound animal- and
field-husbandry practices. Todd's efforts led to
widespread discontent in black areas.
Todd also turned his attention to miscegnation,
and while of minor importance only, this proved to
be a highly contentious and emotional issue. A rift
developed between Todd and the UFP, matters
coming to a head when Todd was accused of
abrogating the principles of collective cabinet
responsibility, and his entire cabinet resigned,
thereby forcing him from office.
Todd was succeeded by Sir Edgar Whitehead,
who remained Prime Minister until the upset
election in 1962 when the Rhodesian Front came
to power. Whitehead's tenure of office was characterised
by escalating violence not only in Southern
Rhodesia, but also in other Federal territories.
Whitehead's first task in Southern Rhodesia was to
revise the 1923 Constitution, which still contained
clauses empowering the British Government to
withold assent to Bills of the Legislative Assembly
of Southern Rhodesia. (This right had never been
exercised.) His aim was in fact independence. Talks
between the two governments led to a series of
constitutional conferences starting in 1960. Joshua
Nkomo, leader of the National Democratic Party
at that time, agreed to co-operate with Whitehead
on a new constitution, and denounced violence.
The new constitution was finally accepted after a
referendum by some 42 000 votes to 22 000.
When the constitution was presented to the
House of Commons in London certain changes
had however been made to the original proposals
which had been accepted during the referendum.
These changes in fact increased the British Government's
power to interfere in the process of government in Southern Rhodesia.
The constitution did have certain merits on the
other hand, as provisions had been made for black
advancement. It contained a Bill of Rights aimed
at preventing discriminatory legislation, and
providing a safeguard against laws infringing on
civil liberties. Provision had been made for a
Constitutional Council that would act as a watch-
dog as regards legislation, ensuring that this was
not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.
The bill also opened up the franchise to a greater
extent than ever before, and for the first time
permitted blacks to sit in the Legislative Assembly.
They would have become the majority in due
course. The Constitution required the support of
the blacks however, and this was not forthcoming.
While Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole had agreed
to the provisions of the constitution, they subsequently
changed their minds and their more
extremist followers started a campaign of intimidation
to prevent blacks from registering as voters.
Their actions amounted to a boycott of the constitution.
BLACK LEADERSHIP IN FEDERATION YEARS
Whitehead's inability to cope effectively with the
black extremists is reflected by the cat-and-mouse
game they played with him. The African National
Congress (ANC) was banned in 1959, and the
extremists promptly formed the National Democratic
Party which Whitehead banned in December
1960. The leaders were undeterred, and started
yet another organisation, the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU), and acts of terror continued.
ZAPU was banned in September 1962, but by
then lawlessness was rife and it remained so until
the Rhodesian Front Party restored order.
Nkomo set up the People's Caretaker Council
(PCC) in 1963, insisting that this was not a
political organisation. Sithole broke with Nkomo
at this stage, and formed the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU). Robert Mugabe, leader
of the Zimbabwe Independence People's Army
(ZIPA), was one of the members of ZAPU who
broke with Nkomo in 1963 to help Sithole with the
formation of ZANU. Nkomo and Mugabe are
today again united in the Patriotic Front, a
development which took place during the Geneva
Conference in 1976.
The power of the black extremists was broken for
the time being and peace restored when Ian Smith
succeeded to the premiership in 1964. He banned
ZANU and the PCC-ZAPU, and imprisoned
Nkomo and Sithole along with other leaders. They
were released from detention in 1974, at the
insistence of international pressure which held that
there could not be meaningful talks on resolving
the Rhodesian settlement issue while the black
leaders were imprisoned.
FEDERATION LIMPS ALONG
By the late 1950s it was becoming increasingly
clear that the Federation's days were numbered.
The black leaders in Nyasaland, Banda and
Chipembere, were willing to use force and violence
to get their way, and were interested in independence,
not Federation. The same applied in Northern Rhodesia
where Kaunda led the black nationalists.
Banda and other black leaders were in fact jailed
in 1958 for plotting against the Governor of
Nyasaland. The British Government accepted in
1962 Nyasaland's right to secede, and in 1963 the
Northern Rhodesia Legislature passed a motion
demanding secession from the Federation.
Federal Prime Minister Welensky argued vehemently
that no provision had been made for
secession from the Federation without the consent
of all five parties (the Federal Government, the
three partner countries and Britain) but it was
increasingly clear that the Federation could not
work if one or more of the states involved wanted
out.
The 1959 Devlin Commission Report on the
state of emergency in Nyasaland, and the Monckton
Commission charged with preparing material
for the 1960 Federal Review Conference ultimately
sounded the death knell of the Federation.
Devlin's report was severely critical of British
policy in Nyasaland, and by implication in the
Federation, while the Monckton Commission
concluded that the Federation could not survive
except by force, or the introduction of massive
changes in racial legislation.
Before dissolving the Federation, the British
Government promised both Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia independence, but refused to give
Southern Rhodesia a similar commitment.
IAN SMITH AND THE RHODESIAN FRONT
However, before dealing finally with the final
dissolution of the Federation and the events that
culminated in UDI on 11 November 1955, it is as
well to briefly trace the rise of the Rhodesian Front
and Ian Smith, who has played so dramatic and
dominant a role in the Rhodesian political scene
over the past 13 years.
Winston Field became leader of the newly
formed right-wing Dominion Party (DP) in 1957,
and won a major by-election when he defeated
Evan Campbell, prominent member of the United
Federal Party (UFP), for a federal seat. The DP
came close to ousting the UFP in the Southern
Rhodesia in the 1958 elections when it won 13 seats
to the UFP's 17.
Continuing unrest, Whitehead's failure to cope
with it, public dismay at the 1961 Constitution,
and the drift to the left in Rhodesian politics had
all led to increasing disenchantment with the UFP.
The Rhodesian Front, formed by the Dominion
Party and dissenters from the UFP in March 1962,
(these included Smith, who had resigned from the
UFP over the 1961 Constitution) caused an upset
during the December elections, coming to power
with a majority of five seats in the 50-member
Legislature.
Winston Field became Prime Minister, with Ian
Smith as his deputy. During the whole of 1963,
until Smith succeeded him as Prime Minister in
April 1964, Field was engrossed in dismantling the
Federation following a vain bid to secure
Rhodesian independence.
THE FEDERATION DISINTEGRATES
Acting on the advice of Welensky, Field at first
refused to attend the Victoria Falls Conference
where the Federation was to be finally dismantled,
arid demanded that he be given a prior commitment
on independence. The British Government
was not prepared to give this undertaking, and
R.A. Butler, MacMillan's First Secretary of State
in charge of Central African Affairs, managed to
wriggle out of a tight spot by convincing Field that
Southern Rhodesia 'like the other territories will
proveed through the normal proceed to independence.'
He further persuaded Field that Southern
Rhodesia could not achieve independence while
still a member of the non-independent Federation,
and that a number of financial, defence, constitutional,
and similar matters had to be ironed out
before self-governing dependencies could become
independent.
Field was won over, albeit reluctantly, and he
attended the Victoria Falls Conference in June
1963. The rest is history. The Federation was
dissolved, Southern Rhodesia inherited massive
Federal debts, and Field came away without his
independence. Field later claimed that Butler had
given him a categorical assurance that Rhodesia's
demand for independence would be dealt with
immediately, and would present no problems,
provided he attended the conference. This assurance
was allegedly repeated in the presence of
Smith. Butler however, flatly denied that he had
ever made such a commitment.
ROAD TO UDI
Field's failure to resolve the independence issue
led to his resignation in April 1964, and he was
succeeded by Ian Smith, then little known beyond
the ranks of the RF. He was considered to be a raw
colonial and a hard right-winger particularly by
British politicians and civil servants. Within 20
months of taking office, Smith had a larger
following than any of his predecessors, and was
known throughout the world, having defied
Britian, the Commonwealth, the UN, in fact the
world, by his Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI) on 11 November 1965.
When Smith came to office the general expectation
was that he would immediately assume independence,
but he first turned his attention to
gaining support in Rhodesia, and toured the
country, addressing scores of gatherings. His theme
was independence, and the need to explore peaceful
avenues open to Rhodesia.
Negotiations between Rhodesia and the British
Government were resumed. Smith visited London
in September 1964 for talks with Home and
Sandys, but the matter of testing African opinion
proved to be the stumbling block to a concensus
between the two governments. Smith returned to
Rhodesia, optimistic that agreement could be
reached with Britain. History however intervened
in October 1964 when the Labour Government
narrowly defeated the Conservative Party, and
Harold Wilson came to power.
Smith and Wilson were totally incompatible -
not only politically, but also personally, and the
dislike and mistrust between them did nothing to
ease the situation between Britain and Rhodesia.
Exchanges between the two men were marked
by increasing acrimony. When Smith called an
election in May 1965, and the RF won 50 of 65
seats in Parliament, the stage was set for UDI, and
the Salisbury Government put in train plans to
implement it. These included the identification
and isolation of senior civil servants who were
opposed to UDI, the development of an effective
propaganda arm in the Department of Information,
and political control of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation.
SMITH'S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
Wilson was fully aware of the direction of events
in Rhodesia, and did make attempts to forestall
UDI. He dispatched two of his ministers to Rhodesia,
and invited Smith to visit London in October.
When this failed, he visited Rhodesia personally
towards the end of October 1965, making an
eleventh hour bid to avert UDI. His efforts failed,
and Ian Smith announced his country's Unilateral
Declaration of Independence on 11 November
1965.
The British Government retaliated swiftly.
Rhodesia was removed from the sterling area,
British exports of capital goods to Rhodesia were
banned, the purchase of Rhodesian tobacco was
discontinued, Rhodesia was denied access to the
London capital market, the Commonwealth Sugar
Agreement was terminated (insofar it affected
Rhodesia), and Rhodesian passports were declared
illegal documents. The Southern Rhodesia Act outlawed
most trade with Rhodesia on 16 November,
and on 5 December the British Government seized
Rhodesian assets worth £9 million in the British
Reserve Bank.
In spite of these measures, Wilson's predictions
that the Rhodesian government would collapse
"within a matter of weeks" did not prove true.
Britain took the Rhodesian matter to the UN
Security Council on 9 April 1966 and obtained the
world body's consent to impose the "Beira blockade"
to prevent oil destined for Rhodesia from
reaching the Mocambique port. The British
government expected the oil embargo to bring the
Rhodesian government to its knees. At the January
1967 Commonwealth Conference. Wilson again
emphasized that the "rebel government" could not
survive an oil embargo for long, and that the
rebellion would end in weeks rather than months.
British warships prevented several tankers from
reaching Beira during April 1966 but most of
Rhodesia's oil requirements had by then been
rerouted through other Southern African ports.
LONG ROAD OF FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS
The British Government announced at the end
of April that "informal exploratory talks" with
Rhodesia would take place to determine whether a
basis for negotiated settlement still existed. These
talks continued until August, with Britain
demanding Rhodesian surrender as a prerequisite
to official negotiation. Although Rhodesia did
accept certain British proposals, no major progress
was made. Smith was again invited on 19 Sep-
tember for further talks with the British Prime
Minister on board the cruiser HMS Tiger. These
discussions took place on 2 December 1966'. Britain
now made an additional demand, that Rhodesia
return to "legality" by renouncing UDI and accepting
a British governor for Rhodesia.
Rhodesia's rejection of these preconditions led to
Britain's formally withdrawing all offers of an
independent constitution, and adopting the standpoint
that there could be no independence before
majority rule (NIBMAR). Britain then went to the
UN and appealed for selected mandatory sanctions
to include oil. The world body readily agreed to
this, thereby violating its own charter. British
imports from Rhodesia dropped to 15 percent, and
those to West Germany by 87 percent of their
original level, while German exports to Rhodesia
soon rose to 103 percent of the 1965 figures. After
UN selective mandatory sanctions had been invoked
in 1967, 65 percent of Rhodesia's foreign
trade went through South Africa (as compared to
35 percent in the past), and this percentage soon
increased. Sanctions have therefore remained a
poorly enforced policy.
Despite several attempts to restart talks during
1967 and 1968, relations between London and
Salisbury deteriorated considerably after appeals
by three convicted terrorists against their death
sentences by the Rhodesian Court of Appeal. The
right of appeal to the Privy Council no longer
existed under the 1965 constitution. Despite a
last-minute reprieve granted by the Queen, and a
subsequent application to the Appelate Division of
the High Court, the application was dismissed, and
the three terrorists were executed on 6 March.
Rhodesia had again demonstrated the country's
sovereignty. The Appelate Division of the High
Court of Rhodesia ruled on 18 September 1968
that the government was also the de jure government of Rhodesia.
Despite the fact that Rhodesia had increasingly
and convincingly demonstrated her independence,
attempts to find a political settlement continued.
Talks between Smith and his British colleague
Wilson were held aboard HMS Fearless on 10-13
October 1968. The Tiger proposals remained basically
unaltered, except to omit the interim government
Wilson had earlier regarded as a prerequisite
for any just test of black opinion. The proposals
were again rejected, despite the fact that Britain
was now prepared to grant independence on a
basis which would leave political power in the
hands of the whites. The Salisbury government
stated that it was unwilling to accept the proposed
"mechanisations" for constitutional amendment.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Further talks took place between Thompson and
the Rhodesian government before the end of 1968,
but nothing came of these. Rhodesia raised her
new flag on 11 November, and officially rejected
the Fearless proposals a week later. The country
turned her attention inwards during 1969, and
determined to bring her own house in order. In
May Prime Minister Smith made it clear that
Britain's "intractable attitude" had ended all hope
of a negotiated settlement. He went on to announce
a new constitution, to be published in a
White Paper on 20 May. The referendum held
exactly one month later, resulted in an 81 percent
poll in favour of a republic, indicating that 72,5
percent of the voters had accepted the new constitution
proposed by the Rhodesian Front Government.
The constitutional proposals were published
on 11 September 1969, and passed by Parliament
on 17 November. Clifford Dupont, the officer
administering the government, signed the Bill on
29 November.
Constitutional and administrative ties were not
the only links to be severed. In December 1969 for
instance, the University of Rhodesia decided not to
confer University of London degrees in future, but
to award its own. Rhodesia became a republic in
March 1970, whereupon the US immediately
closed her consulate in Salisbury. In spite of this,
the United States and Britain jointly vetoed a
United Nations proposal for total mandatory sanctions
against Rhodesia. Rhodesia's first president,
Mr Clifford Dupont, was sworn in on 16 April
1970.
PEARCE COMMISSION
The next major attempt at a solution came more
than a year later when Lord Goodman, close
confidant of Wilson, arrived in Salisbury on 30
June 1971. Various new proposals were discussed,
but the initiative came to an abrupt end when the
Socialists were ousted by a Conservative Govern-
ment in Britain. The new Prime Minister, Edward
Heath, sent Home, his Foreign Secretary, to
Rhodesia, and this round of talks in November
1971 led to London and Salisbury agreeing on
a formula for independence. The Rhodesian Prime
Minister and the British Foreign Secretary agreed
on the following five principles:
1) Unimpeded progress towards majority rule;
2) A guarantee against retrogressive amendments to the constitution;
3) Immediate improvement in the political status of the black population;
4) Progress towards ending racial discrimination;
5) Any basis for independence must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
Despite Rhodesia's misgivings on the last point
- the acceptability of the settlement to the people
of Rhodesia as a whole - both parties signed the
agreement setting out the proposals in Salisbury on
24 November, 1971. The commission assigned to
test Rhodesian opinion was led by Lord Pearce,
and arrived in Rhodesia on 11 January 1972.
Within the week, violence erupted in such centres
as Salisbury, Gwelo, and Umtali. The African
National Council (ANC), led by Bishop Abel
Muzorewa, came out against the settlement propo-
sals, thereby driving many followers of Joshua
Nkomo (ZAPU), and Ndabaninge Sithole (ZANU)
into the ranks of the ANC as these detained black
leaders also continued to oppose any settlement
that did not promote a rapid transition to black
majority rule. When the Pearce Commission left
Rhodesia on 11 March 1971, it had recorded a
massive "no" from the black population, whereas
98 percent of the 100 000 whites had said "yes",
and 97 percent of the coloureds, and 96 percent of
the Asians had expressed themselves in favour of
the new Anglo-Rhodesian settlement proposals.
Home later told the House of Commons: "I would
ask the Africans to look again very carefully at
what they have rejected ... the proposals are still
available because Mr Smith has not withdrawn or
modified them".
As it happened, black rejection of the proposals
failed to generate any new plans, but resulted in a
stalemate that was to last until the Kissinger
initiative in 1976.
EMERGING TERRORIST CAMPAIGN
Terrorists attacked a white farm in the Centenary
area on 21 December 1972. This incident
marked the beginning of a guerrilla war that
continues with varying intensity until the present.
As tension mounted throughout the northern areas
of the country, the government in Salisbury decid-
ed to close the country's border with Zambia until
such time as the Zambian authorities gave the
assurance that no anti-Rhodesian terrorists would
be harboured in their country. Zambia closed her
border with Rhodesia on 1 February, 1973 and has
kept it closed, despite Rhodesia's decision, three
days later, to reopen her side of the border. The
border area remained tense as more and more
landmine and shooting incidents were reported.
The most significant of these encounters occurred
in the vicinity of the Victoria Falls on 15 May
1973, when two Canadian tourists were killed by
rifle fire from Zambian side of the Zambezi River.
On 5 July, a large gang of armed terrorists
abducted 295 African pupils and teachers from St
Alberts mission in the north-east region of the
country. Rhodesian security forces succeeded in
rescuing all but eight of those abducted. In August
serious unrest erupted on the campus of the
University of Rhodesia following initial student
protest about low wages paid to African workers at
the university. The increased guerrilla activity had
also forced the Rhodesian government to extent
national service from nine months to one year. In
June, while the Victoria Falls incident was still
clear in every mind, several officials from the
British Foreign Office arrived in Rhodesia for talks
with the Rhodesian government, and leaders of the
ANC. During the last months of 1973, further
terrorist incursions finally became such a menace
that the Rhodesian government started offering
cash rewards for information leading to the capture
or death of terrorists.
SOUTHERN AFRICA CALLS THE TUNE
The Portuguese coup on 25 April 1974 had an
immediate and wide-ranging effect on the political
landscape of Southern Africa. By the middle of the
year, a Frelimo-led caretaker government had been
installed in Lourengo Marques, which meant that
the port of Beira, hitherto one of Rhodesia's main
trade outlets, was no longer available. The same
applied to Lourengo Marques. A new railway link
from Rutenga to Beit Bridge was completed in
September. This has provided an additional
railway line between Rhodesia and South Africa that
has now become Rhodesia's lifeline to the outside
world. In the general election, held on 31 July, the
Rhodesia Front Party again won all 50 white
constituencies.
South African Prime Minister John Vorster
launched his famous detente-with-Africa policy
during a speech to the Senate in Cape Town on 23
October 1974. Pres Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia
reacted a few days later, welcoming the speech as
"the voice of reason for which Africa and the world
have been waiting". Realising that the Portuguese
coup had drastically changed the situation for
white Southern Africa, and for Rhodesia in particular,
Kaunda now encouraged black Rhodesian
nationalists to unite with a view to negotiating
with the Rhodesian government, a course both he
and Vorster openly favoured. Several leaders,
including Sithole and Nkomo, were released as
result of Vorster's detente efforts. Black leaders met
in Lusaka, and on 9 December 1974 they signed an
agreement uniting ZAPU, ZANU and FROLIZI
(Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe), under the
banner of the African National Council of Bishop
Muzorewa. Two days after the meeting, Smith
informed the country that the government was to
hold a constitutional conference with the nationalists, and that nationalist leaders still in detention
would be released. The Prime Minister indicated
that he expected terrorist incursions in Rhodesia to
cease in reciprocation. South Africa also expected
acts of terrorism to cease, and Vorster confirmed
that South African police units originally sent to
Rhodesia in 1967/68, would be withdrawn if
terrorists were to discontinue their own activities.
Despite a definite lull in terrorist incursions, these
soon increased again, and on 10 January 1975 the
Rhodesian government stopped the release of
political detainees. Security measures were again
tightened, and military officials later admitted that
their relaxed vigilance during the initial stages of
detente had enabled terrorists to step-up activities
in certain areas of Eastern and North-Eastern
Rhodesia. Sithole was again arrested in March
1975 on charges of plotting the assassination of
certain of his political opponents. This caused an
immediate outcry in African circles, and pressure
was brought to bear on South Africa to effect his
release. Smith led a high-ranking Rhodesian
government delegation to a conference with the
South African Prime Minister on 15 March.
Herbert Chitepo, leader of the ZANU movement,
was assassinated by political rivals in Lusaka
four days later, revealing the serious rift within the
nationalist movement. The Rhodesian Special
Court renewed the detention order on Sithole at
the beginning of April, but he was released on 6
April following an appeal by Muzorewa, supported
by the South African government. Efforts to
bring the Rhodesian government and the various
nationalists together, were intensified during the
next two months, the South African government
playing a prominent role in attempts to bring the
interested parties to the conference table. Tension
again mounted among supporters of the various
black movements. Thirteen people were killed and
28 injured when the police opened fire on a crowd
of several thousand blacks on 2 June.
The initial talks held between Smith and the
ANC leaders on 15 June 1975 ended in a deadlock
as the parties were unable to agree on the venue for
a constitutional conference. The Rhodesian Minister
of Information and several MP's flew to Lusaka
ten days later for talks with Kaunda, and reached
agreement for a conference to be held on neutral
ground soon after their arrival. The conference was
held on the bridge near the Victoria Falls in
railway carriages provided by the South African
Railways on 25 August. Kaunda and Vorster
attended the meeting which may be regarded as
the climax of the detente exercise, despite the fact,
that Smith and the black nationalists failed to
reach agreement. The ANC disintegrated after the
Victoria Falls meeting with Joshua Nkomo forming
his own internal wing, and Muzorewa and
Sithole leading the external faction. The front-line
presidents, notably Nyerere of Tanzania and
Machel of Mozambique believed that political
settlement was impossible, and this led directly to
the establishment of the Zimbabwe People's Army
(ZIPA), a military group consisting of former
ZANU and ZAPU cadres. ZIPA forces, led by a
Moscow-orientated, 18-man High Command under
former ZANU Field Commander Rex Nhongo,
launched a new offensive against Rhodesia on 18
January 1976. This onslaught was perhaps the
single most significant element in the political
struggle for Rhodesia, and quickly led to an
escalation of the conflict, especially along the
Mogambique border where incidents have become
increasingly common. South African and Cuban
involvement in the Angolan civil war, and the
threat of Cuban involvement in Rhodesia, once
more fixed the international spotlight on Southern
Africa and the Rhodesian issue, and led to the
Kissinger initiative and the abortive Geneva Conference.
Smith met Kissinger, America's Secretary of
State, for talks in Pretoria, and returned to Rhodesia
to announce that he had accepted the Kissinger
proposals calling for establishment of an interim
government and a handover to black majority rule
within two years. The proposals included
American-British assurances, and guarantees for
the white minority. The agreement called for a halt
to sanctions and the terrorist war. The black
nationalists, notably Robert Mugabe of ZIPA, who
claims to have assumed command of ZANU's
external wing from Sithole, and a number of
front-line presidents, all rejected the Kissinger
proposals, and intimated that they had never been
party to them - the impression Kissinger had
given according to Smith and Vorster.
The Salisbury Government and the black leaders
assembled at Geneva under the chairmanship
of Mr Ivor Richard, a British UN representative
in October 1976 to try and see how the
proposals could best be implemented. However,
the conference was marked by dissent among the
black delegates from the beginning and when it
broke up for Christmas no headway had been
made. In fact the assembly of the conference
originally scheduled for mid-January 1977 has
been indefinitely postponed because of the deadlock.
Sources:
The Rhodesian constitutional dispute: Black majority
government or meritocracy? Bulletin, 14 (4)
1976, p.116-136.
Rhodesian Black groupings in disarray. Bulletin,
14(7-8) 1976, p.268-270. Rhodesian parties and
factions, p.294-295.
Rhodesia. Bulletin, 14(9-10) 1976, p.320-322.